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PART 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION 
 
Abstract  
This dissertation seeks to address research questions regarding the challenges that 
employees face in making sense of their work environments. As boundedly rational 
agents, different employees process information in different ways. This 
conceptualization raises a number of important questions regarding the contingencies 
that determine how employees interpret and react to specific organizational elements. 
This dissertation is thus based on a broad research question: How, and under which 
conditions employees (differentially) react to reward mechanisms, structural features 
of the organization, and social interactions in the workplace? The six studies in this 
dissertation span different research contexts, methodologies, and theoretical angles. 
Yet, they all deal with this fundamental question, and collectively contribute to a 
better understanding of how bounds in human rationality together with contextual and 
psychological contingencies drive employee behavior.  
 
Introduction  
Given bounded rationality (Simon, 1955, 1978), people perceive and make sense of 
the world in terms of cognitive frames that they impose on the information 
environment so as to give it form and meaning (Gavetti & Rivkin, 2007; Hodgkinson 
& Healey, 2008; Walsh, 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005). The development 
of these frames is linked to specific socio-cultural and environmental contingencies. 
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For this reason, different employees may well make sense of similar scenarios in 
widely different ways.  
Yet, almost sixty years after Simon’s initial contribution on bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1955), management research does not fully capture the extent to 
which employees’ limited rational capabilities determine how they perceive and react 
to fundamental dimensions of the organizational life. In other words, as Gavetti & 
Levinthal pointed out: “we still struggle with the implications of the notion of 
bounded rationality for our models of individuals and organizations” (2001: 213). In 
this dissertation, I look at these implications in the context of reward systems, 
structural features of the workplace, and social interactions among employees.  
 With regard to reward mechanisms, existing research in agency theory is 
based on several simplifying assumptions regarding the knowledge that individuals 
have of each other and how they process that knowledge (Lubatkin, Lane, Collin & 
Very, 2007). However, recent findings in evolutionary anthropology (Call & 
Tomasello, 2008), neuroscience (Gallagher & Frith, 2003) and neuro-economics 
(Singer & Fehr, 2005) indicate that these assumptions are particularly problematic if 
considered from a bounded-rationality perspective. Further, research suggests that 
rewards are important signals in the workplace (Connelly, Certo, Ireland & Reutzel, 
2010), and that these signals may be ambiguous in terms of whether they are 
perceived as instruments of control or competence affirmation (Deci, Koestner & 
Ryan, 1999). Yet, existing research does not seem to provide indication of what 
decides when one of these two interpretations will be dominant. Clearly, this is 
problematic as different interpretations are expected to lead to different behaviors 
(Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000).  
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 A similar logic applies to the structural factors of the organization, both in a 
more specific context (the design of the workplace), and in a broader sense 
(organizational design). Given bounded rationality, these design factors may be 
interpreted as instances of control or competence affirmation (Deci & Ryan, 2000; 
Ryan & Deci, 2000), and in turn they may induce different behavioral responses. 
Specifically, in the context of the workplace design, tools that separate employees 
from each other (partitions, walls, etc.) may be ambiguous in terms of their real 
function. In the context of the organizational design, specific configurations of 
organizational elements (organizational structure, coordination mechanisms, and 
contingencies) may differentially induce the boundedly rational employee to believe 
that the decision rights that have been delegated to him are (or are not) likely to be 
reneged. Existing research fails to capture the complex psychological mechanisms 
that are behind these sensemaking processes.  
 Finally, with regard to social interactions, the structuralist perspective on 
networks traditionally focuses on consequences of network configurations—that is, 
specific patterns of relationships between nodes—and de-emphasizes the importance 
of individual-specific characteristics and psychological processes (Borgatti & Halgin, 
2011; Kilduff, Tsai & Hanke, 2006). Yet, abundant research evidence highlights that 
cognitive and psychological factors are fundamental drivers of human behavior 
(Ocasio, 1997; Ryan & Deci, 2000). In particular, considerations of bounded 
rationality would suggest that attentional factors are crucially important in deciding 
the extent to which a node can benefit from his position in the social structure. This 
aspect has been overlook in current research. Again, this is problematic because an 
imperfect understanding of these attentional constraints may provide researchers and 
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practitioners alike with an inaccurate understanding of the behavioral implications of 
given structural (network) configurations. The papers that form this dissertation 
investigate all these aspects.  
 
Contributions 
The papers of this dissertation are strongly interconnected in that they complement 
each other by investigating from different angles the phenomenon of interest—i.e., the 
implications of taking a behavioral approach to incentive systems, organizational 
design, and social interactions in organizations. The papers use different 
methodologies and datasets (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Type of Paper  
Theoretical Papers Empirical Papers 
1. The Principal’s Theory of Mind: The Role of 
Mentalizing for Reward Design and 
Management in Principal-Agent Relations 
2. Motivating Knowledge Sharing when 
Rewards are Ambiguous: The Role of 
Complementary Motivators 
3. Physical Separation in the Workplace: 
Separation Cues, Sensemaking, and 
Behavioral Responses 
5. Network Size and Prosocial Behavior: Taking 
Bounded Rationality into Account 
4. Organizational Design and the Credibility of 
Delegated Decision Rights 
6. Brokerage and Creativity: A Bounded 
Rationality Perspective 
 
In total, two papers are currently under review at peer-reviewed journals (Human 
Resource Management, European Management Review), three papers have been 
recently submitted (Organization Studies, Journal of Management Studies, 
Organization Science), one paper is awaiting submission. Five out of the six papers 
have been presented (have been accepted for presentation) at the 2012 (2013) 
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Academy of Management Meetings. Additionally, five out of the six papers have been 
presented in invited seminars (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Overview of Presentations and Submissions  
Paper Presentations Submission 
1. The Principal’s Theory of 
Mind: The Role of 
Mentalizing for Reward 
Design and Management in 
Principal-Agent Relations 
1. BI Norwegian Business 
School (September 2012) 
2. 2012 AOM Meeting 
(August 2012) 
European Management Review, 
R&R (March 2013) 
2. Motivating Knowledge 
Sharing when Rewards are 
Ambiguous: The Role of 
Complementary Motivators 
1. 2012 AOM Meeting 
(August 2012) 
2. Copenhagen Business 
School (June 2011) 
Human Resource Management, 
R&R 2nd round (January 2013) 
3. Physical Separation in the 
Workplace: Separation 
Cues, Sensemaking, and 
Behavioral Responses 
1. 2012 AOM Meeting 
(August 2012) 
2. INGENIO Institute, 
Valencia (March 2012) 
Organization Studies, Submitted 
(February 2013) 
4. Organizational Design and 
the Credibility of Delegated 
Decision Rights 
1. 2013 AOM Meeting 
(accepted for presentation) 
2. EURAM Conference 2013 
(accepted for presentation) 
Journal of Management Studies, 
Submitted (February 2013) 
5. Network Size and Prosocial 
Behavior: Taking Bounded 
Rationality into Account 
1. INGENIO Institute, 
Valencia (April 2013) 
2. 2013 AOM Meeting 
(accepted for presentation) 
Organization Science, 
Submitted (October 2012) 
6. Brokerage and Creativity: 
A Bounded Rationality 
Perspective 
1. INGENIO Institute, 
Valencia (April 2013) 
 
 
The six papers can be organized around three main groups. In the following, the six 
papers are briefly discussed.  
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Paper 1 & 2: Incentives and bounded rationality. These two papers focus on the 
design (Paper 1), and interpretation (Paper 2) of incentive systems given 
considerations of bounded rationality.  
• Paper 1 (“The Principal’s Theory of Mind: The Role of Mentalizing for Reward 
Design and Management in Principal-Agent Relations”) posits that agency 
theory—one of the most important foundational theories in management 
research—rests on tenuous cognitive assumptions. In this paper, we combine 
classical agency theory with a realistic theory of the intrinsically imperfect human 
potential for interpersonal sensemaking. This allows us to systematically show 
how the principal’s “mentalizing” (one individual’s understanding of another 
individual’s intentions, knowledge, and beliefs) with the agent influences value 
creation in principal-agent relations, and to link this to organizational 
sensemaking instruments.  
• Paper 2 (“Motivating Knowledge Sharing when Rewards are Ambiguous: The 
Role of Complementary Motivators”) looks at processes of rewards sensemaking 
in the context of knowledge sharing. Specifically, the extant literature identifies a 
number of antecedents of the motivation to share knowledge, implicitly 
suggesting that those who are exposed to such antecedents assume they are 
unambiguous. However, whether a reward for sharing knowledge is intended to be 
controlling or informational is not always clear. We posit that he presence of other 
potential antecedents of knowledge-sharing motivation may overcome such 
ambiguity. Specifically, we test for complementarities among rewards, job design, 
and work climate in the form of a three-way interaction among these variables 
with respect to their impact on knowledge-sharing motivation. Our analysis of 
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1,523 employees in five knowledge-intensive firms shows that employees who are 
exposed to ambiguous rewards for knowledge sharing experience higher levels of 
autonomous motivation to share when they are simultaneously exposed to a job 
design and work climate that support knowledge sharing. We argue that job 
design and work climate serve as a context for how employees experience rewards. 
 
Paper 3 & 4: Workplace design / organizational design and bounded rationality. 
These two papers focus on how employees attribute meaning and, in turn, react to: 1) 
physical separation from their colleagues (Paper 3), and 2) instances of delegated 
decision rights (Paper 4) given considerations of bounded rationality.  
• Paper 3 (“Physical Separation in the Workplace: Separation Cues, Sensemaking, 
and Behavioral Responses”) investigates how employees make sense of the 
physical environment in the workplace. Physical separation is pervasive in 
organizations, and it has powerful effects on employee behavior and 
organizational performance. However, research shows that workplace separation 
is characterized by a variety of tradeoffs, tensions, and challenges that lead to both 
positive and negative organizational outcomes. By developing new theory on the 
nature, antecedents, and consequences of separation awareness—a psychological 
state in which people are aware of their physical separation from others—we 
proffer a model of the positive and negative potential inherent in separation in the 
workplace. We distinguish between control and competence affirmation as 
psychological states that are triggered by physical separation in the workplace, 
and in turn reinforce controlled or autonomous motivation, thereby influencing 
employees’ engagement in constructive and destructive behaviors. 
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• Paper 4 (“Organizational Design and the Credibility of Delegated Decision 
Rights”) looks at configurations of organizational elements that support the 
credible delegation of decision rights to employees. Managers delegate the right to 
make decisions to employees because such delegation may economize on scarce 
attention and may positively impact motivation, increasing organizational value 
creation. However, managers often renege on delegation. The withdrawal of 
delegated rights may have negative consequences for the motivation of 
organizational members. Therefore, making delegation credible is essential for 
sustaining the advantages that flow from delegation. We argue that organizational 
design—specifically, the internal fit between key organizational elements—plays 
a key role in making delegation credible. Our theory introduces a neglected 
incentive dimension to organizational design exercises, and sheds new light on the 
relation between organizational design, credible delegation, and value creation. 
 
Papers 5 & 6: Networks and bounded rationality. These two papers focus on how 
insights on limited rationality and, in turn, attentional capabilities combine with 
structural features of the informal organization to predict prosocial (Paper 5) and 
creative (Paper 6) behaviors in the workplace.  
• Paper 5 (“Network Size and Prosocial Behavior: Taking Bounded Rationality into 
Account”) combines structural and psychological perspectives on prosocial 
behaviors in organizations. Employees are expected to be more likely to engage in 
prosocial organizational behaviors if they have a large social network that gets 
them in contact with several colleagues. However, drawing on bounded rationality 
arguments, we argue that this effect depends on the focal employee’s ability to 
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focus and concentrate in the workplace, and thereby give attention to the need for 
prosocial action. Data from 69 employees in a single firm suggest that the 
interaction between egocentric network size and attention has a significant and 
positive effect on employees’ engagement in prosocial organizational behaviors. 
• Paper 6 (“Brokerage and Creativity: A Bounded Rationality Perspective”) looks 
at how structural and attentional perspectives combine in predicting creative 
behaviors in organizations. Employees are expected to be more likely to be 
creative if they occupy a brokerage position that provides them with access to 
non-redundant information. However, we draw on bounded rationality arguments 
and propose that being exposed to diverse information also carries cognitive costs. 
Data from 68 employees in a single firm suggest that the relation between 
brokerage and creativity is curvilinear (inverted U shape), and contingent on the 
focal employee’s ability to focus and concentrate in the workplace. 
 
Conclusion 
This dissertation advances our understanding of how, given their cognitive limitations, 
employees react to some of the most fundamental elements of the modern 
organization: reward systems, structural (design) features, and social (network) 
interactions with colleagues.  
 One important generic finding is the immense importance of sensemaking 
processes in driving employee behavior in directions that can also be extremely 
diverse (e.g., prosocial versus antisocial behaviors, cf. Paper 3). A second, general, 
finding is that sensemaking processes are contingent not only on individual-level 
factors (e.g., autonomous versus controlled motivation, cf. Paper 4; limited attentional 
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capabilities, cf. Paper 5 and Paper 6), but also on contextual and environmental 
factors (e.g., organizational identity and vision, cf. Paper 1). Finally, this 
dissertation’s main general contribution is to highlight that the effect of several 
fundamental instruments that are normally used to direct employee behavior is not so 
straightforward as previous research may have suggested. The reason for this is 
interpretive in nature: the result of, say, a reward does not reside in the reward entirely, 
but rather on how the employee interprets that reward. And this in turn depends on 
several different contingencies that, given the limitations in that employee’s rational 
capabilities, decide which cognitive frames she will apply in decoding the reward. 
This research suggests that similar mechanisms apply to the context of the structural 
(design) features of the organization, and of the relational (network) configurations 
that develop in the workplace. A similar logic may as well apply to other areas which 
have not yet been researched from a bounded rationality perspective, and this offers 
fascinating research avenues for the future.  
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THE PRINCIPAL’S THEORY OF MIND: 
THE ROLE OF MENTALIZING FOR REWARD DESIGN AND  
MANAGEMENT IN PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONS 
 
 
Abstract  
Agency theory is one of the most important foundational theories in 
management research, but it rests on tenuous cognitive assumptions. We 
combine classical agency theory with a realistic theory of the intrinsically 
imperfect human potential for interpersonal sensemaking. This allows us to 
systematically show how the principal’s ability to mentalize with the agent 
influences value creation in principal-agent relations, and to link this to 
organizational sensemaking instruments.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Agency theory (Gibbons, 2005; Grossman and Hart, 1983; Holmström, 1979; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Laffont and Martimort, 2002; Prendergast, 1999) is one of the most 
important foundational theories in management research (see Eisenhardt, 1989; Hendry, 
2002). Agency theory has found numerous applications in various streams of management 
research (Merchant, Van der Stede and Zheng, 2003), such as incentive management (Stroh, 
Brett, Baumann and Reilly, 1996), accounting (Antle and Demski, 1988; Lambert, 2001), 
organization theory (Abrahamson and Park, 1994; Zenger, 1994), and corporate governance 
and strategy (Amihud and Lev, 1999; Brush, Bromiley and Hendrickx, 2000; Coff, 1997). 
The theory provides fundamental insight into the roles of contracting, monitoring, 
organizational arrangements, and the incentives embodied therein. 
 Agency theory and its many applications are based on several simplifying assumptions 
(Lubatkin, Lane, Collin and Very, 2006). In this paper, we specifically focus on the 
assumptions regarding the knowledge that individuals have of each other and how they 
process that knowledge. In order to precisely identify and discuss these issues, we take our 
point of departure in the core, typically mathematical, statements of the theory (e.g., 
Holmström, 1979, 1982; Grossman and Hart, 1983; Laffont and Martimort, 2002) rather than 
in interpretations of agency theory found in the management literature (e.g., Eisenhardt, 
1989).1 The theory’s formal core statements highlight the clear, albeit strong and contentious, 
nature of knowledge and rationality assumptions in agency theory. For example, in analyses 
of moral hazard, the principal is assumed to perfectly know the agent’s taste for risk (Ross, 
1973; Holmström, 1979). The source of such knowledge is the principal’s ability to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Eisenhardt (1989) makes a distinction between formal, mathematical agency theory (“principal-agent 
research”) and a more applied, verbal version of the theory (“positivist agency theory”). However, formal 
agency theory is just as “positive” (in a theory of science sense) as “positivist agency theory” and both have 
normative implications. The distinction is not found in contemporary agency theory.  
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understand key characteristics of what is in the agent’s mind. When principals engage in such 
understanding, they “mentalize” (Singer and Fehr, 2005).  
 To theoretically approach and build up the mentalizing construct, we draw on new, 
converging insights from evolutionary anthropology (Call and Tomasello, 2008), 
neuroscience (Gallagher and Frith, 2003), neuro-economics (Singer and Fehr, 2005), and 
research on perspective-taking in psychology (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin and White, 2008). In 
line with this research, we define mentalizing as one individual’s understanding of another 
individual’s intentions, knowledge, and beliefs. The relevancy of the mentalizing concept has 
been evidenced in both theoretical and empirical research. Such research indicates that 
mentalizing is a meaningful construct that it is usually imperfect, that—absent specific 
neurological pathologies—it varies on a continuous scale that ranges from inaccurate to 
(imperfectly) accurate, and that it is asymmetrically distributed across individuals. It also 
suggests that mentalizing processes can be deliberate or non-deliberate (i.e., automatic), and 
that they can be influenced by context and experience. Our unique and specific contributions 
consist of the introduction of this construct (the general human capacity to mentalize) into the 
context of agency theory, and an exploration of the value-creating implications of doing so.  
 In agency theory, the principal’s knowledge with respect to much (but not all) of what 
is “inside the head” of the agent is assumed to be perfect. Coupled with other assumptions 
(such as those regarding risk preferences and the timing of the game), this assumption allows 
for clean predictions regarding how incentives will drive the behavior of such actors as 
employees, managers, and suppliers (Prendergast, 1999). However, the assumption that a 
principal is capable of perfectly grasping, for example, an agent’s motivations seems 
increasingly tenuous. High personnel turnover and the increasing use of fleeting project 
organization in many industries, as well as the increasing prevalence of cross-national and 
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cross-cultural management teams and networks, make an assumption of imperfect 
mentalizing on the part of the principal a more adequate analytical starting point.  
 We examine the consequences of introducing more realistic assumptions about 
mentalizing for agency theory and its management applications. On the one hand, we posit 
that mentalizing is imperfect and that, as a result, real-world principals cannot perfectly 
mentalize in the manner assumed by agency theory. On the other hand, we assert that 
mentalizing provides access to “soft psychological information” that is not considered in 
agency theory. This information provides cues to the agent’s type or effort. We show that 
novel insights into the design and management of rewards follow from this information. 
Specifically, we argue that mentalizing is a fundamental and cost-efficient instrument for 
reducing information asymmetry and raising value creation in the principal-agent setting.  
 The evidence suggests that incentives are often far from perfectly matched with the 
agents whose behavior they are meant to regulate, sometimes with detrimental consequences 
(Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 1994; O’Connor, Priem, Coombs and Gilley, 2006; Zahra, 
Priem and Rasheed, 2005). One example was Dun and Bradstreet’s practice of only paying 
bonuses to salespersons when customers bought a larger subscription to the firm’s credit 
report services than they had purchased in the preceding year. This practice led to huge 
lawsuits based on claims that Dun and Bradstreet salespersons had fraudulently 
misrepresented the usage of subscriptions to lure customers into buying larger subscriptions 
(Roberts, 1989). One possible cause may have been imperfect mentalizing: principals may 
not have envisioned that their agents would react in creative, yet clearly dysfunctional, ways 
to the incentives. In other words, they did not grasp the intentions that the distortionary 
incentives might give rise to. As the example suggests, the principal’s mentalizing matters 
because it influences the incentives he offers to the agent, and how he monitors the agent and 
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otherwise manages the relationship. In turn, such “incentive management” (Holmström, 
1979, 1999) influences the value that principal and agent jointly create.  
 In order to understand this issue, we must raise and answer the following research 
questions: How do the design and management of incentives depend on the principal’s 
mentalizing? How does this relation differ from the predictions of agency theory? We seek to 
answer these questions by developing the construct of mentalizing in the context of the 
agency relation. We thus contribute to the understanding of the cognitive micro-foundations 
of value creation (see Gavetti and Levinthal, 2001).  
Most extant critical discussions of agency theory in economics, and in management and 
organization research have centered on the motivational assumptions of the theory (Fehr and 
Falk, 2002; Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton, 2005; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Lubatkin et al., 
2006; Osterloh and Frey, 2000; Perrow, 1986). However, very few papers have explicitly 
dealt with knowledge and rationality assumptions. Papers written by Hendry (2002, 2005) are 
closest to this paper in terms of concerns regarding the assumptions of agency theory. 
Hendry’s papers significantly extend standard agency theory by demonstrating that most of 
the theory’s predictions rely on the structural properties of principal-agent relationships rather 
than classical assumptions about opportunistic self-seeking behavior and total competence. 
However, our focus differs. Hendry relaxes key assumptions of agency theory and then 
shows that, with only one exception, the predictions produced by the standard theory remain 
the same. Although we also relax assumptions, we generate new predictions about principal-
agent relations by placing principal-agent relations with imperfectly mentalizing principals in 
a broader organizational setting.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First, we clarify the implicit 
theory of mind in agency theory, namely that the principal possesses a perfect mentalizing 
capability in certain key respects, but in other, equally key, respects, the principal possesses 
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little or no mentalizing capability. Second, we develop a more realistic conception of 
mentalizing capability. Third, we use this conception to develop propositions about how 
mentalizing capability can increase value creation. Fourth, we contextualize our reasoning in 
an organizational setting and discuss how the value-creation consequences of mentalizing are 
influenced by governance mechanisms. We close with a discussion of the implications and 
limitations of our analysis, and we draw up an agenda for future research on these themes.  
KNOWLEDGE ASSUMPTIONS IN PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY  
The Principal-Agent Setting and the Principal’s Problem 
 Agency theory is based on a combination of assumptions regarding what individuals 
know, how they cognitively process what they know, and how they are motivated in the 
context of agency settings—that is, when one of (for simplicity) two individuals assumes the 
role of principal and delegates a task to the other individual, the agent. Specifically, agency 
models are mathematical representations of the situation in which an informed individual 
(typically the agent) trades with an uninformed individual (typically the principal) (Laffont 
and Martimort, 2002). The issue that the individuals are informed/uninformed about concerns 
what the agent does (“hidden actions,” motivating models of “moral hazard”) or what “type” 
he is (“hidden characteristics,” motivating models of “adverse selection”).  
The principal’s problem stems from a conflict between insurance and incentives (Ross, 
1973; Holmström, 1979). Agency theory generally assumes that principals are risk neutral, 
while agents are risk averse. In this context, the risk-neutral principal should bear all of the 
risk. However, incentive issues complicate the situation. If the agent’s action cannot be 
observed and there is uncertainty, incentives must be considered. Absent uncertainty, the 
principal could infer from observing the result which action the agent had chosen and reward 
him accordingly. However, the result is assumed to be influenced by a stochastic variable. 
While both principal and agent know how this variable is distributed (and know that the other 
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knows), the principal cannot observe the actual realization of the variable. He merely 
observes a “noisy signal” of the agent’s effort. To motivate the agent, the contract will 
specify a reward schedule: the agent’s payment from the principal is a function of the 
observable consequences. In general, such a contract will only be second best, as it will not 
realize the maximum or first-best value creation. The latter is defined as the value creation 
that would have arisen if the principal had been fully informed and could direct the agent to 
take the best action. The reason for the second-best nature of most contracts is that they give 
the agent incentives; this, in turn, exposes the agent to risk. A risk-averse agent will suffer a 
loss of perceived well-being (“utility”) as a consequence and will demand a risk premium. 
Agency loss can thus be measured by the risk premium. Reducing the agency loss is the same 
as reducing the risk premium. In turn, one way of increasing the value created in an agency 
relation is to reduce the risk premium. This can, for example, be achieved by obtaining better 
signals about the agent’s performance (Holmström, 1979). This reduces the incentives that 
the agent needs and, thus, the agent’s perceived risk. Agency theory basically predicts that 
value creation cannot be lifted to the first-best level. However, efficient incentive design and 
management can approximate that level.  
 Normally, the principal’s problem can be addressed in two ways: by monitoring the 
agent’s actions (observing inputs) or by using outcome-based compensation (incentive pay). 
By introducing additional information systems (such as accounting) or by extracting extra 
information about the agent’s actions in other ways, it is often possible to improve on agency 
relations, even though the additional information may be imperfect (Holmström, 1979). 
Applications of agency theory have typically considered such indicators as accounting 
returns, stock performance, sales growth, market share, and comparative performance, 
whereas psychological information, such as facial expressions and other aspects of bodily 
language, have not been considered. When the principal has better information about the 
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actions of the agent, he no longer needs to expose the agent to such strong incentives to make 
him chose the best action. Thus, the agent needs to shoulder less risk and will demand a 
smaller risk premium. As a result, value creation in the relation increases (i.e., the agency loss 
is reduced). However, to maximize value creation, the principal also needs to decide which 
signals related to the agent’s performance should be included in performance assessment. For 
example, is the performance of other agents a relevant signal? Can post-effort conversations 
with the agent offer additional information?   
After deciding which measures to apply, the principal needs to decide which measures 
and incentives should be linked. For example, a decision needs to be made regarding how 
strong incentives should be. Certain tasks or agents may not be well aligned with strong 
incentives because the agent’s tolerance for incentives depends on his risk aversion, or (going 
beyond agency theory) because such incentives can be detrimental to either the agent’s 
intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985) or the special motivation that the agent may 
associate with working in well-functioning teams (Lindenberg and Foss, 2011). The principal 
also needs to make decisions on the intensity of monitoring agents. Typically, the stronger the 
incentives, the stronger monitoring should be. Finally, the principal needs to assess the extent 
to which multi-tasking occurs. The more the agent needs to multitask, the less likely it is that 
strong incentives will be used, as “in essence, complex jobs will typically not be evaluated 
through explicit contracts” (Prendergast, 1999: 9). (Later, we argue that this implies that 
“complex jobs” will be evaluated through mentalizing.)  
Much of agency theory is about such incentive management issues, especially: 1) 
strategic behavior on the part of agents—agents may influence the principal by offering 
favors or developing friendship ties (Tirole, 1986) or they may manipulate the signals related 
to their performance (Holmström, 1982); 2) the “rewarding A while hoping for B” (Kerr, 
1975) problems that multi-tasking may give rise to (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991); and 3) 
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problems of subjective performance measurement (Bakeret al., 1994; Levin, 2003)—for 
example, managers may shy away from critically distinguishing among employees, or they 
may not wish to give poor ratings to subordinates whose pay is determined by such ratings 
(Murphy and Cleveland, 1991).  
Knowledge Assumptions in Agency Theory 
 Given agency theory’s enormous influence and its contentious assumptions, a 
significant amount of literature deals critically with the theory, addressing its motivational 
assumptions (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Osterloh and Frey, 2000) and its performative 
consequences (Ferraro et al., 2005; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). However, although the 
cognitive and epistemic assumptions of the theory are arguably as contentious as the 
motivational assumptions, they have been subject to much less discussion, perhaps because 
they are less visible. These assumptions concern how individuals process knowledge 
(cognitive) and what knowledge they have (epistemic) (Goldman, 1978).  
 Cognitive assumptions. Agency theory is sometimes interpreted as resting on 
foundations of bounded rationality (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989). In fact, however, agency theory 
does not assume bounded rationality. Rather, it assumes the “full” or “maximizing” 
rationality characteristic found in mainstream economics, where the principal and the agent 
can both be modeled as maximizing expected utility (Laffont and Martimort, 2002; see 
Hendry, 2002). However, work in behavioral and experimental economics, and in psychology 
suggests that individuals generally do not possess the cognitive apparatus needed to 
maximize expected utility (unless decision situations are very simple) (Camerer, 1998; 
Kahneman and Tversky, 2000; Simon, 1978).  
Epistemic assumptions. Agency theory makes several far-reaching assumptions 
regarding the knowledge held by the principal and agent. The theory imports the knowledge 
assumptions of game theory. One such assumption is that differences in beliefs among 
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individuals can be completely explained by differences in information (Halpern, 2002). 
Another key knowledge assumption is that individuals are not only (fully) rational in the 
sense of being capable of maximizing expected utility, but that they also ascribe such 
rationality to others (Holler, 2001). In fact, the ascription of rationality takes a specific form. 
Player A knows that Player B is rational. Conversely, Player B knows that Player A is 
rational. Furthermore, the mutual knowledge goes on ad infinitum (“A knows that B knows 
that A knows that B knows … that X is the case”). This is the assumption of “common 
knowledge” (Lewis, 1969; Aumann, 1976), an assumption that underlies most modern game 
theory, including game-theoretical agency theory.  
In agency theory, a number of the basic ingredients are assumed to be common 
knowledge in this sense. In the case of a moral hazard situation, such mutual knowledge 
includes knowledge of those who are involved in the relation, the actions that are available to 
them, the risk preferences of the agent, the assumption that both the principal and agent are 
rational, the agent’s opportunity cost, what the task that the principal delegates to the agent 
entails, and so on. Of course, the knowledge of the principal is not totally congruent with the 
agent’s, as there would not be an agency problem in such a case. Thus, the principal usually 
cannot observe the actions the agent chooses and the specific manifestations of uncertainty. 
Alternatively, he may not know the agent’s characteristics (his “type”). However, in all other 
respects the principal knows perfectly what the agent knows (and vice versa).  
Problematic Aspects of the Knowledge Assumptions in Agency Theory 
 A strong implication of the above is that a principal can perfectly read the agent’s mind 
with respect to a number of key conditions that influence the principal-agent relation (the 
agent can also perfectly read the principal’s mind with respect to these conditions, but here 
we focus mainly on the principal; see Hendry, 2002). Undoubtedly, designing and managing 
incentives often requires considerable agent-specific knowledge. Agency theory routinely 
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assumes that the principal perfectly knows and understands the agent’s degree of risk 
aversion and his opportunity costs. Simultaneously, the principal cannot observe the agent’s 
effort. Therefore, with respect to the agent’s effort, the principal’s understanding is extremely 
imperfect. In real managerial practice, the principal can develop knowledge of the agent that 
will allow him to interpret the various behavioral clues that signal that agent’s effort (e.g., is 
the agent’s staring out of the window a signal of moral hazard or intense, productive 
thinking?). Thus, agency theory assumes—in a manner that does not seem empirically 
warranted—that the principal has a perfect theory of some parts of the agent’s mind and, at 
the same time, a highly imperfect understanding of other parts. To address this issue, in the 
following we turn towards a more realistic treatment of the principal’s knowledge by 
introducing the concept of mentalizing and linking it to agency theory.  
MENTALIZING AND RELATED CONSTRUCTS 
Putting Oneself in Others’ Shoes 
The ability to put oneself in another person’s shoes has long been recognized as a 
crucial aspect of social interaction. In particular, this ability serves as a key mechanism for 
coordinating beliefs and actions. The importance of this ability is evident across the social 
sciences, including sociology (Schutz, 1932; Weber, 1979), and economics and game theory 
(Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Furthermore, social 
psychologists and marketing scholars stress that perspective taking plays a significant role in 
negotiations (Galinsky et al., 2008) and adaptive selling (Dietvorst, Verbeke, Bagozzi, Yoon, 
Smits and Van Der Lugt, 2009).  
Given bounded rationality (Simon, 1955), individuals perceive, understand, and make 
sense of the world in terms of cognitive frames that they “impose on an information 
environment to give it form and meaning” (Walsh, 1995: 281; see Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007; 
Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2005). 
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The development of these cognitive frames is linked to specific socio-cultural and 
environmental contingencies. Thus, although individuals share many cognitive frames or 
“typifications” as a result of socialization (Berger and Luckman, 1967; Weick, 1995), those 
frames have important idiosyncratic and person-specific features (see Schütz, 1932), which 
produce “cognitive distance”—a difference between distinct cognitive schemes (Nooteboom, 
2000; Nooteboom, Van Haverbeke, Duysters, Gilsing and Van Den Oord, 2007; Wuyts, 
Colombo, Shantanu, and Nooteboom, 2005). In contrast, in the world of agency theory there 
can be no cognitive distance, as its existence is ruled out by the assumptions of common 
priors and common knowledge (Aumann, 1976). For real-world principals, however, 
cognitive distance is a crucially important factor.  
Defining Mentalizing  
 Recent developments in evolutionary anthropology (Call and Tomasello, 2008), 
cognitive neuroscience (Gallagher and Frith, 2003), neuro-economics (Singer and Fehr, 
2005), and social psychology (Galinsky et al., 2008) highlight the importance of one 
individual’s understanding of another individual’s intentions, knowledge, and beliefs. When 
an individual makes inferences about such mental states, he “mentalizes” (Singer and Fehr, 
2005)—he forms conjectures about mental states that are not directly observable but are 
useful because they can make sense of and predict the behaviors of others. This process is 
particularly important for individuals’ interactions with others (Premack and Woodruff, 
1978).  
 Intentions, knowledge, and beliefs are three distinct ingredients of human 
psychological—and, in turn, behavioral—functioning. However, a precise representation of 
this functioning rests on a simultaneous understanding of these three complementary 
constituents of mentalizing (Call and Tomasello, 2008). An understanding of intentions—
plans of action that are chosen in pursuit of a goal (Bratman, 1989; Dennett, 1987)—
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represents the foundation of mentalizing. In fact, an understanding of intentions provides the 
first “interpretive matrix for deciding precisely what it is that someone is doing in the first 
place” (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne and Moll 2005: 675).  
 For example, suppose that a principal knows that an agent is working several extra 
hours, and he wants the agent to maintain this extra effort. However, the action of working 
extra hours may have widely different intentional connotations. An agent may be working 
extra because he is intrinsically motivated to deliver good performance or because he is 
externally motivated by the potential for a monetary bonus. While giving a monetary reward 
to the extrinsically motivated agent would be a proper way of encouraging that agent to keep 
working, giving the same reward to an intrinsically motivated agent would crowd out the 
motivation and diminish the agent’s effort (Frey and Jegen, 2001). An understanding of the 
agent’s intentions is, therefore, important for the principal.  
 This conclusion is strengthened by a consideration of the effects of incentives on 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation beyond the principal-agent dyad. In a situation with 
multiple agents, perceptions of injustice may arise if an agent sees other agents getting a 
reward that he does not receive because the principal infers that he is mainly intrinsically 
motivated. Thus, the principal’s mentalizing must also include how the agent compares 
himself socially and how he reacts to such comparisons.  
 An individual’s intentions are influenced by her knowledge. The contextualization of 
an individual’s intentions relative to an understanding of her knowledge is the second 
constituent of mentalizing. Contextualizing significantly refines the understanding of an 
individual’s intentions. In terms of the above example, if the principal knows that the agent 
knows that the organization has, for instance, just implemented a reward system, the principal 
may expect the agent to work harder in order to get a bonus (rather than because the agent has 
an innate interest in the task).  
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 As beliefs are, by definition, mental, the possibility of understanding someone’s beliefs 
represents “the pinnacle of mind reading” (Tomasello et al., 2005: 675; see Kaminski, Call 
and Tomasello, 2008). Moreover, the ability to explain the behavior of an actor based on 
what that actor believes to be the case remains crucial when the actor’s beliefs are wrong. In 
terms of the example, the principal believes that the agent is working extra hours because he 
knows about the recently implemented reward system. Suppose, however, that the principal 
also knows that the agent is ignorant about the output-based (as opposed to input-based) 
nature of the reward criterion—in other words, the principal knows that the agent is wrong in 
thinking that his extra work will automatically result in an increase in his compensation. The 
principal may or may not decide to let the agent know about the error in his belief.  
In sum, the principal’s ability to simultaneously discern what an agent wants to do (i.e., 
his intentions), how he regards the environment in which he operates (i.e., his knowledge), 
and what he deems probable (i.e., his beliefs and false beliefs about what will happen based 
on his information) are important parts of mentalizing. Mentalizing has been shown to form 
the basis for understanding how others make sense of their world and, in turn, for 
cooperative, deceptive, and empathetic behavior (Galinky et al., 2008; Tomasello et al., 
2005).  
The Mechanisms of Mentalizing  
Mentalizing is a cognitive mechanism that involves the activation of deliberate and 
non-deliberate (i.e., automatic) processes. Neuroscience research demonstrates that humans 
have an innate brain system that is dedicated to mentalizing. Specific brain regions are 
unconsciously and effortlessly activated when people engage in non-deliberate mentalizing 
(i.e., “implicit mentalizing,” Frith and Frith, 2003). However, mentalizing is not an 
exclusively automatic process. Other brain regions are activated when people deliberately 
engage in mentalizing processes (i.e., “explicit mentalizing,” Frith and Frith, 2003; see Frith 
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and Frith, 1999; Gallagher and Frith, 2003). Given the mainly intentional and rational stance 
of classical agency theory, we take the non-deliberate and innate side of mentalizing as a 
given. In other words, we assume that principals effortlessly and automatically mentalize 
with agents to a certain extent, and we focus on the intentional and non-automatic side of 
mentalizing.  
Since culture is the “webs of significance” (Geertz, 1973: 5) that give sense to the 
human experiencing of phenomena, mentalizing is intimately related to context and, more 
generally, to the cognitive distance that separates the mentalizer from the mentalizee. Clearly, 
the higher the cognitive distance, the harder mentalizing will be. For example, complex 
collaborative activities involving shared goals and socially coordinated intentions require a 
high degree of mutual understanding, which can be furthered by culturally contextualized 
processes (Tomasello et al., 2005), such as rituals (Chwe, 2001; Dacin, Munir and Tracey, 
2010). Rituals are mechanisms that assist in the construction of shared meaning (Kunda, 
1992; Meyer and Scott, 1983) by influencing how people think and make sense of situations 
(Van Maanen and Kunda, 1989). Rituals thus support mentalizing.  
Mentalizing may result in simplistic (even wrong) conjectures or in an accurate 
representation of the contents of someone else’s mind. Neuroscience research clearly 
indicates an individual’s placement between the two extreme positions of being able versus 
being incapable of mentalizing depends on whether one possesses specific, innate neural 
prerequisites. Consistent with this, the absence of mentalizing has been shown to be typical of 
developmental or acquired disorders such as autism (Baron-Choen, Leslie and Frith, 1985; 
Frith and Frith, 1999). However, variations along the accuracy dimension (i.e., the continuous 
scale that ranges from having an inaccurate theory to an accurate theory of the other’s mind) 
are linked to the sophistication of the aforementioned cultural and experiential mechanisms, 
and to the cognitive distance between mentalizer and mentalizee.  
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Moreover, mentalizing is not immune to problems of cognitive distortion (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979). Thus, imperfect mentalizing reflects an inability to accurately mentalize, 
as well as overconfidence on the part of the principal, who may believe he knows things 
about the agent’s mind that he actually does not (see Flynn and Wiltermuth, 2010). To avoid 
overly complicating the argument, we abstract from the specific ways in which mentalizing 
may be imperfect. In addition, mentalizing greatly supports and combines with distinct 
psychological processes, such as information processing and memory processes. While we 
focus on mentalizing, we also assume that it naturally antecedes and concurs with other 
psychological processes in triggering the emergence of theories about others’ minds.  
Mentalizing may be understood as a skilled behavior. In general, a skill is a “capability 
for a smooth sequence of coordinated behavior that is ordinarily effective relative to its 
objectives given the context in which it normally occurs” (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 73). 
Thus, mentalizing has skill-like qualities in that it is program-like (i.e., mentalizing consists 
of an ordered sequence of cognitive steps); it is built upon a mixture of tacit and explicit 
knowledge (in fact, rarely is the mentalizer completely aware of the mechanisms that 
engender his having a theory of the other’s mind); and it requires the making of a certain 
number of choices, which vary in terms of the degree of intentionality (e.g., although the 
decision to mentalize may be intentional, the choice of how to proceed in order to mentalize 
may be unintentional). Like a skill, and consistent with its context-driven components, 
mentalizing can also be altered by environmental cues.  
Finally, it is important to note that all of the aforementioned factors (deliberate and 
non-deliberate components of mentalizing, the importance of context and culture, potential 
variations in accuracy, and the skill-like nature of the construct) do not imply that accurate 
mentalizing is a remote possibility. On the contrary, convergent research clearly indicates that 
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mentalizing is a fundamental driver of human interaction, which suggests that relatively 
precise degrees of mentalizing are, in fact, found in real-world scenarios.  
Related Constructs 
Mentalizing overlaps with two constructs that are familiar from the management 
research literature: transactive memory and perspective taking. However, mentalizing is not 
fully congruent with these concepts. Transactive memory is the shared division of cognitive 
labor with respect to the encoding, storing, retrieving, and communicating of knowledge from 
different but complementary domains (Wegner, 1986; Brandon and Hollingshead, 2004). 
Over time, members of a group may develop a common understanding of each other’s areas 
of competence and expertise. Transactive memory is the group’s members shared 
understanding of “who knows what” in the group (Brandon and Hollingshead, 2004). This 
type of transactive memory is similar to mentalizing in that it involves an understanding of 
what others know, but mentalizing has a much broader focus. Not only does it refer to the 
understanding of others’ knowledge but also, more importantly, to the understanding of their 
intentions and beliefs (Tomasello et al., 2005).  
Perspective taking refers to the consideration and adoption of someone else’s 
psychological viewpoint (Davis, 1983), which activates a process of “self-other merging” 
(Davis, Conklin, Smith and Luce, 1996: 714). This process rests on the cognitive and 
emotional levels (Galinsky and Moskowitz, 2001; Galinsky and Ku, 2004). Perspective 
taking is similar to mentalizing, as it relates to the understanding of what others know, think, 
imagine, and feel. However, whereas perspective taking has both cognitive and emotional 
dimensions, mentalizing refers exclusively to cognitive theorizing about another individual’s 
mental states.  
Knowledge Assumptions in Agency Theory in Light of the Mentalizing Construct 
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 Agency theory assumes that the principal has perfect access to and knowledge of 
certain mental states of the agent. Typically, what exactly is included under this wide-ranging 
knowledge assumption depends on the specific kind of agency model. For example, in moral 
hazard models, the principal perfectly knows the agent’s attitudes regarding risk, the actions 
that the agent thinks of as being available, the agent’s perceived opportunity costs, and so on. 
Of course, this is not necessarily intended as a descriptively accurate assumption, but as an 
assumption that eases mathematical modeling. However, in managerial practice, principals 
are imperfect mentalizers and mentalizing is not in unlimited supply. Managers/principals, 
like econometricians who work empirically with agency theory (Salanié, 2003: 462), face 
much “unobserved heterogeneity” with respect to the actual contents of agents’ minds. In 
turn, their mentalizing capabilities matter with regard to reward design and value creation.  
 In sum, we argue that to design and manage incentives, a principal needs to build a 
cognitive map of the agent’s cognitive categories and states. For reasons of mathematical 
tractability, agency theory models assume that this is unproblematic, as embodied in the 
assumptions of common priors and common knowledge. In contrast, we argue that 
mentalizing is imperfect and that it provides access to information sources that are not 
considered in agency theory. In the following, we address the principal’s mentalizing as a 
crucial determinant of incentive design and management (and, hence, value creation) in the 
principal-agent relation.  
CONSEQUENCES OF MENTALIZING IN PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONS  
Boundary Conditions and Research Model 
 Our theorizing applies to the standard principal-agent setting of a principal and an 
agent, and it holds wherever this setting occurs, regardless of the organizational type. To 
facilitate exposition, we adopt the perspective of the principal in the sense that we address the 
principal’s mentalizing (and black box the agent’s mentalizing, see Hendry, 2002). Although 
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cognitive, motivational, and emotional processes are intertwined (Cohen, 2005; Kruglanski, 
Shah, Friedman, Fishbach, Chun and Sleeth-Keppler, 2002), we follow recent research in 
social psychology (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2008) in that we separate these processes. We focus 
our attention on the cognitive level, and disregard any emphatic, emotional, or motivational 
processes that may accompany mentalizing. Moreover, as we focus on the interrelationship 
between mentalizing capability and value creation, we hold all other determinants of value 
creation in principal-agent relations (including the agent’s risk preferences, sensitivity to 
incentives, etc.) constant. We assume that the principal seeks to maximize value creation in 
the relationship. We do not make any specific assumptions about whether the principal lets 
the agent share in any additional value creation. Figure 1 shows how we reason from 
mentalizing capability to value creation.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 here 
-------------------------------------- 
Learning the Agent’s Type and Managing Signals  
 We begin by examining the consistency of the mentalizing construct and key agency 
theory predictions. Agency theory shows that decreasing the level of asymmetry of 
information in the relation between principal and agent increases value creation in the 
relation. In other words, a better-informed principal can better ascertain an agent’s type, 
reducing the need for costly signaling. Moreover, he is better able to infer the agent’s true 
effort level from the signal on the agent’s effort—the output—and can design his incentives 
more precisely. This reduces the agent’s perceived risk and the risk premium, thereby 
increasing value creation.  
 Mentalizing and information asymmetry are distinct constructs. However, mentalizing 
can antecede the degree of information asymmetry in a principal-agent relationship. 
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Specifically, increased mentalizing leads to a reduction in information asymmetries. In turn, 
this increases value creation in the relation because improved mentalizing improves the 
principal’s understanding of the agent’s type and the signals related to the agent’s actions. 
For example, rather than relying on knowledge of the average characteristics of a group of 
agents, the principal can better ascertain characteristics specific to a certain agent.  
 There are a number of mechanisms through which the principal’s improved mentalizing 
leads to higher value creation. First, the principal can design a contract that better matches the 
specific agent in terms of striking the right tradeoff between providing the agent with 
insurance and offering performance incentives. Second, a principal who learns the agent’s 
type can better match the agent with specific tasks. For example, if the agent has a high 
degree of risk aversion, he may dislike being exposed to an environment in which he has to 
handle several tasks, as this makes it more difficult for the principal to reliably measure his 
effort (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). Mentalizing is the psychological mechanism that 
provides the principal with key information about the agent—information that agency theory 
assumes the principal already possesses. Thus, mentalizing serves as a vital mechanism for 
understanding real-world principal-agent relations. It may be that principals can gain such 
information through, for example, trial-and-error with different incentives, and infer agent 
characteristics from such a learning process. However, such processes are costly and lengthy, 
and mentalizing is a lower-cost alternative. This reasoning suggests the following 
proposition:  
Proposition 1: Mentalizing on the part of the principal is a lower-cost way of getting to 
know the agent’s risk preferences, disutility of effort and sensitivity to incentives. This 
knowledge increases value creation in the relation. 
 In addition, mentalizing can provide access to soft psychological information that is not 
considered in agency theory. For example, mentalizing may provide insight into the agent’s 
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self-concept orientation—whether the agent thinks of himself mainly in individualistic, 
relational, or collective terms (Cooper and Thatcher, 2010). This element matters for 
incentive design because it influences whether the agent should be offered team, rather than 
individual, incentives (Lindenberg and Foss, 2011). Because mentalizing can provide access 
to additional information (relative to what is considered in agency theory), the principal can 
develop a reward design that better fits the peculiar characteristics of the agent. This 
increases value creation in the relation, as the agent’s perceived risk is reduced, necessitating 
a smaller risk premium.  
  Mentalizing also creates value because it is geared toward interpreting signals about 
the agent’s effort and trustworthiness (Singer and Fehr, 2005). Signaling helps to reduce 
information asymmetry between the two parties (Riley, 2001; Spence, 2002). This reduction 
depends on the reliability of the signal and on the receiver’s capability to correctly interpret 
the signal (Connelly, Certo, Ireland and Reutzel, 2010). Clearly, the ability to distinguish 
honest signals from false signals—and, in turn, to recognize trustworthy agents—is important 
for the design of efficient reward systems. Bonus contracts that rely on fairness and trust can, 
in fact, be more efficient than explicit incentive contracts that are enforced by the courts 
(Baker et al., 1994; Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt, 2007; Fehr and List, 2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 
2004). However, attributions of dishonesty are often stereotypical and inaccurate (Aavik et 
al., 2006). This is partially due to game playing on the side of the agent, who may adjust his 
conduct in social interactions so as to guide the impression that the principal forms of him 
(Goffman, 1990; Leary and Kowalski, 1990). The principal’s ability to accurately detect 
dishonesty and impression management on the side of the agent is linked to the principal’s 
ability to recognize and decode subtle (verbal and non-verbal) micro-expressions (Ekman and 
O’Sullivan, 1991). Given his improved understanding of the agent’s mental states, a 
mentalizing principal is clearly better equipped to decode an agent’s signals—facial gestures, 
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body language, communication, etc.—as clues to his trustworthiness. Thus, mentalizing leads 
to better comprehension of the information content and the reliability of the diffuse signals on 
the agent’s effort and trustworthiness, and therefore to an improvement in monitoring (see 
Holmström, 1979). This means that the principal can better ascertain the agent’s true effort 
level, and, if necessary, influence him to increase this level. Again, principals may be capable 
of gaining such information by adopting various learning theories or by experimenting with 
different incentives. However, we submit that mentalizing is a lower-cost alternative. Thus:  
Proposition 2: Mentalizing on the part of the principal enables him to interpret subtle 
clues regarding the agent’s effort and trustworthiness at a lower cost, and improves his 
understanding of the agent’s type and effort relative to what is posited in standard 
agency theory.  
 Rewards, punishments, and even informal encouragement or criticism are signals 
themselves. They tell the agent something about the principal, his intentions, and his attitudes 
(Bénabou and Tirole, 2003). Specifically, a principal’s decision to use one reward as opposed 
to another (or as opposed to not using a formal reward) has been proven to be an extremely 
strong signal for the agent (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003; and, outside of agency theory, Ryan 
and Deci, 2000). Agents’ receptiveness to the same signals differ. Incentives may, therefore, 
have a substantially different impact on various agents. An important issue is for the principal 
“to understand in what cases they [monetary incentives] should be used with caution” 
(Bénabou and Tirole, 2003: 490). Simply put, the principal needs to understand what a given 
incentive will signal to a given agent. Such an understanding is derived from the principal’s 
mentalizing, part of which originates deliberately. For example, if the principal is capable of 
mentalizing with the agent, he may understand that the agent is intrinsically interested in her 
task, and he may realize that a monetary reward may signal mistrust and, eventually, crowd 
out that agent’s motivation. In this case, the principal should choose a reward that signals 
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trust or flexibility to the agent. In other words, high mentalizing allows the principal to make 
more sophisticated use of the signaling component of incentives. In particular, he can fine-
tune signals to increase the agent’s effort. Thus: 
Proposition 3: Mentalizing on the part of the principal enables him to design 
incentives so that they convey desired signals to the agent. 
The improved ability to interpret clues about the agent’s effort and signal to the agent provide 
a novel source of value creation, as the agent’s perceived risk goes down, necessitating a 
smaller risk premium.  
Diagnosing Inefficiencies and Adjusting Incentives  
We have argued that principals that are skilled in mentalizing can learn the type of the 
agent, interpret signals about the agent’s effort, and design incentives so as to convey given 
signals to the agent (“incentive focus”). However, mentalizing principals are also capable of 
evaluating (ex post) the fit of incentives with the agent. In fact, by simply matching an 
understanding of the agent’s type with the agent’s reactions (i.e., signals) to a given reward, 
the mentalizing principal can evaluate the extent to which that reward actually fit the agent 
(“incentive adjustment”) in a time- and, in turn, cost-efficient way. Thus:  
Proposition 4: Mentalizing on the part of the principal enables him to diagnose reward 
inefficiencies at an early stage and to reduce such inefficiencies in a low-cost manner 
by redesigning rewards.  
A principal who can gain additional insight into the characteristics, intentions, and 
beliefs of the agent by mentalizing can also better utilize the incentive instruments at his 
disposal. For example, he is better positioned to judge the best combination of fixed and 
variable pay components in a contract that he offers to the agent and how to use verbal 
recognition as a complement to (or substitute for) such incentives. Also, mentalizing 
improves monitoring and the sending of signals to the agent, as argued above. Principals with 
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more mentalizing capability will benefit more from the use of existing incentive instruments 
and vice versa. Thus, the relation between mentalizing and the principal’s extant portfolio of 
incentive instruments is characterized by complementarity (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995).  
Moreover, an improved understanding of the agent’s characteristics and intentions (i.e., 
his type), and of the signaling potential of incentives increases the principal’s motivation to 
explore new incentives, to build a richer and more refined reward portfolio (“expanded 
incentive portfolio”), and to adjust existing incentive instruments so that they better fit the 
agents with whom the principal is mentalizing (“incentive refinement”). Thus, with a low 
level of mentalizing, the principal will tend to choose incentives that are “at hand” and that fit 
the average agent. Mentalizing improves the principal’s understanding of the agent’s type as 
well as his interpretation and sending of signals, and allows him to build a richer, more 
refined incentive portfolio by combining incentives in novel ways and by including new 
kinds of incentives. We therefore suggest:  
Proposition 5: Principals skilled in mentalizing will rely less on routine or habitual 
behaviors when choosing reward mechanisms, and they will exhibit a higher degree of 
creativity in their rewarding practices.  
Costly Mentalizing 
Mentalizing on the part of the principal is a source of value in the principal-agent 
relationship. It is the mechanism through which soft psychological information is included in 
the principal’s assessment of the agent’s type and effort, and the signaling in which he 
engages. In a long-term relation, much mentalizing happens as a costless by-product of the 
main activities in the relation. However, we treat mentalizing as a deliberate mental act. 
Mentalizing requires mental effort (attention, information processing, etc.) that cannot be 
spent on other activities. Thus, mentalizing may have fixed costs. For example, a principal 
that is new to the culture of a firm in which he has assumed a managerial role needs to learn 
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about the culture of that firm to ensure that he and the firm’s agents share some of the basic 
premises upon which mentalizing is built (Kunda, 1992). Similarly, establishing a relation 
with a new agent involves a certain initial investment in mentalizing with that agent. For 
instance, internship programs are used with increasing frequency by firms in order to get to 
know potential employees before deciding whether to hire them. These fixed costs of 
mentalizing suggest that principals will prefer agents who are similar in type, so that they can 
spread the fixed costs of mentalizing over many agents. There are also variable costs of 
mentalizing. For example, the principal may invest effort into interpreting a certain signal 
about the agent’s effort.  
Optimum mentalizing balances these costs against the benefits of mentalizing (i.e., the 
optimum is described by equality between the marginal benefits and the marginal costs of 
mentalizing). Note that there may be other benefits to learning the agent’s type and managing 
signals in addition to those that we have already identified. For example, persons low in 
mentalizing may experience greater social anxiety in interpersonal contexts. In such cases, an 
enhancement of mentalizing may reduce psychological costs. Overall, mentalizing introduces 
an additional tradeoff in the principal’s problem, and entails additional costs and benefits that 
need to be taken into consideration in understanding how value is created in principal-agent 
relations. From a prescriptive point of view, we need to identify: (a) the factors that cause 
value creation in such relations; (b) the main problems in the realization of these factors; and 
(c) the main instruments through which these problems can be averted or mitigated. Thus far, 
we have dealt with mentalizing capability as a factor that causes value creation in principal-
agent relations and we have noted the costs of mentalizing. In the following section, we deal 
in greater detail with the obstacles, represented as a cognitive distance construct, as well as 
the distinctly organizational facilitators of mentalizing capability.  
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MENTALIZING AND VALUE CREATION: THE IMPACT OF COGNITIVE 
DISTANCE AND ORGANIZATIONAL SENSEMAKING  
Agency theory is “institutionally neutral” in the sense that principal-agent relations are not 
uniquely tied to specific governance structures or institutions. They can exist within as well 
as between firms (and in numerous other social arenas) (Hart, 1995). However, a significant 
part of principal-agent relations are embedded within firms (Eisenhardt, 1989; Shapiro, 
2005).  
Much research proceeds from the assumption that agency problems are endemic in 
organizations (Hart, 1995; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). At the same time, organizations 
encompass key instruments for handling these problems. Thus, established agency theory 
points to rewards coupled with performance measurement (Laffont and Martimort, 2002), 
tournaments (Lazear, 2000), and task design (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991) as means to 
overcome agency problems. Hendry (2002) stresses the importance of training and 
instruction. Akerlof and Kranton (2005) argue that workers’ identities can function as 
important work incentives because they encompass ideals as to how a given job should be 
done, which significantly reduces principal-agent problems. Lindenberg and Foss (2011) 
point to a specific kind of social motivation that arises in team situations and argue that firms 
can succeed in mobilizing such “joint production motivation,” keeping agency problems at 
bay. 
We propose a different view of how organizational instruments can mitigate agency 
problems. Our starting point is that mentalizing capability is functional to the extent that 
individuals are cognitively distant. The higher the level of cognitive distance in a relation, the 
more difficult it is for a principal with a given level of mentalizing capability to understand 
the agent’s type, actions, signals, and so on. However, cognitive distance is a variable that 
can be influenced by organizational means. Figure 2 shows how we introduce cognitive 
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distance and organizational instruments into our framework (the dotted arrows and boxes 
represent the main parts of Figure 1).  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 here 
-------------------------------------- 
Cognitive Distance and Value Creation  
By assigning attributes to the agent’s intentions, knowledge, and beliefs, the principal 
tries to understand—and eventually look at the world through—the agent’s cognitive lens. By 
definition, the construct of cognitive distance captures variability (Cannon-Bowers, and 
Salas, 2001; Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008; Nooteboom, 2000). The principal and the agent 
may look at the world through completely different (high distance) and quite similar (low 
distance) cognitive schemes. As sensemaking processes are facilitated by familiarity with the 
focus of attention, mentalizing is simpler when cognitive distance is limited. Thus, high 
cognitive distance between principal and agent has a negative impact on the accuracy of the 
principal’s mentalizing. As the principal’s mentalizing influences value creation through the 
mechanisms of learning the agent’s type and signaling (and the improved use of incentive 
instruments that this gives rise to, see P1 to P5), cognitive distance indirectly influences value 
creation. Specifically:  
Proposition 6: The positive effect of mentalizing on value creation in principal-agent 
relations is negatively moderated by the cognitive distance that separates principal and 
agent.  
Experience and Physical Proximity  
Mentalizing rests on innate and cultural bases. Whereas the former are constant, the 
principal’s experience (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000), including his understanding of a 
cultural context (Kunda, 1992), and his physical proximity with the agent (Gavetti, 2005) are 
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important determinants of the principal’s mentalizing. Principals base their decisions on 
evaluations of potential alternatives that can (probabilistically) lead to certain consequences 
(March, 1994). These evaluations can be driven by experience or cognition. While 
experiential evaluations depend on actual trials of alternative options, cognitive evaluations 
depend on mental representations of reality (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2001). Cognitive and 
experiential evaluative mechanisms are closely interrelated: cognition influences experiential 
learning, while experience effects cognitive representations (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; 
Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007). Consequently, we expect to see an interaction effect between 
cognitive distance and physical proximity such that the principal’s experience (negatively) 
moderates the (negative) impact of cognitive distance on the value-creation implications of 
the principal’s mentalizing.  
In addition, a principal’s mentalizing depends on his physical positioning relative to the 
agent. Consistent with the idea that rationality is bounded and situated (Simon, 1955; 
Dearborn and Simon, 1958), there is evidence that important signals of human behavior can 
be perceived only by direct observation of specific verbal and non-verbal micro-expressions 
(Ekman and O’Sullivan, 1991). This suggests that given a fixed cognitive distance between 
principal and agent, physical proximity between the parties eases the principal’s bridging of 
that distance. Physical proximity allows the principal to grasp additional aspects of the 
agent’s behavior, which leads to the making of more accurate attributions. Thus, like the 
principal’s experience, physical proximity (negatively) influences the (negative) impact of 
cognitive distance on the contribution to value creation of mentalizing (i.e., P6):  
Proposition 7: The negative effect of cognitive distance on the value creation arising 
from mentalizing is negatively moderated by the principal’s experience and physical 
proximity to the agent.  
The Role of Organizational Sensemaking Instruments in Bridging Cognitive Distance 
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Evolutionary anthropologists argue that humans have been equipped by evolution to 
spontaneously recognize joint endeavors and see themselves as part of such endeavors. This 
involves definitions of roles and responsibilities, and cognitions about the relevant tasks, 
interdependencies, timing, and possible obstacles to coordination in the joint endeavor 
(Tomasello et al., 2005; Higgins and Pittman, 2008). Lindenberg and Foss (2011) argue that 
organizations need to nurture, mobilize, and sustain these innate, but latent, capacities for 
coordination if they are to overcome the cognitive distance that is inevitably produced by the 
organizational division of labor, as well as implications for ingroup/outgroup dynamics 
(Brewer, 1991), and organizational roles and their emotional and cognitive correlates. The 
tension between the organizational division of labor and shared cognition is generally 
recognized in organization theory, and many researchers emphasize the role of the 
organization in shaping members’ beliefs, and, in effect, reducing cognitive distance (Kogut 
and Zander, 1996; Lindenberg and Foss, 2011; Weick, 1995; Weick and Roberts, 1993; Witt, 
1998).  
Research on organizational identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005; Brewer and Gardner, 
1996; Brickson, 2005, 2007; Dutton, Roberts and Bednar, 2010; Kogut and Zander, 1996) 
focuses directly on how the formation of identity is intertwined with cognitive 
homogenization processes. The sharing of cognition that organizational identity supports may 
mean that “procedural rules are learned, and coordination and communication are facilitated 
across individuals and groups of diverse specialized competence” (Kogut and Zander, 1996: 
502). An emerging stream of literature deals with shared cognition in teams (e.g., 
Mohammed and Dumville, 2001). In this regard, an important goal of effective team design is 
to assist in the sharing of cognitions (Hirschfeld, Jordan, Feild, Giles, and Armenakis, 2006; 
Priem, Harrison and Muir, 1995). Mathieu and Rapp (2009) argue that clarification regarding 
individual roles in the team and how roles are interrelated is a particularly important aspect of 
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team design, as are clear performance objectives, task coordination, and contingency plans 
for task execution. De Dreu (2007) shows that the more team members understand the 
interdependencies in the team, the more they engage in helping behaviors and learning, and 
the higher their productivity. Apparently, clearly defining and communicating task 
interdependencies contributes to overcoming cognitive distance because it contributes to task 
reflexivity, that is, “the extent to which team members overtly reflect upon the group’s 
objectives, strategies, and processes and adapt them to current or anticipated endogenous or 
environmental circumstances” (West, 1996: 559). This includes more than the sharing of 
cognitions or mental models (or “reducing information asymmetry”), as successful adaptation 
at the group level also requires “cross understanding” (Huber and Lewis, 2010) in which 
group members understand how they differ in terms of knowledge, roles, and so on, and how 
such differences must be taken into account when adapting to change.  
On the organizational level, the sharing of cognitions and even task reflexivity can be 
supported by multiple means. A clear vision and mission statement that focus on a common 
purpose and are consensually supported by top management support the sharing of cognitions 
(Ashforth and Johnson, 2001). The same is true of organizational rituals (Dacin, Munir and 
Tracey, 2010). Chwe (2001) argues that a key purpose of rituals is to support the formation of 
epistemic conditions that approximate the common knowledge conditions of game theory. 
Thus, organizational members who participate in rituals and who know that other 
organizational members participate know that all participants share the knowledge that was 
communicated at the ritual. Task reflexivity, which is cognitively more demanding than 
shared cognition, may be assisted by job rotation and cross-training, as these practices make 
employees familiar with other functions, roles, activities, and so on, and help them to 
understand how these contribute to firm goals. In summary: 
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Proposition 8: Organizational identity, transparent team and task design, and the 
communication of shared beliefs reinforce the value-creation potential of mentalizing 
by reducing the cognitive distance between principals and agents.   
While organizations can be designed to reduce cognitive distance between principals and 
agents, complete elimination of such distance may not be desirable for reasons of variety 
generation (Walsh, 1995).  
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
We have argued that mentalizing is a fundamental determinant of value creation in principal-
agent relations. Specifically, we have suggested that mentalizing represents one way in which 
a principal improves his knowledge of the agent’s characteristics and efforts, as it allows him 
to access the kind of soft psychological information that is not considered in standard agency 
theory. As a result, incentive instruments can be better tailored to agents and principals can 
be more creative in their use of the incentive instruments that are at hand. Mentalizing thus 
represents a source of value creation in principal-agent relations beyond those considered in 
agency theory. 
Our analysis proceeded through four different stages. First, we reviewed and 
problematized (Alvesson and Sandberg, 2011) the cognitive and epistemic assumptions of 
agency theory. Second, we conceptualized the mentalizing construct. Third, focusing on the 
context of a simple principal-agent relationship, we showed that the principal’s mentalizing 
leads to an improved understanding of the agent's type and signaling, and in turn to higher 
value creation in the relation. Finally, we showed that the value creation potential of 
mentalizing is moderated by the cognitive distance that separates principal and agent. We 
discussed individual- and organization-level factors that can be used to reduce cognitive 
distance and moderate its impact on the value-creation consequences of mentalizing. In this 
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section, we close by discussing our model’s contributions, practical implications, and 
desirable future developments.  
Contribution to Theory  
 This paper contributes to management research in a number of ways. First, it explicitly 
introduces the notion of mentalizing into agency theory. Agency theory implicitly makes 
assumptions about mentalizing, but unrealistically assumes that mentalizing is perfect with 
respect to certain parameters and variables (e.g., the agent’s risk preferences) and highly 
imperfect with respect to other variables (e.g., the agent’s effort). We introduce a more 
realistic notion of mentalizing as generally imperfect but given to improvements (Bagozzi, 
Verbeke, Berg, Rietdijk, Dietvorst, and Worm, in press).  
 Second, we show that integrating these constructs with agency theory enriches the 
theory, leading to an improved understanding of the sources of value creation in principal-
agent relations. Thus, a principal that is skilled at mentalizing can better learn the type of the 
agent, read the signals related to the agent’s effort, and signal to the agent. Mentalizing thus 
allows for a fuller understanding of subjective performance assessment (Baker et al., 2004) 
and relates relational signaling (Lindenberg and Foss, 2011) to agency theory. Mentalizing 
creates value because it results in better estimates of the agent’s effort and type, and eases the 
matching of agents with contracts. It also leads to greater creativity in contract design. Agents 
will prefer principals that are more skilled at mentalizing to principals that are less skilled 
because the mentalizing of the former leads to more value creation and, hence, a bigger 
“value pie” that can be shared by the principal and the agent.  
 A third contribution is the placement of agency theory into an explicit organizational 
context. Recent research emphasizes the importance of recognizing the institutional contexts 
in which principal-agent relations take place (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Lubatkin et al., 
2007). Specifically, the incorporation of an institutional perspective into agency theory is 
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expected to improve our understanding of agency problems and, in turn, to allow for more 
accurate predictions (Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodríguez, and Gomez-Mejia, in press). We show 
that when organizational sensemaking instruments reduce the cognitive distance between 
principal and agent, the value-creation potential of the principal-agent relation is higher 
(given a fixed degree of mentalizing capability). In so doing, we implicitly confirm that the 
explanatory power of agency theory may be leveraged by placing the theory in specific 
organizational contexts.  
 Before we turn to a discussion of potential avenues for future research, we note that, to 
some extent, the principal’s needs for mentalizing and agent-specific information are 
mitigated by self-selection and signaling on the part of the agent. Self-selection means that 
there is an endogenous matching of agents and contracts to the extent that agents choose 
offered contracts on the basis of their (unobserved) heterogeneity (Lazear, 2000). Agent 
signaling means that the agent can convey credible information about such factors as his 
ability to the principal. However, while self-selection and signaling make life easier for the 
principal, they do not eliminate the need for mentalizing. Even well-developed reward 
systems with a high degree of automation leave considerable room for judgment on the part 
of the principal regarding the interpretation of concrete signals on agent performance (Baker 
et al., 1994). Such judgments may be based on mentalizing. With respect to signaling, signals 
are often very coarse (e.g., education, grades, job history). The fact that firms conduct 
complicated hiring processes with multiple face-to-face interview rounds testifies to the fact 
that signaling is not a complete substitute for mentalizing. Thus, firms (principals) need to not 
only learn the type of an agent but also understand agent-specific characteristics. This 
requires mentalizing.  
Future Research  
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 The introduction into agency theory of cognitive and epistemic assumptions that are 
more in accord with the traditional emphasis on bounded rationality in management theory is 
an ambitious target toward which this paper makes but a first step. Our contribution to current 
theory can be further elaborated and extended in several ways. Specifically, we envision eight 
attractive avenues for future research.  
 The mentalizing construct and its antecedents. Mentalizing has been researched in 
evolutionary anthropology (Call and Tomasello, 2008), neuroscience (Gallagher and Frith, 
2003), neuro-economics (Singer and Fehr, 2005), and psychology (Galinsky et al., 2008). We 
have conceptualized it in a managerial context, but we have provided a highly abstract 
treatment in the specific context of the agency relation. However, as monitoring (in a broad 
sense) employees only constitutes a subset of a manager’s activities, it seems promising to 
extend mentalizing to other managerial activities, such as coordination (Heath and 
Staudenmeyer, 2000) and leadership. A useful avenue for future research would be to 
investigate what, specifically, may antecede intentional mentalizing in a managerial context. 
In other words, are there any organizational factors that may actually trigger the deliberate 
mentalizing potential of a low-mentalizing principal?  
 The agent’s mentalizing. To keep our analysis manageable, we have made several 
simplifying assumptions. One such assumption is that we only need to consider the 
principal’s mentalizing. Although we have “frozen” the agent’s mentalizing, mentalizing is 
clearly an interactive process involving both principal and agent. The question is whether 
taking the agent’s mentalizing into account will change our conclusions. On the one hand, a 
mentalizing agent will better understand that a mentalizing principal seeks to improve his 
understanding of the agent’s characteristics, effort, and so on to the benefit of both. Given 
such reasoning, our conclusions should be strengthened by including the agent’s mentalizing. 
On the other hand, it may be that agents who are high in mentalizing relative to principals 
 
 
51 
may better game incentive systems to their own advantage (Tirole, 1986). This would 
complicate our reasoning because it would suggest that the agent’s mentalizing may be value 
destroying. However, to the extent that principal-agent relationships are placed in competitive 
conditions, value-destroying relationships are not viable and the sorting process will match 
agents and principals that are high in mentalizing.   
 Empathy. Recent evidence from social psychology depicts the capacities to cognitively 
understand others’ point of view and to emotionally connect with others as “related but 
distinct social competencies” (Galinsky et al., 2008: 378). This paper focuses only on the 
perspective-taking (i.e., cognitive) dimension of empathy. However, cognition, emotion, and 
motivation tend to be intertwined in human behavior (Cohen, 2005; Kruglanski et al., 2002). 
We did not freeze motivation per se; for instance, we considered the agent’s motivation as 
key to value creation and, therefore, as a crucial target of the principal’s mentalizing. Rather, 
we controlled for the possibility that the principal’s mentalizing may trigger affective and 
emotional behaviors in the principal himself. In other words, a precise theory of the agent’s 
mind might engender emotional and affective reactions in the principal that could, in turn, 
substantially condition the principal-agent interaction. For example, a principal who is high in 
mentalizing may recognize that an agent is misbehaving because of honest incompetence 
rather than for self-seeking reasons (Hendry, 2002). Such a principal may feel sympathy for 
the (incompetent) agent and decide not to use the intended sanctions. Consistent with 
Galinsky et al.’s (2008) analysis of the impact of empathy in negotiations, it could be argued 
that the emergence of strong affective and emotional feelings linked to enhanced mentalizing 
on the side of the principal likely influences value creation in the principal-agent relation. 
The effects may be negative or positive, as increased mentalizing may foster antipathy or 
sympathy, and both may have negative as well as positive consequences for value creation 
depending on the concrete situation.  
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 Principal and agent characteristics. Principals and agents differ on multiple 
dimensions. To simplify the exposition, we only focused on the principal’s experience and 
proximity to the agent. However, principals—not least in their capacities as managers—also 
differ on dimensions such as attitudes, information-processing styles, and leadership styles, 
characteristics that seem to be good candidates for additional moderators for the models 
depicted in Figures 1 and 2. For example, information-processing styles may moderate the 
relation between mentalizing capability and type learning postulated in Proposition 1. 
Similarly, agent characteristics need to be introduced more fully in our theorizing. A starting 
point may be to consider the agent’s experience as a potential moderator between mentalizing 
and type learning. For instance, experienced agents may be better at recognizing and 
preventing the principal’s mentalizing by means of impression management. Thus, the 
agent’s experience may (negatively) moderate the impact of the principal’s mentalizing on 
his understanding of the agent’s type.  
 Variability. Although we place principal-agent relations in an organizational context, 
we do not discuss them in the context of an environment. Nevertheless, environments differ 
widely (Dess and Rasheed, 1991) and in ways that could matter to the reasoning in this paper. 
For example, mentalizing in fast-moving industries may be different from mentalizing in 
slower-moving industries. Relatedly, the extent to which the firm confronts many different 
environments (e.g., national firms versus multinational corporations) matters for mentalizing. 
One important reason why the environment matters is that different environments typically 
involve agents with different characteristics. Human resource management scholars use the 
construct of the “human resource pool” (Lepak and Snell, 1999). In analogy to this, firms 
confront “agent pools.” These may be dimensionalized in terms of size, heterogeneity, and 
turnover. As firms differ widely in size, the size of their agent pools also differs widely. 
National firms typically confront less heterogeneous agent pools than multinational firms. 
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Firms in dynamic environments typically experience greater turnover than firms in less 
dynamic environments (Haveman, 1995). It may be hypothesized that mentalizing is more 
complex and costly (and its effects are weaker) when the number of agents is high, agents are 
heterogeneous, and the relation between principal and agent(s) is characterized by high 
turnaround. Specifically, in terms of the model in Figure 2, the number, heterogeneity, and 
turnover of the agent pool negatively moderate the (negative) effect of organizational 
sensemaking instruments on cognitive distance (i.e., Proposition 8).   
 Performance implications. Much interest has recently been devoted to understanding 
the micro-foundations of organizational performance in terms of both motivational 
(Gottschalg and Zollo, 2007; Lindenberg and Foss, 2011) and cognitive micro-foundations 
(Gavetti, 2005; Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007). A concern with micro-foundations naturally 
involves human resources, which are perhaps the “key ingredient to organizational success 
and failure” (Baron and Kreps, 1999: 4). The contribution to value creation made by human 
resources is, among things, dependent on their motivation. In this paper, we have addressed 
how factors related to knowledge and rationality influence the provision of incentives and, 
hence, the motivation of agents. We have identified three factors that influence value creation 
related to human resources: mentalizing, cognitive distance, and organizational sensemaking 
instruments. Mentalizing may be treated as resource in the sense of the resource-based view 
(Barney, 1991). Mentalizing, in fact, may give rise to rents when it yields improvements in 
value creation (net the costs required to obtain that increase) that exceed those of the 
competition. The costliness of imitating these rents may make rents sustainable.  
 Mentalizing and “envy costs.” While one strength of mentalizing is that it allows for 
the design of fine-grained, agent-specific incentives (see Propositions 1 to 5), the 
implementation of “customized” incentives may raise issues of fairness and consistency in 
organizations. Although the aim of mentalizing is to improve the measurement of input 
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performance, and thus contribute to a better alignment of efforts and rewards, it is possible 
that the increased differentiation brought about by mentalizing may lead to perceptions of 
inequity and even envy among organizational members (Nickerson and Zenger, 2008). 
Perceived inequity relative to relevant social referents may drive attempts to restore equity in 
ways that are harmful to the organization (e.g., refusing to cooperate with those referents who 
have been “privileged”; Cropanzano, Goldman and Folger, 2003). Such “envy costs” need to 
be balanced against the benefits of mentalizing in a fuller, more realistic model of the costs 
and benefits of mentalizing.  
 Empirical work. Future research may also include empirical work on the ideas 
proposed here so as to gather additional “empirical detail about how principals and agents 
actually choreograph their dance” (Shapiro, 2005: 283). With the aid of increasingly 
sophisticated instruments and multidisciplinary techniques, researchers are developing scales 
for measuring individuals’ capabilities to mentalize (Dietvorst et al., 2009). This makes it 
possible, in principle, to test our research model and propositions. However, given that 
empirical research on mentalizing in the context of principal-agent relations and in the 
organizational context is virtually non-existent, a multi-methodology approach that relies on 
interview, in-depth observational, and experimental methods seems preferable.  
Formal Work. Economic models are deliberately kept simple for the purpose of 
mathematical treatment. One could fear that taking mentalizing into account in the way we 
have proposed may make models intractable or, at least, non-parsimonious. However, 
economists are busy building tractable and parsimonious models of bounded rationality (e.g., 
Rubinstein, 1998; Mullainathan, 2002). Moreover, the outcomes of substituting the current 
unrealistic cognitive and epistemic assumptions of agency theory with more realistic ones 
ultimately need to be examined in the context of formal models that allow for greater 
stringency than verbal logic.  
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A first stab at such a formalization could be to add a variable, say ”m,” that refers to the 
mentalizing ability of the principal (and, potentially, a second one for the agent’s mentalizing 
ability). This variable, which would vary between 0 and 1 (0 = no mentalizing ability; 1 = full 
ability, i.e., the classical agency case), would then also show up in, for example, the formula 
for the optimal incentive intensity (Holmström, 1979), beta. Less than perfect mentalizing 
(i.e., m < 1) would lower the optimal beta, as it is more likely that the variable component of 
the remuneration is inappropriate given the agent’s characteristics. Similar results could be 
derived for optimal monitoring intensity.  
Coda 
In recent decades, agency theory has become an important source theory in 
management. At the same time, the world has become increasingly globalized, the average 
tenure of employees has been significantly reduced, environments have become increasingly 
dynamic and unpredictable, and firms have increasingly made use of fleeting forms of 
organization and relations. These developments cast doubt on a fundamental assumption in 
principal-agency theory—that the principal can (in certain crucial respects) perfectly mind-
read the agent.  
In this paper, we have examined the consequences of making more realistic 
assumptions with respect to the principal’s mentalizing, and we have shown how this leads to 
a richer, more managerially relevant theory of value creation in principal-agent relations. We 
believe that an understanding of the role played by the human potential for interpersonal 
sensemaking will not only enrich the explanatory potential of the theory, but also provide 
managers with refined guidance for value maximization. We trust that the analysis presented 
here will encourage future explorations of this new, important path towards understanding 
value creation in economic relations.  
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MOTIVATING KNOWLEDGE SHARING WHEN REWARDS ARE 
AMBIGUOUS: THE ROLE OF COMPLEMENTARY MOTIVATORS 
 
 
Abstract  
The extant literature identifies a number of antecedents of the motivation to share 
knowledge, implicitly suggesting that those who are exposed to such antecedents 
assume they are unambiguous. However, whether a reward for sharing knowledge is 
intended to be controlling or informational is not always clear. The presence of other 
potential antecedents of knowledge-sharing motivation may overcome such ambiguity. 
Specifically, we test for complementarities among rewards, job design, and work 
climate in the form of a three-way interaction among these variables with respect to 
their impact on knowledge-sharing motivation. Our analysis of 1,523 employees in five 
knowledge-intensive firms shows that employees who are exposed to ambiguous 
rewards for knowledge sharing experience higher levels of autonomous motivation to 
share when they are simultaneously exposed to a job design and work climate that 
support knowledge sharing. We argue that job design and work climate serve as a 
context for how employees experience rewards. 
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INTRODUCTION  
An expanding body of research within, or closely related to, the human resource management 
(HRM) field addresses knowledge sharing and its antecedents. In particular, certain types of rewards 
(Gagné & Deci, 2005), job designs (Foss, Minbaeva, Reinholt, & Pedersen, 2009; Grant, 2007, 
2008b), and work climates (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Ryan & Deci, 2000b) are argued to call 
forth the autonomous motivation that is a main driver of knowledge-sharing behaviors (Osterloh & 
Frey, 2000; Reinholt, Pedersen, & Foss, 2011). Extant research implicitly assumes that rewards for 
knowledge sharing are unambiguous in the sense individuals know whether those rewards are meant 
to play an informational or controlling role. However, the purpose of knowledge-sharing rewards 
may be far from obvious. For example, depending on the context, extrinsic rewards for knowledge 
sharing may stimulate feelings of autonomy (and not just crowd out intrinsic motivation, as is 
sometimes posited). Moreover, while it recognizes the importance of rewards, job design, and 
climate as antecedents of knowledge sharing, extant research has not shed much light on the 
interactions of the above predictors. Notably, we do not know whether these predictors support or 
even reinforce each other, and if so, why this is the case.  
 In this research, we argue that these issues are very closely related. Based on the idea that “it is 
not the reward per se, but rather its meaning to the recipient, that determines the reward’s effects” 
(Deci et al., 1999: 658), we focus on the role of context (here job design and climate) in determining 
employees’ responses to rewards for knowledge sharing. Such rewards may be fairly ambiguous. For 
example, is “recognition” intended to signal to an employee an appreciation of her competence or is 
it an attempt to control her? In order to answer this question, we must focus on various aspects of the 
context, such as the other instruments that management may use to stimulate employees’ propensity 
to share knowledge, because doing so provides insight into the causality attributions that employees 
may make.  
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A central issue in the understanding of motivation is the perceived locus of causality, that is, an 
individual’s self-perception of whether what causes him to engage in a specific behavior is internal 
or external (DeCharms, 1968; Ryan & Connell, 1989). Employees’ causality attributions regarding 
their own engagement in knowledge sharing are important because such attributions significantly 
affect behavioral effort, persistence, and quality (Weinstein & Ryan, 2010). An internal perceived 
locus of causality is therefore a crucial driver of the efficacy of rewards aimed at triggering 
behaviors, such as knowledge sharing, that are mainly autonomously motivated (Deci et al., 1999). 
Our main argument is that employees’ self-attributions are highly dependent upon the perceived 
consistency among different antecedents of knowledge sharing—specifically, rewards for knowledge 
sharing, the level of autonomy in the job design, and the work climate’s support of knowledge 
sharing.  
This argument implies that certain configurations of antecedents of autonomous motivation for 
knowledge sharing are complementary in the sense that the presence of one antecedent increases the 
effect of other antecedents on such motivation (Ennen & Richter, 2010; Meyer, Tsui, & Hinings, 
1993). This idea aligns with recent contributions to the HRM field that look at how systems of 
practices may influence employee motivation (e.g., Gottschalg & Zollo, 2007; Foss et al., 2009; 
Mossholder et al., 2011). We specifically theorize that antecedents of motivation for knowledge 
sharing may be complementary in terms of ambiguity reduction. Thus, job design and work climate 
(which are relatively unambiguous in terms of control versus information) provide a background 
against which employees interpret informal rewards as informational or controlling. In other words, 
consistency is the main driver of reductions in reward ambiguity. Data from a survey of 1,523 
employees in five knowledge-intensive firms suggest that the interaction between rewards, and a job 
design and a work climate that are supportive of knowledge sharing has a significant and positive 
effect on employees’ autonomous motivation to share knowledge.  
MOTIVATIONAL FOUNDATIONS FOR KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
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Fostering Autonomous Motivation for Knowledge Sharing 
 Knowledge sharing is a discretionary behavior that is associated with beneficial outcomes for 
the individuals involved and for the organization at large. Knowledge sharing matters to individuals 
and organizations because it fosters learning (Alavi & Leidner, 2001; Hansen, Mors, & Løvås, 2005) 
and other beneficial organizational outcomes, such as improved absorptive capacity, best practice 
transfer, and productivity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Tsai, 2001). 
Knowledge sharing is difficult to measure and, thus, to enforce by means of formal schemes based 
on extrinsic rewards (e.g., bonuses) (Osterloh & Frey, 2000). Sharing behaviors tend to rely on 
sentiments of fairness, loyalty, helpfulness, reciprocity, and individual initiative on the side of the 
individuals involved. Consistently, several studies show that autonomous motivation is a critical 
driver of employees’ engagement in knowledge sharing (e.g., Foss et al., 2009; Gagné, 2009; 
Osterloh & Frey, 2000; Reinholt et al., 2011).  
 A key point in self-determination theory (SDT) (Gagné & Deci, 2005) is that motivation differs 
not just in level but also in kind. In particular, motivation differs in terms of the extent to which it is 
autonomous. An autonomously motivated individual has a perceived locus of causality that is 
internal, such that an autonomously motivated individual feels that she is the originator of her own 
behavior. This feeling also produces the impression that the specific behavior is self-endorsed, and 
congruent with her interests and values (Weinstein & Ryan, 2010). 1  However, autonomous 
motivation is not automatically maintained, but requires signals of autonomy, competence 
affirmation, and relatedness (as opposed to control) (Gagné & Deci, 2005). Most importantly, 
motivation-crowding research shows that autonomously driven behaviors may easily be 
compromised by situations that the individual experiences as controlling (Deci et al., 1999; Frey & 
Jegen, 2001; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). For instance, research highlights that rewards (Deci et 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In contrast, when an individual is motivated in a more controlled manner, the perceived locus of causality is ascribed to 
forces that are external to the individual. This implies that the individual does not feel that she “owns” the behavior, but 
feels “pressured” to undertake it—either by an external source (external pressure) or by a poorly integrated external 
regulation (self-imposed pressure) (Deci & Ryan, 1985) 
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al., 1999), communication (Ryan et al. 1983), evaluations (Harackiewicz et al., 1984), and imposed 
deadlines (Amabile, DeJong, & Lepper, 1976) that are perceived as controlling may undermine 
intrinsic motivation, the prototype of autonomous motivation (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Moreover, 
Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, and Leone (1994) and Grolnic and Ryan (1989) show that perceived control 
may also harm internalized types of extrinsic motivation, which are similarly categorized as 
autonomous motivation (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Thus, autonomous motivation can be compromised 
by instances of perceived control.  
 Gottschalg and Zollo (2007: 423) theorize that organizations can influence employees’ 
motivational attitudes (and, in turn, their interest alignment) through “adjustments of the three 
interest alignment levers: reward system, socialization regime, and changes in the job design.” 
Similarly, Gagné and Deci (2005) argue that an interpersonal environment—in terms of work context 
and the nature of the task—is the most fundamental factor that may be combined with rewards so as 
to support autonomy and, in turn, the development of autonomous forms of motivation. Thus, 
rewards, job design, and work climate have emerged in recent research as the most fundamental 
levers that can influence autonomous motivation and, in turn, knowledge sharing in organizations 
(see also Deci et al., 1999; Foss et al., 2009; Gagné, 2009). We therefore consider each lever in 
detail.  
Rewards. Rewards are an integral part of organizational life and are widely used to motivate 
employees. SDT research recognizes that rewards can have an informational aspect and a controlling 
aspect. When a reward is informational, it conveys information to the recipient that she is competent 
at the focal activity (or information on how she can improve her performance in the future), which 
tends to enhance autonomous motivation. In contrast, when a reward is perceived as controlling, the 
individual feels pressured to deliver specific behavioral outcomes, which has a negative effect on 
autonomous motivation (Ryan, Mims & Koestner, 1983). Whether a reward is perceived as mainly 
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controlling or informational depends on the nature of the reward itself and on the individual’s 
interpretation of that reward (Deci et al., 1999).  
 Although piece-rate rewards may come to mind as an example of controlling rewards (Deci et 
al., 1999; Ryan, Mims & Koestner, 1983), pay-for-performance rewards may be ambiguous in 
actuality, perhaps highly so (Fang & Gerhart, 2012). Furthermore, studies consistently find that 
rewards such as recognition and praise can have a positive effect on autonomous motivation because 
they strengthen the recipient’s feeling of being competent at the focal activity (Deci et al., 1999). 
However, recognition and praise can also be used in a controlling manner (Loch, Huberman, & 
Stout, 2000). The same applies to other rewards, such as interesting assignments, personal and job-
related development, and stimulating challenges, although these are usually argued to be most likely 
to enhance autonomous motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000a). In sum, rewards are 
potentially ambiguous because they can be perceived as either largely informational or largely 
controlling.  
 Job design. Job-design research shows that jobs can be designed to foster autonomous 
motivation (Hackman & Oldham, 1976) and knowledge sharing (Foss et al., 2009; Gagné, 2009). 
Two particularly important dimensions of job design with respect to autonomous motivation are job 
variety and autonomy. The latter refers to the extent to which a job provides the employee with 
freedom to decide when and how to carry out specific tasks (Hackman & Oldham, 1976). Job 
autonomy and variety offer employees a sense of responsibility (Fuller et al., 2006) and volition, 
which are essential for autonomous motivation to thrive (Gagné & Deci, 2005). Furthermore, by 
providing autonomy to employees, management signals confidence in their level of competence and 
their motivation to carry out the focal tasks (Bénabou & Tirole, 2003). In other words, a job that 
provides employees with autonomy and variety strengthens employees’ feeling of being competent 
and self-determined. Such a non-controlling job design is supportive of autonomously-driven 
behaviors, such as knowledge sharing.  
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  Work climate. SDT explicitly theorizes that—along with rewards and job design—work 
climate is essential for employees’ motivation (Gagné & Deci, 2005). Work climate is a multi-
dimensional construct (Fletcher & Nusbaum, 2009). However, we specifically argue that a work 
climate that values sharing and supports relatedness enhances employees’ autonomous motivation 
because it emphasizes choice rather than control (Gagné & Deci, 2005). Mossholder, Richardson, 
and Settoon (2011) describe a similar type of climate, and stress the importance of a high level of 
mutual commitment and trust. Such a climate provides a secure social base from which employees 
gain a sense of being connected to others. This, in turn, is critical for the development of autonomous 
motivation (Deci & Ryan, 2000).  
 The same pattern has been found to be applicable in the context of knowledge sharing. Collins 
and Smith (2006) empirically show the importance of a trusting and collaborative social climate for 
employee engagement in knowledge sharing. Cabrera et al. (2006) find that perceived support from 
managers and colleagues is one of the most important determinants of knowledge sharing among 
employees. Other research links employees’ perceptions of organizational norms regarding 
knowledge sharing to their intentions to engage in knowledge sharing (Bock, Zmud, Kim, & Lee, 
2005). In sum, an autonomous motivation to share knowledge is stimulated by a work climate that is 
perceived as trusting, cooperative, and supportive of knowledge sharing.  
 The above identification of rewards, job design, and work climate as the principal levers for 
triggering autonomous motivation towards knowledge sharing has strong similarities with the self-
regulatory approach (Tyler & Blader, 2005), empowerment (Conger & Kanungo, 1988), and 
commitment systems (Mossholder, Richardson & Settoon, 2011). These can be contrasted with the 
command-and-control approach, powerlessness, and compliance systems, respectively. In the 
following, we argue that these motivators form a configuration in the context of predicting 
autonomous motivation to share knowledge. 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
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Ambiguous Rewards for Knowledge Sharing  
 Organizational activities may exhibit varying degrees of complexity, uncertainty, and 
ambiguity (March & Simon, 1958; Stinchcombe, 1990; Saint-Charles & Mongeau, 2009). 
Knowledge-sharing behaviors are characterized by a high degree of ambiguity because of the 
intangible nature of knowledge, the difficulty of assessing what exactly is being shared in terms of a 
well-defined measurement standard, the inherent condition of the asymmetric information that is 
obtained through knowledge-sharing relations, and the difficulty of defining meaningful performance 
standards for knowledge-sharing efforts. Rewards provided in organizational contexts for carrying 
out activities with the above characteristics are fraught with the same problems, as they are 
ambiguous and difficult for employees to interpret (Lindenberg, 2000; Bénabou & Tirole, 2003). As 
such, a crucial determinant of the effects of knowledge-sharing rewards on motivation and, in turn, 
on behavior is the reduction of the ambiguity associated with those rewards.  
 From the perspective of SDT, the relevant process concerns whether an employee perceives a 
reward for knowledge sharing as controlling or informational. When an employee perceives a reward 
as controlling, he believes that an external source is controlling his behavior and thus feels in a 
position of dependence vis-à-vis the provider of the reward (DeCharms, 1968). A controlling reward 
therefore elicits the perception of an external locus of causality (Deci et al., 1999). In contrast, when 
a reward is perceived as informational, the locus of causality is perceived as internal because the 
reward triggers feelings of competence and autonomy. Rewards for knowledge sharing that are 
perceived as informational will therefore foster employees’ autonomous motivation to engage in 
knowledge sharing.  
 Different types of rewards may differentially be perceived as informational or controlling. 
For example, pay-for-performance schemes have often been associated with control, whereas 
interesting assignments have typically been associated with perceptions of autonomy. Nevertheless, 
research increasingly shows that virtually all rewards may carry substantial ambiguity in terms of 
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how controlling or informational they are in the perceptions of the employee. This ambiguity 
depends on several factors, such as the way the rewards are implemented, the narratives that 
accompany their implementation, the context in which they are implemented, and the extent to which 
they are based on subjective processes of managerial judgment (e.g., Fang & Gerhart, 2012; Loch et 
al., 2000). Thus, even though the nature of the reward itself may have some impact on whether that 
reward is more likely to be perceived as informational or controlling, other factors greatly affect the 
salience of the two aspects. Employees must draw information from these additional factors in order 
to ascertain whether a given reward is predominantly informational or controlling.  
The Importance of Context and Consistency  
Rewards are not provided in a vacuum. Organizations have access to many different levers, 
including job design, and less tangible yet highly important instruments like “culture” and “identity” 
(Gottschalg & Zollo, 2007). Configurational research (Meyer, Tsui, & Hinings, 1993) and research 
on complementarities among organizational practices (Ennen & Richter, 2010) lend credence to the 
notion that those levers tend to cluster in configurations (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990, 1995; Wright, 
2003). More generally, this view is consistent with research demonstrating the importance of 
considering firms’ work policies as part of a coherent system (e.g., Aral, Brynjolfsson, & Wu, 2012; 
Bowen & Ostroff, 2004; Huselid, 1995; Milgrom & Roberts, 1995).  
Moreover, when exposed to multiple stimuli originating from the same source, employees 
process those stimuli in search of consistency (Connelly et al., 2010; Lindenberg, 2003). In fact, 
human actors actively seek consistency in their beliefs, values, and attitudes (Festinger, 1957) to such 
an extent that a lack of perceived consistency may make communication less effective (Connelly et 
al., 2010; Gao, Darroch, Mather, & MacGregor, 2008; Schlicht, 2008), and ultimately threaten 
individuals’ motivation to initiate and persist in tasks (Thomas & Velthouse, 1990). Along the same 
lines, configurations that are internally consistent have been shown to be more effective than 
configurations that are internally inconsistent (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005; Ennen & Richter, 2010).  
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Thus, the effects of the individual elements of a configuration cannot be fully understood in 
isolation, as they only acquire full force in the configuration (Meyer et al., 1993), that is, in the 
broader organizational context (Bamberger, 2008). In the case of a configuration of rewards, job 
design, and climate aimed at triggering knowledge sharing, we propose that these particular features 
of a given work environment influence employees’ interpretation of rewards for knowledge sharing. 
In other words, the work environment plays a critical role in reducing the ambiguity that is naturally 
associated with those rewards.  
Given the interpretive nature of the mechanisms underlying such a configuration, we expect the 
motivators to interact with each other in a complementary (as opposed to simply additive) fashion. 
We expect multiple, consistent elements to converge so as to reinforce each other in engendering a 
consistent view of potentially ambiguous circumstances. Consistency is particularly important in the 
case of autonomous motivation for knowledge sharing. In fact, while autonomous motivation is 
highly beneficial in terms of psychological and behavioral outcomes, it is fairly fragile and can be 
disrupted if non-supportive environmental conditions, such as a lack of consistency, are encountered 
(Ryan & Deci, 2000a).  
Consistency and Ambiguity Reduction in the Context of Rewards for Knowledge Sharing  
 We argue that contextual factors make it easier for employees to reduce the ambiguity 
surrounding the motives of a given reward. Specifically, we argue that job design and work climate 
constitute the broader context that serves as a cognitive backdrop for an employee’s causality 
attributions regarding rewarded behaviors. In this sense, we expect reinforcing relations among 
rewards for knowledge sharing, a work climate that is supportive of knowledge sharing, and a job 
design that—through manifestations of autonomy and variety—promotes knowledge sharing.  
 Employees use what they know about job design when they attempt to reduce the ambiguity 
(information versus control) of rewards. Ceteris paribus, a job design that promotes autonomy and 
variety strengthens feelings of competence and self-determination, and in turn supports an 
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informational interpretation of a causally ambiguous reward for knowledge sharing. From being 
granted autonomy in the job, employees know that management does not exercise excessive control, 
but rather trusts employees to perform tasks in the best possible way. Similarly, a work climate that 
is trusting, cooperative, and thus supportive of knowledge sharing is consistent with informational 
and non-controlling rewards. Therefore, in the context of knowledge sharing, a work climate that is 
supportive of knowledge sharing emphasizes the informational aspect of a causally ambiguous 
reward for knowledge sharing. By the same token, a job design that promotes employees’ autonomy, 
competences, and self-determination is consistent with a work climate that is trusting and 
cooperative, and thus supportive of knowledge sharing.  
A configuration of motivators that is consistent in being informational and supportive of 
autonomy will elicit perceptions of an internal locus of causality and therefore lead to high levels of 
autonomous motivation for knowledge sharing. However, given that autonomous motivation is easily 
disrupted, a configuration of motivators that is internally inconsistent (such that one or more 
motivators are perceived as controlling) will likely prompt a shift in the perception of the locus of 
causality from internal to external. In other words, a context (in terms of job design and work 
climate) that is internally consistent and supportive of autonomy, trust, and cooperation will lend 
credence to an informational interpretation of ambiguous rewards. In contrast, an inconsistent 
configuration of motivators will cast doubt on management’s motives for rewarding knowledge 
sharing, and employees are therefore likely to perceive rewards as attempts to control their 
engagement in knowledge sharing.  
In sum, the efficacy of rewards for autonomous behaviors has been shown to be conditional 
upon the perception of those rewards as being informational (as opposed to controlling). Therefore, 
we expect employees who are exposed to a knowledge-sharing-supportive climate and job design to 
be more likely to perceive the informational aspect of potentially ambiguous knowledge-sharing 
rewards as salient—and, in turn, to manifest higher levels of autonomous motivation to share 
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knowledge. In other words, there should be complementarities between rewards for knowledge 
sharing, and knowledge-sharing-supportive work climate and job design. Thus, we hypothesize the 
following:  
Hypothesis: There is a positive interaction effect among 1) rewards for knowledge sharing, 2) 
a non-controlling job design, and 3) a work climate that is supportive of knowledge sharing on 
the autonomous motivation to share knowledge, such that the presence of any two components 
of this system without the third is less effective than the presence of all three combined.  
Figure 1 summarizes the hypothesized relations.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 here 
-------------------------------------- 
METHODS 
Data Collection and Research Site 
The data used in this analysis were collected from five knowledge-intensive firms that are 
headquartered in Denmark. The aim was to involve all of the employees in each firm (i.e., individual 
respondents) who could be involved in the sharing of knowledge. This approach made it possible to 
collect multi-source, individual-level data (e.g., Rousseau, 1985; Holmbeck, Li, Schurman, 
Friedman, & Coakley, 2002).  
The data were collected from the following Danish firms: COWI, MAN Diesel, NNIT, Oticon, 
and Rambøll. Two of the firms are active in manufacturing (MAN Diesel produces diesel engines; 
Oticon produces hearing aids); two are active in consulting, mainly related to construction and 
engineering (COWI and Rambøll); and the last firm (NNIT) provides consultancy services in IT (for 
more descriptive data on the five firms, see Table 1).  
The firms differ in terms of size. With more than 5,000 employees, Rambøll and Oticon are 
more than five times larger than NNIT, which has less than 1,000 employees. MAN Diesel and 
 
	  
84 
COWI lie between these extremes. However, all five firms may be described as knowledge intensive 
in terms of their use of highly skilled employees (employees with engineering and economics 
degrees are particularly common in these firms), and in terms of their strong, explicit focus on 
knowledge creation and sharing. None of the firms are listed on the stock exchange, but three of 
them (COWI, Oticon, and Rambøll) are owned by foundations with a long-term orientation. The two 
remaining firms are owned by other companies, with MAN Diesel being part of the German 
company MAN and NNIT being part of the Danish company Novo Nordisk. All five firms have 
relatively high sales per employee, spanning from DKK 742,000 (approximately USD 141,000) in 
Rambøll to DKK 1,246,000 (approximately USD 237,000) in MAN Diesel.  
This setting of five knowledge-intensive firms that differ on some dimensions is particularly 
relevant for our study of whether the determinants of autonomous motivation to share knowledge 
differ across firms. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the sampling frame.   
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
-------------------------------------- 
From February 2007 to April 2008, the same questionnaire was distributed to relevant 
employees in the five firms. In collaboration with firm representatives (typically HR representatives), 
the departments within each firm that were most relevant in terms of knowledge sharing were 
identified. The departments surveyed were characterized by team-based work, and encompassed such 
job functions as engineering, management consultancy, and IT consultancy. All employees from 
these departments were invited to participate in the survey. Typically, the survey was conducted in a 
condensed period of two to three weeks in each firm (Table 1 provides details on the exact time span 
of the survey for each firm). A total of 3,456 employees were approached across the five firms and 
1,593 responses were returned, providing an overall response rate of 46% (ranging from 41% in 
Rambøll to 82% in NNIT; see Table 1). However, due to missing values, only 1,523 responses were 
 
	  
85 
included in the statistical test of the models. This corresponds to a highly satisfactory useable 
response rate of 44%.  
More than half of the useable responses (51.6%) were derived from a single firm—Rambøll. 
The other half of the respondents were more evenly distributed across the remaining four firms (with 
NNIT providing the lowest share at 7% and MAN Diesel the highest share at 16% of all 
respondents). Although the high response rate (above 50%) makes non-response bias less of an issue, 
we examined the likelihood of this bias in a number of ways. First, we discussed the issue with the 
firm representatives within each of the five firms, who assured us that there were no visible biases 
between those responding to the survey invitation and the overall demographic distribution of their 
firms’ employees. Second, we compared demographic variables (age, tenure, level of education, and 
gender) between the early and late respondents (wave analysis). The assumption is that the group of 
late respondents is closer to the non-responding group than the group of early respondents 
(Rogelberg & Stanton, 2007). In this regard, we conducted an ANOVA analysis of the differences in 
means for the two groups for the demographic variables. The hypotheses of differences in the means 
are all rejected (with F-values < 2). Given these results, we are confident that our data does not suffer 
from major problems of non-response bias.  
Research Instrument 
The data was collected using a web-based questionnaire, which was developed on the basis of a 
focused literature review. It was pre-tested with managers and management scholars to ensure that 
each item and the overall format were easily understood.  
As the effect of rewards, job design, and climate depends on how employees interpret these 
elements (Deci et al., 1999), and as we are interested in employees’ perceptions of locus of causality 
in terms of the reasons for their engagement in knowledge sharing, the independent and dependent 
variables in this study were operationalized through self-reports. Such measures are useful in studies 
of human behavior (Howard, 1994), especially in studies of motivation, which is difficult for 
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observers to assess (Ryan & Connell, 1989). Thus, most studies of motivations to share knowledge 
make use of self-reported measures (e.g., Cabrera, Collins, & Salgado, 2006; Szulanski, 1996).  
However, a well-known potential limitation of self-reported measures is common method bias. 
We addressed this potential bias through our research design and by running appropriate statistical 
tests. Our questionnaire consisted of different scales, some of which were reversed. This diminishes 
the risk of biases (Rust & Coil, 1994). More importantly, Evans (1985) has shown that interaction 
effects are robust against common method bias. Furthermore, Siemsen, Roth, and Oliveira (2010: 
472) highlight that “[c]ommon method bias can be effectively controlled by including other 
independent variables, which exhibit small bivariate correlation (< 0.3) among each other and those 
measures that suffer from CMV. Thus, CMV is less of a problem in OLS models with many 
independent variables, especially if these variables are not highly correlated.” In fact, we included 
five continuous variables (all with a bivariate correlation below 0.3) and four categorical variables as 
explanatory variables in the tested models. The highest correlation of 0.21 was obtained between 
rewards for knowledge sharing and autonomy-promoting job design (see Table 3).  
In addition, we performed a number of statistical analyses to assess the severity of common 
method bias. First, a Harman’s one-factor test on the items indicated that common methods bias was 
not an issue. In other words, multiple factors were detected and the variance did not merely stem 
from the first factors (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). The five continuous independent variables 
included in the models form three factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1, and the first two factors 
only capture 26% and 23% of the total variance, respectively. Furthermore, following Lindell and 
Whitney (2001) and Podsakoff, Mackenzie, and Podsakoff (2003), we conducted an analysis 
involving marker variables. While these marker variables did have separate explanatory power in 
some cases, they did not remove the significance of the key variables. While the statistical tests do 
not eliminate the threat of common method bias, they suggest that our results are not driven 
predominantly by common method variance. Moreover, our results are based on complex estimations 
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that involve multiple independent variables and interaction terms. It has been argued that it is highly 
unlikely that the results of such models emerge solely as a result of common methods bias (Evans, 
1985; Siemsen et al., 2010). 
An invitation with the link to the internet-based questionnaire was emailed via the company 
representatives to the agreed-upon sample. To reduce potential social desirability bias, respondents 
were ensured that the survey software prevented identification of individual employees. All 
questionnaires were returned directly to the researchers and only aggregate-level data (firm and 
division level) were provided to the company, which further reduces the likelihood of biased 
responses (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  
Measures 
Most measures used in this study were adapted from existing scales in the knowledge-sharing 
and motivation literature. Our final model included four multi-item variables: the dependent variable 
and three independent variables. In addition, we included two single item variables and four 
categorical variables as control variables. For all multi-item variables, a confirmatory factor analysis 
was conducted to test for reliability. In the following sections, we describe the operationalization of 
the variables. The exact wording of the items that form the multi-item variables is presented in Table 
2. The table also includes factor loadings, t values, and R-squared values for each item, as well as the 
average variance extracted and construct reliability for each variable. 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 here 
-------------------------------------- 
Autonomous motivation to share knowledge. Items from the Self-Regulation Questionnaire 
(SRQ) (Ryan & Connell, 1989) were adapted to reflect motivation for knowledge sharing. The SRQ 
assesses different types of motivation in specific behavioral domains. A motivation construct that 
reflects domain-specific motivation (a more situation-based type of motivation) was chosen. 
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Specifically, in the context of the current research, “motivation” does not refer to a general, stable 
personality trait. Rather, the construct as used here reflects motivation towards a specific behavior 
across time, namely knowledge sharing.  
We identified motivation for knowledge sharing by asking respondents questions about their 
underlying reasons for engaging in knowledge sharing. For the purpose of this research, the SRQ 
measures of intrinsic and identified motivation were used to estimate autonomous motivation. These 
motivation types have been applied when measuring autonomous motivation in previous research 
using the SRQ (e.g., Weinstein & Ryan, 2010; Williams, Grow, Freedman, Ryan, & Deci, 1996). 
More specifically, respondents were asked: “Why do you share knowledge?”. Four items were used 
to capture employees’ autonomous motivation towards knowledge sharing: “…because I enjoy it” 
(intrinsic), “…because I like it” (intrinsic), “…because I find it personally satisfying” (identified), 
and “…because I think it is an important part of my job” (identified). Answers were provided using a 
seven-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The value of 
composite reliability is 0.81, providing strong evidence of the reliability of the construct. 
Furthermore, the AVE value of 0.52 is highly satisfactory. The autonomous motivation variable was 
calculated as the average of the four items.  
Rewards for knowledge sharing. The items used for this variable were adapted from Cabrera, 
Collins, and Salgado (2006) and Maurer and Tarulli (1994). We asked respondents to indicate how 
they assessed personal outcomes of knowledge sharing. Specifically, we asked respondents to 
indicate the extent to which, in their experience, knowledge sharing led to: “…interesting 
assignments and projects,” “…recognition from the head of my department,” “…recognition from 
my colleagues,” “…professional development,” an “increase in salary,” an “increased chance of 
bonus,” and a “better reputation.” Answers were provided using a seven-point Likert scale ranging 
from “very little extent” to “very large extent.” The values for construct reliability and AVE for this 
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variable are 0.88 and 0.52, respectively, which are both highly satisfactory. The knowledge-sharing 
rewards variable was calculated as the average of the seven items.  
 Autonomy-promoting job design. Measures of job characteristics were adopted from Sims, 
Szilagyi, and Keller (1976), who improved on Hackman and Oldham’s (1975) job characteristics 
instrument (the Job Characteristics Inventory), and provided evidence of the instrument’s reliability 
and validity. We asked respondents to indicate the extent to which their current jobs were 
characterized by the following dimensions: “the freedom to carry out my job the way I want to,” “the 
opportunity for independent initiative,” and “the scope for variety in my job.” These were measured 
using seven-point Likert scales ranging from “very little extent” to “very large extent.” The three 
items form a strong variable with a construct reliability of 0.76 and an AVE of 0.51. Accordingly, the 
non-controlling job design variable was calculated as the average of the three items. 
   Knowledge-sharing-supportive climate. We derived our items for the climate variable from 
Husted and Michailova’s (2002; Michailova & Husted, 2004) work on knowledge-sharing hostility 
and its determinants. Although Husted and Michailova (2002; Michailova & Husted, 2004) do not 
explicitly form the construct of “supportive climate,” their items for constructs such as “reasons for 
hoarding (knowledge)” and ”reasons for rejecting (knowledge)” can be used to measure the presence 
of an organizational climate that is supportive of knowledge sharing. 
 Specifically, in order to capture the respondents’ assessments of the extent to which the 
interpersonal context encouraged knowledge sharing, we asked them to indicate (on a seven-point 
Likert scale) the extent to which they strongly disagreed (= 1) or strongly agreed (= 7) with four 
statements. All four statements were formulated negatively as “discouraging knowledge sharing.” 
They were therefore reverse coded in the statistical analysis. The four statements are: “It is important 
to keep own ideas secret until one is acknowledged as the source of the idea,” “Knowledge sharing 
reduces the incentive for others to create new knowledge,” “Time spent on knowledge sharing could 
be spent on more important activities,” and “Sharing knowledge is risky because others may 
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misinterpret the shared knowledge.” These statements tap into the climate construct in terms of  the 
shared perceptions of employees concerning the practices, procedures, and kinds of behaviors that 
are rewarded and supported in a certain setting (Schneider, 1990: 384). In particular, the inclusion of 
such expressions as “until one is acknowledged” suggests that the statements relate to the shared 
perceptions of employees. The values for construct reliability and AVE for this variable are 0.80 and 
0.50, respectively, which are satisfactory. The variable was calculated as the average of the four 
items. 
Control variables. Job rotation was added as a control variable because an employee who has 
been involved in job rotation might have a large network of colleagues with which she worked on 
previous occasions and with whom she feels comfortable. This is likely to influence employee 
motivation to engage in knowledge sharing. The variable was measured on a seven-point Likert scale 
indicating whether the respondent had been included in job rotation (1 = very little extent; 7 = very 
large extent).  
A number of the respondents’ personal characteristics, such as gender, tenure, age, and 
education, were included, as they effect autonomous motivation to share knowledge. For instance, 
long-tenured employees typically have large networks, but they may also be less dependent on 
others’ knowledge. Furthermore, it has been argued that higher education goes hand-in-hand with 
autonomous motivation to share knowledge. Tenure was measured as the number of years the 
respondent had worked in the firm (average of 7.7 years). Gender was a categorical variable that 
took a value 0 for male and 1 for female. Females represented 27% (406) of the respondents. Age 
was a categorical variable with six intervals: “18-24 years,” “25-34 years,” “35-44 years,” “45-54 
years,” “55-64 years,” and “65+ years.” Most of the respondents were between 25-34 years (34%) or 
35-44 years (31%). Education was likewise measured as a categorical variable depending on the 
length of the respondent’s education with the following categories: “high-school or below,” “middle-
range training,” “Bachelor’s degree,” “Master’s degree,” and “PhD.” The largest share of 
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respondents had a Master’s degree (46%), while 31% had a Bachelor’s degree. In addition, most of 
those with a Master’s degree had obtained the degree in a technical area, typically engineering. The 
relatively high level of education among the respondents provides another indication that many of 
them were involved in activities for which knowledge sharing would be important.       
We also included control variables for each of the five firms, as the level of autonomous 
motivation to share knowledge might vary by firm. Furthermore, as there may be a multilevel issue, 
we ran a random coefficient model with autonomous motivation to share knowledge as the 
dependent variable and the firm as the group variable. The potential multilevel effects of the firms 
were tested in an empty random coefficients model, i.e., a model without any covariates except for 
the intercept that expresses the higher-level effect on our dependent variable. The value of the 
intercept is 0.009 (Z = 1.01, p = 0.16), which is marginal and clearly insignificant. Accordingly, the 
intra-class coefficient is as low as 0.015, indicating that only 1.5% of the variation in autonomous 
motivation to share knowledge is explained by firm-level factors. 
Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations are provided in Table 3 for all continuous 
variables. Notably, the level of autonomous motivation to share knowledge is relatively high, with an 
average of 5.87 on the seven-point scale. In fact, one-third of the respondents indicate average values 
of more than 6 for autonomous motivation. Of the three independent variables, the supportive 
climate obtains the highest average value (5.84), while an autonomy-promoting job design and 
rewards for knowledge sharing reach average values of 5.52 and 3.98, respectively. All three 
independent variables are therefore at or above the mean of 4. The control variable of job rotation 
has an average value of 2.15, which is clearly below the mean of the seven-point scale.     
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 here 
-------------------------------------- 
RESULTS 
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We use hierarchical moderated regression models to investigate the proposed hypothesis.2 As the 
three variables included in the interaction terms (rewards for knowledge sharing, autonomy 
promoting job design, and knowledge sharing supportive climate) are measured on different scales, 
we standardized them before creating the interaction terms. The regression results are presented in 
Table 4. 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 here 
-------------------------------------- 
All four models on autonomous motivation to share knowledge included in Table 4 include 
control variables related to the individual employee’s job (job rotation), personal characteristics (age, 
education, gender, and tenure) and firm controls. In Model 0 (Table 4), we include only the control 
variables. Model 1 includes all first-order associations between autonomous motivation to share 
knowledge and rewards for knowledge sharing, autonomy-promoting job design, and supportive 
climate, respectively. Model 2 adds all second-order associations. Model 3 includes the proposed 
three-way interaction. 
Our hypothesis predicts a three-way interaction among rewards for knowledge sharing, 
autonomy-promoting job design, and a knowledge-sharing-supportive climate, such that the 
autonomous motivation to share knowledge is highest when all three variables are high. To be 
corroborated, the hypothesis would require a statistically significant increase in variance explained 
(F-test for increment in R-squared) in Model 3, as well as findings consistent with the hypothesis.  
As can be seen in Table 4, the explanatory power of the control variables is limited, with an R-
squared value of 0.03 in Model 0. However, by including the independent variables—which are all 
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  Although it is acceptable to have dependent variables based on Likert scales (with more than five categories, so they 
approximate a normal distribution) in statistical models which assumes interval data, we tested the robustness of the 
models by running them as ordered logit models. However, we found no differences when these results were compared to 
the reported results.   
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highly significant in Model 1—an R-squared of 0.20 is obtained. None of the second-order effects in 
Model 2 are significant and the F-increment test is also insignificant. However, the addition of the 
three-way interaction in Model 3 increases the explanatory power. Thus, Model 3 in Table 4 shows 
that the addition of the three-way interaction increases the overall R-squared by 0.02 compared with 
Model 1 and by 0.01 compared with Model 2. As such, the F-increment tests show that Model 3, 
which includes the interaction effect, is superior to Model 1 with only main effects and to Model 2, 
which includes second-order effects. This suggests that it is appropriate to examine the three-way 
system of complements as a whole because any two of three practices do not necessarily create 
complementarities without the third —i.e., there is no evidence of an interaction effect for a partial 
system in which only two of the three components are implemented. The R-squared for Model 3 
indicates that almost one-fourth of the variation in employees’ autonomous motivation to share 
knowledge is explained by the variables in the model. Furthermore, as hypothesized, the three-way 
interaction is positive and significant (β = .06, p < .001; Model 3, Table 4). All in all, these estimates 
provide evidence of complementarities between informal rewards for knowledge sharing and a 
context (in terms of job design and work climate) that supports these rewards.  
We used the procedure outlined by Aiken and West (1991) to plot the high and low levels of 
each variable (one standard deviation above and below the mean). Figure 2 depicts the pattern of the 
moderated results related to our hypothesis. The highest level of employees’ autonomous motivation 
to share knowledge is found when rewards for knowledge sharing, an autonomy-promoting job 
design, and a knowledge-sharing supportive climate are all high.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 Here 
-------------------------------------- 
 Notably, the slope is increasing in all four cases in which rewards for knowledge sharing are 
increasing. However, the greatest increases occur in the combination with a high degree of job 
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autonomy and a highly supportive climate, and in the combination with a low degree of job 
autonomy and a low degree of supportive climate and contextual support. In the two other cases—
where either job autonomy or contextual support is low (and the other high)—the effect of rewards 
for knowledge sharing is more moderate. This may also explain why all second-order effects in 
Model 2 (Table 4) are insignificant. Together, these results provide support for our configurational 
argument, which suggests that the three independent variables positively amplify each other in their 
effect on autonomous motivation to share knowledge. Interestingly, and in line with the 
configurational arguments underlying the hypothesis, the amplifying effect is only obtained when all 
independent variables are high.  
 Finally, we explained the choice of autonomous motivation for knowledge sharing as our 
dependent variable by building on extant research that identifies autonomous motivation as a 
crucially important antecedent of effort and persistence in general, and knowledge sharing in 
particular (Lindenberg & Foss, 2011; Podsakoff et al., 2000; Weinstein & Ryan, 2010). As a 
robustness check, we statistically tested the relation between our dependent variable (autonomous 
motivation to share knowledge) and three specific behavioral variables: knowledge provision, 
knowledge acquisition, and knowledge sharing (the latter being framed in terms of both provision 
and acquisition). We did not report these results, as they are completely aligned with our previous 
findings. In all three cases, the relation between autonomous motivation to share knowledge and 
these behavioral variables was positive and highly significant.  
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
Previous research has demonstrated the presence of complementarities among reward systems, job 
design, and work climate (Gagné & Deci, 2005; Gottschalg & Zollo, 2007). By looking at these three 
levers in the context of knowledge sharing, we can examine specific, theory-driven predictions about 
how and why rewards for knowledge sharing combine with a job design and work climate that are 
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supportive of knowledge sharing to create a three-way complementary system of organizational 
practices.  
We develop the argument that rewards for knowledge sharing and a context supportive of 
knowledge sharing (in terms of work context and job design) reinforce each other in the sense that 
the autonomous motivation for knowledge sharing is highest when all three motivators are high. Our 
argument is that employees rely on contextual factors when they attempt to understand whether a 
potentially ambiguous motivator (rewards, in our model) is mainly controlling or informational. The 
main finding of our study is that employees who are exposed to rewards for knowledge sharing 
experience higher levels of autonomous motivation to share knowledge when they are also exposed 
to other non-controlling, knowledge-sharing-supportive motivators.  
Theoretical Implications  
Our findings extend previous research by taking a configurational stance on the motivational 
foundations of prosocial organizational behaviors. We therefore elaborate on how our study 
contributes to theory and research on the antecedents of knowledge sharing, self-determination, and 
HR practices.   
Knowledge sharing. There has been considerable interest in the knowledge-sharing literature 
in how rewards cause knowledge sharing. However, this interest has mainly focused on addressing 
the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic rewards (Cabrera & Cabrera, 2005; Cabrera et al., 
2006). The current paper introduces a different perspective in that we focus on the ambiguity of 
rewards—a characteristic common among all types of rewards. By highlighting the importance of 
consistency between instruments aimed at triggering knowledge-sharing behaviors, we shed new 
light on the contingencies that determine the successful implementation of rewards for knowledge 
sharing.  
Self-determination theory. Our research also contributes to closing a gap in SDT, where the 
idea that contextual factors play a role in determining rewards’ effects has been suggested but not 
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theorized or empirically examined (Deci et al., 1999). We extend and sharpen this argument by 
suggesting that job design and work climate constitute the context against which rewards are 
assessed. This process, we argue, constitutes a crucial determinant of how rewards are actually seen 
and, in turn, received by employees. In a broader context, this is consistent with the argument that the 
management of motivation is, to a large extent, the management of cognitions (Lindenberg & Foss, 
2011).  
More broadly, our arguments harmonize with recent research (beyond SDT) stressing the need 
to recognize the contexts in which incentive processing takes place (Lindenberg, 2000; Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2003; Benabou & Tirole, 2006; Lubatkin et al., 2007). Our research indicates that the value-
creation potential of a given reward is de facto contingent on its processing (by the employee) 
together with other motivators—that is, that the same reward may trigger different responses 
depending on whether it is processed “in context.” Thus, the understanding of reward mechanisms is 
improved by considering them in their specific context.  
HR practices. Increasingly, HR research focuses on how HR practices can stimulate prosocial 
motivation and behaviors (e.g., Grant, 2007). Moreover, such research also considers how HR 
practices influence employee motivation by looking at these practices in systemic or configurational 
terms (e.g., Gottschalg & Zollo, 2007; Foss et al., 2009; Mossholder et al., 2011). For example, 
Mossholder et al. (2011) examine how HR systems drive relational climates that vary in terms of 
how well they motivate helping behaviors, while Gottschalg and Zollo (2007) propose a model in 
which an organic system of practices is put into place so as to trigger different motivational attitudes 
that, in turn, aligns employees’ interests with those of the organization.  
Similarly, in our research, we provide evidence that the (perceived) consistency between 
multiple distinct motivators contributes to the emergence of higher levels of autonomous motivation 
among employees to behave prosocially. Furthermore, we suggest that the mechanisms that enable 
these alignment processes are psychological in nature. Our research is thus relevant to the HR 
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context, as it confirms the importance of systems of practices and indicates the need for further 
investigations into the interpretive underpinnings of those systems.  
Managerial Implications  
 Employees are increasingly interested in doing work that benefits others (Colby, Sippola, & 
Phelps, 2001; Grant & Berg, 2010; Turban & Greening, 1997). Providing employees with the means 
and opportunities to satisfy this prosocial inclination has become an increasingly important part of 
modern management practice (Brickson, 2005; Thompson & Bunderson, 2003). Autonomy-
supportive rewards are normally used to strengthen employees’ autonomous engagement in POB. 
However, these rewards are seldom provided in isolation, and managers need to know that these 
rewards may interact with other contextual factors in complex ways. More specifically, they must 
understand that the realization of the potential efficacy of such rewards often lies in employees’ 
correct interpretations of rewards as authentically supportive of autonomy.  
 This research shows that fostering high levels of autonomous motivation to share knowledge 
among employees requires more than the simple implementation of autonomy-supportive reward 
mechanisms. If employees are not put in conditions that enable them to clearly identify and believe 
the informational nature of such rewards, investments in the implementation of rewards for 
knowledge sharing may be a suboptimal use of resources. By suggesting that employees may use job 
design and work climate as a context for interpreting rewards, we provide managers with a clear 
indication of the fundamental importance of establishing consistent systems or motivators that are 
supportive of autonomous motivations for prosocial behaviors in the workplace.  
Limitations and Future Research  
The contributions of this study should be considered in light of its limitations. First, our 
dependent variable—the motivation to engage in knowledge sharing—represents the motivation for 
only one prosocial behavior, albeit an important one. It would be desirable to consider motivations 
for a broader set of prosocial behaviors. In principle, the dynamics hypothesized in this paper may 
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take place every time an autonomously driven behavior is incentivized by means of potentially 
ambiguous rewards that are provided in context—that is, along with other motivators. Thus, we 
expect our model to be generalizable to (autonomously driven) behaviors other than knowledge 
sharing. However, we leave confirmation of this prediction to future research.  
Second, our results do not rule out the existence of two-way complementarities between any 
two of the three complements we test. Our test confirms that the combination of all three elements in 
our system creates, on average, a greater-than-additive impact on autonomous motivation for 
knowledge sharing. However, pair-wise complementarities may exist, perhaps for certain sub-groups 
of firms or for certain industries.  
Third, because we rely on cross-sectional data, the direction of causality cannot be fully 
ascertained. For example, it may be argued that our autonomous motivation measure could reflect 
pre-existing individual characteristics. In other words, people that like to share knowledge may tend 
to place themselves in contexts where they can do so—for example, in contexts where job design is 
non-controlling and where knowledge-sharing behaviors are valued. This notwithstanding, our 
arguments run in the direction from rewards, job design, and work climate to autonomous motivation 
to share knowledge because an autonomous motivation for knowledge sharing is indeed a malleable 
characteristic that can be influenced by environmental factors. Most research in self-determination 
theory (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2000) depicts motivational states as mutually exclusive at a fixed point in 
time but malleable over time. In particular, it is important to note the difference between 
“situational” motivation and “disposition.” The type of motivation that we address in this research is 
situational, and self-determination research highlights that the environment has an impact on 
situational motivation (Gagné & Deci, 2005). Therefore, additional research based on experimental 
or longitudinal data is needed to investigate causality in our model.  
 While our study extends previous literature on the motivational antecedents of POB by 
distinguishing between autonomous and controlled motivation, one of the main strengths of self-
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determination theory is that it differentiates among several types of autonomous and controlled 
motivation. Theoretically, these different types of motivation have been argued to affect behavior in 
different ways (Gagné & Deci, 2005). Therefore, future research that looks in detail at how specific 
types of rewards, job designs, and work climates may be used to foster the emergence of, for 
example, intrinsic, identified, introjected, and external motivations to behave prosocially would be 
welcome.  
 Finally, we have proposed that employees look for consistency in their work environment in 
order to reduce the potential ambiguity of rewards that can be experienced as both controlling and 
informational. Our data do not allow us to directly analyze this mechanism. Although, we argue that 
our findings lend considerable credence to the existence of such a process, it would be highly 
desirable to collect qualitative, interview- and/or participant-based data in order to add insight into 
the nature of this process (as in Grant, Dutton, & Rosso, 2008). Moreover, work on this issue should 
also consider other possible organizational factors that may influence the dynamics under discussion. 
Such factors may include how authority is legitimized in an organization (i.e., in terms of fiat and 
power, or in terms of requirements for ongoing efficient production), whether collective goals are 
clear and directional, and how teams and tasks are designed (beyond the degree of job autonomy 
considered in this paper; e.g., role clarification, Mathieu & Rapp, 2009).  
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SHARING
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KNOWLEDGE-SHARING 
SUPPORTIVE CLIMATE
FIGURE 1 
Three-Way Interaction among Rewards, Job Design, and Work Climate
 
 
	  
112 
 
Figure 2. Three-way interaction with autonomous motivation to share knowledge as the 
dependent variable 
 
 
 
	  
113 
Table 1. Descriptive data for the five firms and data on the conducted surveys 
 
  
COWI 
 
 
MAN Diesel 
 
NNIT 
 
Oticon 
 
Rambøll 
 
Descriptive data 
 
Industry  
(NACE code and 
description) 
711210  
Consulting 
engineering 
activities within 
construction 
281190 
Manufacture of 
engines and 
turbines 
620200 
Computer 
consultancy 
activities 
464620 
Manufacture 
of hearing 
aids and 
supplies 
711210  
Consulting 
engineering 
activities within 
construction 
Total sales (DKK 
billions) 
3.0  3.1 1.2 5.5 4.7 
Size (number of 
employees) 
3.820 2.488 995 5.072 6.385 
Sales per 
employee (DKK 
1,000) 
794 1.246 1.171 1.082 742 
Return on equity 26.7% 14.4% 44.3% 269.3% 33.5% 
Ownership Foundation 
(83%) 
Foreign group 
(100%) 
Danish group 
(100%) 
Foundation 
(58%) 
Foundation 
(93%) 
  
Survey data 
Survey period June 27-Aug. 
28, 2007 
Feb. 19-27, 
2007 
May 10-25, 
2007 
Feb. 12-17, 
2007 
April 8-28, 
2008 
Number of 
employees 
contacted 
570 505 136 300 1996 
Number of 
submitted 
questionnaires 
246 263 112 148 824 
Response rate 
 
43% 52% 82% 49% 41% 
Useable 
responses 
238 245 108 146 786 
Useable response 
rate 
42% 49% 79% 49% 39% 
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Table 2: Constructs and items 
 Factor 
loading 
t 
value 
R2-
square 
Construct 
reliability 
Average 
variance 
extracted 
 
Autonomous motivation to share knowledge 
I share knowledge with others because… 
1) I enjoy doing so. 
2) I think it is an important part of my job. 
3) I find it personally satisfying. 
4) I like sharing knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.68 
0.64 
0.74 
0.82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23.89 
21.69 
30.22 
37.68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.46 
0.41 
0.55 
0.67 
 
 
 
 
0.81 
 
 
 
 
0.52 
 
Rewards for knowledge sharing 
To what extent do you experience that knowledge sharing leads to… 
1) An increased chance of interesting assignments and projects? 
2) Increased recognition from the head of my department? 
3) More recognition from my colleagues? 
4) An increased chance of professional development? 
5) An increase in salary? 
6) An increased chance of a bonus? 
7) A better reputation? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.74 
0.76 
0.78 
0.66 
0.64 
0.61 
0.82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36.02 
44.40 
46.16 
26.66 
24.65 
18.41 
57.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.55 
0.57 
0.61 
0.44 
0.41 
0.37 
0.67 
 
 
 
 
0.88 
 
 
 
 
0.52 
 
Autonomy-promoting job design 
To what extent is your current job characterized by the following? 
1) The freedom to carry out my job the way I want to. 
2) The opportunity for independent initiative. 
3) The scope for variety in the job. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.70 
0.79 
0.64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29.35 
33.29 
20.42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.49 
0.63 
0.41 
 
 
 
 
0.76 
 
 
 
 
0.51 
 
Knowledge-sharing-supportive climate 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (all 
reverse coded) 
1) It is important to keep own ideas secret until one is 
acknowledged as the source of the idea. 
2) Knowledge sharing reduces the incentive for others to create 
new knowledge. 
3) Time spent on knowledge sharing could be spent on more 
important activities. 
4) Sharing knowledge is risky because others may misinterpret the 
shared knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.65 
 
0.75 
 
0.70 
 
0.73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17.30 
 
21.96 
 
19.54 
 
22.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.42 
 
0.56 
 
0.49 
 
0.53 
 
 
 
 
0.80 
 
 
 
 
0.50 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix including all continuous variables (N = 1,523) 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
1. Autonomous motivation to share knowledge 1.00      
2. Rewards for knowledge sharing 0.31 1.00     
3. Autonomy-promoting job design 0.23 0.21 1.00    
4. Knowledge-sharing-supportive climate 0.28 0.06 0.16 1.00   
5. Job rotation 0.04 0.17 0.05 -0.06 1.00  
6. Tenure -0.06 -0.11 0.15 -0.02 -0.01 1.00 
Mean 
 
5.87 3.98 5.52 5.84 2.15 7.66 
Std. Dev 
 
0.78 1.24 1.01 0.87 1.53 8.80 
Min. values 
 
1.25 1 1 1 1 0 
Max. values 
 
7 7 7 7 7 49 
 
All coefficients greater than 0.05 are significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 4: Hierarchical moderated regression models (N = 1,523) 
 (Standard errors are listed in parentheses)a 
***, **, and *  indicate significance levels of 0.1%, 1%, and 5%, respectively. 
a All continuous independent variables are standardized. 
 
 
 Autonomous motivation to share knowledge 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 6.07*** 
(0.20) 
6.07*** 
(0.19) 
6.06*** 
(0.19) 
6.03*** 
(0.19) 
Rewards for knowledge sharing 
 
 0.19*** 
(0.02) 
0.19*** 
(0.02) 
0.18*** 
(0.02) 
Autonomy-promoting job design  0.11*** 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
Knowledge-sharing-supportive climate 
 
 0.20*** 
(0.02) 
0.20*** 
(0.02) 
0.18*** 
(0.02) 
Rewards for knowledge sharing * 
Autonomy-promoting job design 
  0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Rewards for knowledge sharing * Knowledge-
sharing-supportive climate 
  0.03 
(0.02) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
Autonomy-promoting job design * Knowledge-
sharing-supportive climate 
  -0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
Rewards for knowledge sharing * Autonomy-
promoting job design * Knowledge-sharing-
supportive climate 
   0.06*** 
(0.01) 
 
- Job rotation 
 
- Tenure 
 
- Gender 
 
- Age 
18-24 years 
25-34 years 
35-44 years 
45-54 years 
55-64 years 
65+    years 
 
- Education 
High school or below 
Middle-range training 
Bachelor’s degree 
Master’s degree 
Ph.D. 
 
- Company 
COWI 
MAN Diesel 
NNIT 
Oticon 
Ramboll 
 
 
0.05 (0.02)**  
 
-0.02  (0.03) 
 
 0.16 (0.05)*** 
 
 
0.05 (0.24) 
0.13 (0.18) 
0.19 (0.18) 
0.20 (0.18) 
0.19 (0.19) 
- 
  
 
-0.42 (0.13)** 
-0.33 (0.11)** 
-0.26 (0.10)* 
-0.16 (0.10) 
- 
 
 
-0.05 (0.06) 
-0.16 (0.06)* 
0.08 (0.08) 
-0.01 (0.07) 
- 
 
0.02 (0.02)  
 
-0.03  (0.02) 
 
 0.12 (0.04)** 
 
 
0.01 (0.22) 
0.03 (0.17) 
0.05 (0.17) 
0.02 (0.17) 
0.07 (0.17) 
- 
  
 
-0.18 (0.12) 
-0.13 (0.10) 
-0.13 (0.09) 
-0.13 (0.09) 
- 
 
 
-0.04 (0.05) 
-0.09 (0.06) 
0.01 (0.07) 
-0.01 (0.06) 
- 
 
0.02 (0.02)  
  
-0.03 (0.02) 
 
 0.12 (0.04)** 
 
 
0.02 (0.22) 
0.04 (0.17) 
0.06 (0.17) 
0.03 (0.17) 
0.09 (0.17) 
- 
  
 
-0.18 (0.12) 
-0.13 (0.10) 
-0.13 (0.09) 
-0.12 (0.09) 
- 
 
 
-0.04 (0.05) 
-0.09 (0.06) 
0.01 (0.07) 
-0.01 (0.06) 
- 
 
0.02 (0.02)  
 
-0.03 (0.02) 
 
 0.12 (0.04)*** 
 
 
0.05 (0.22) 
0.05 (0.17) 
0.07 (0.16) 
0.04 (0.16) 
0.09 (0.17) 
- 
  
 
-0.20 (0.12) 
-0.12 (0.10) 
-0.11 (0.09) 
-0.12 (0.09) 
- 
 
 
-0.04 (0.05) 
-0.09 (0.06) 
0.02 (0.07) 
0.01 (0.06) 
- 
N 
F-value 
R-square 
1523 
3.26*** 
0.03 
1523 
20.37*** 
0.20 
1523 
18.48*** 
0.21 
1523 
18.58*** 
0.22 
 
 
F-test for increment 
 
  
108.11*** 
(vs. model 0) 
 
5.41 
(vs. model 1) 
 
16.59*** 
(vs. model 2) 
 
8.25** 
(vs. model 1) 
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PHYSICAL SEPARATION IN THE WORKPLACE: SEPARATION CUES, 
SENSEMAKING, AND BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES  
 
 
Abstract 
Physical separation is pervasive in organizations, and it has powerful effects on 
employee behavior and organizational performance. However, research shows that 
workplace separation is characterized by a variety of tradeoffs, tensions, and challenges 
that lead to both positive and negative organizational outcomes. By developing new 
theory on the nature, antecedents, and consequences of separation awareness—a 
psychological state in which people are aware of their physical separation from others—
we proffer a model of the positive and negative potential inherent in separation in the 
workplace. We distinguish between control and competence affirmation as 
psychological states that are triggered by physical separation in the workplace, and in 
turn reinforce controlled or autonomous motivation, thereby influencing employees’ 
engagement in constructive and destructive behaviors.  
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Enclosures and barriers are among the most visually and functionally salient features of the 
workplace (Elsbach & Pratt, 2007). Doors, walls, partitions, cubicles, and different floors and 
buildings that physically separate workers are evident in virtually every organization. Research going 
back at least four decades demonstrates the impact of such “separation artifacts” on workers’ 
attitudes and behaviors (Allen 2007; Brookes & Kaplan, 1972; Fayard & Weeks, 2011; Hatch, 1987; 
Oldham & Brass, 1979; Oldham, Kulik & Stepina 1991). Separation artifacts regulate the domains of 
action, influence, and information that are available to organizational members, and serve as 
instruments of organizational control. Given these characteristics, organizational members attribute 
meaning to separation artifacts (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). Indeed, these artifacts have consistently 
been found to be highly important to the functioning of organizations (Allen 1977; Davis 1984; 
Kelly, 1992; Laing, Craig & White, 2011).  
 Research shows that separation artifacts may have positive effects in that they can reduce 
intrusion and dissatisfaction (Cohen, 1980; Oldham, 1988); signal competence, distinctiveness, and 
status (Elsbach, 2003; Sundstrom, Burt, & Kamp, 1980); and increase confidentiality and meaningful 
interaction (Carlopio & Gardner, 1992; Hatch, 1987). At the same time, separation artifacts may 
prevent informal communication (Allen, 1977; Boje, 1971; Pile, 1978); inhibit collaboration 
(Elsbach & Pratt, 2007; Mark, 2002); and reduce perceptions of task significance, task identity, and, 
in turn, job satisfaction (Oldham & Rotchford, 1983; Zalesny & Farace, 1987). Extant research thus 
strongly suggests that the management of physical separation by means of separation artifacts can 
have a substantial impact on individuals’ attitudes, motivations, and behaviors (Elsbach & Pratt, 
2007). However, physical separation artifacts have been associated with widely different individual 
and organizational outcomes and, as the above suggests, “[t]heir complexity is evident in the myriad 
of trade-offs, tensions, and challenges inherent in their design and management” (Elsbach & Pratt, 
2007: 2011). This suggests a need for a fuller, more comprehensive model of the nature and effects 
of separation artifacts in the workplace.  
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 We address this need by developing a theoretical model of the nature, antecedents, and 
consequences of “separation awareness.” We proffer “separation awareness” as an individual-level 
construct that mediates the relation between separation cues—that is, various manifestations of 
physical separation in the workplace—and individual-level outcomes, namely motivations and 
behaviors. This model builds on the notion that cognitions precede motivations (Lindenberg & Foss, 
2011), which in turn precede behaviors (Grant, 2009). Specifically, we argue that the cuing 
introduced by separation artifacts in the workplace predicts organizational behaviors.  
 We begin by first introducing and developing the separation awareness construct. We build on 
the concept of the perceived locus of causality (PLOC) (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Gagné & Deci, 2005; 
Ryan & Connell, 1989) to distinguish between two forms of awareness—separation-as-competence-
affirmation and separation-as-control—and we examine how these forms of awareness produce 
opposed motivational attitudes. Second, having described the dual nature of separation awareness, 
we move a step backwards to consider its antecedents, namely separation cues. We dimensionalize 
separation cues depending on their origin and strength. Then, building on sensemaking research 
(Weick, 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005), we examine how such cues interact with an 
employee’s perceived freedom to move and his or her work orientation so as to trigger feelings of 
competence affirmation or control. Third, we consider the behavioral consequences of separation 
awareness. Specifically, we link awareness of separation-as-competence-affirmation to 
organizational citizenship behaviors and awareness of separation-as-control to organizational 
misbehaviors. Fourth, we explore how the behavioral effects of separation awareness are moderated 
by contextual contingencies. Finally, we close with a discussion of our contributions, the limitations 
of our research, directions for future research, and practical implications.  
 Research highlights that an individual’s satisfaction with her compensation is contingent on 
how her compensation compares with that of salient others (Nickerson & Zenger, 2008). We suggest 
that the same logic may apply to the context of separation artifacts. That is, in making sense of her 
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workplace separation, an employee will most likely compare her current situation with that of salient 
others. However, to keep the complexity of the discussion at a manageable level and to allow us to 
focus on our construct of separation awareness, we ground our analysis at the dyadic (manager-
employee) level, and thus control for potential social comparison issues across employees 
(Nickerson & Zenger, 2008; Tai, Naryanan & McAllister, 2012).  
 Furthermore, we focus on two core classes of work behavior: organizational citizenship 
behaviors (OCB), which are extra-role, non-enforceable behaviors that benefit the organization 
(Organ, 1988), and organizational misbehaviors (OMB), which involve the violation of formal 
organizational roles, norms, and expectations (Vardi & Wiener, 1996). We do so for three main 
reasons. First, OCB and OMB can have significant destructive and constructive implications. 
Second, they are general drivers of several important behaviors—e.g., helping colleagues, donating, 
cooperating, and volunteering, as opposed to stealing company property, harassing others, 
sabotaging processes, or misleading customers (Organ, 1988; Vardi & Wiener, 1996). Third, these 
behaviors have been linked to psychological states that strongly resonate with our distinction 
between separation-as-competence-affirmation and separation-as-control. Although these two classes 
of behaviors do not cover the full panorama of outcomes that may result from separation 
management in the workplace, they do capture the most important and extreme outcomes in both the 
positive and the negative direction. As such, we do not propose separation awareness as a single, 
focal construct that contributes to the display of OCB and OMB, but rather as a construct that 
provides a solid and unifying theoretical framework that enhances our understanding of the potential 
functional and dysfunctional implications of separation management in the workplace.  
 Figure 1 shows the model of separation awareness—from its situational antecedents to its 
behavioral consequences—that we develop in this article.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 here 
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SEPARATION AWARENESS: COMPETENCE AFFIRMATION VERSUS CONTROL  
We define “separation awareness” as a psychological state in which people are aware of their 
physical separation from others, and make assumptions about the nature of this separation that 
address the question, “Why am I separated from other organizational members?”. Separation 
awareness is triggered by the feeling of severance that emerges when physical separation artifacts, 
such as partitions, walls, and doors, are introduced.  
 On the basis of the idea that the physical environment—broadly defined as the arrangement of 
material objects and stimuli (Elsbach & Pratt, 2007)—plays a central role in individual behavior, 
which in turn may influence interaction patterns and the formation of relationships, researchers have 
explored the role of the physical environment in organizations (Davis, 1984; Oldham & Brass, 
1979). The main emphasis of this research has been on the role of physical separation—evidence 
suggests that separation influences attitudes, motivations, and behaviors (Elsbach & Pratt, 2007; 
Hatch, 1987). Objects that are used to produce physical separation among employees (“separation 
artifacts”) convey cues of physical separation in the workplace (“separation cues”) that influence 
how employees cognitively frame their organizational context, sense of identity, and motivation, 
which in turn trigger their behavioral responses (Davis, 1984). However, research on the nature of 
these responses is highly heterogeneous in its predictions. The management of separation in 
organizations has been characterized as a powerful and extremely complex activity (Elsback & Pratt, 
2007).  
 Our key point is that these responses are contingent on how employees make sense of their 
separation—that is, on their separation awareness. By introducing this theoretical mechanism, we 
hope to unify the different predictions in the literature concerning the consequences of separation 
artifacts under a comprehensive theoretical framework.  
The Bright Side of Separation  
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 One of the main tenets of research on the impact of physical separation in organizations is that 
separation may limit intrusions and reduce environmental disturbances (mainly by means of better 
visual and acoustic isolation). This helps workers to concentrate on their tasks because, for example, 
the workspace is less crowded, resulting in higher levels of (perceived) privacy and overall job 
satisfaction (Altman, 1975; Elsbach & Pratt, 2007). Research analyzing employees’ reactions to 
changes in office design—usually from single-office to open-office settings or vice versa—provides 
support for these basic propositions. For instance, Oldham (1988) finds that employees who move 
from an open-plan office to a low-density open-office or to a conventional (partitioned) office 
experience substantial improvements in privacy and satisfaction. Similarly, Sundstrom, Burt, and 
Kamp (1980) find an association between physical and acoustic isolation, which are inherent 
characteristics of partitioned offices, and reduced distraction, increased privacy, and, in turn, 
increased workspace and job satisfaction. Similarly, Oldham and Brass (1979) observe a sharp 
decline in intrinsic motivation and satisfaction when a group of employees is moved from a 
multicellular office to an open-plan setting. Moreover, evidence supports the thesis that separation—
for example, in the form of closed offices, which facilitates private conversations—favors 
confidential communication (Carlopio & Gardner, 1992). Furthermore, the perception of enhanced 
privacy may have a positive impact on the frequency of meaningful and useful verbal interactions 
(Hatch, 1987). Finally, Elsbach (2003) argues that separation in the workplace is an important 
instrument for signaling employee status, and shows that a lack of separation may result in perceived 
threats to employees’ workplace identities because of a reduced ability to affirm employee 
categorizations.  
The Dark Side of Separation  
 Other studies paint a different picture in which the introduction of separation has detrimental 
consequences. Empirical research on enclosures in the workplace suggests that separation may 
decrease informal communication, collaboration, and group and task identity. Such research either 
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points out the negative consequences of separation (Boje, 1971; Pile, 1978) or looks at the beneficial 
effects of openness as opposed to enclosure (Zalesny & Farace, 1987). Specifically, Allen (1977), 
Boje (1971), and Pile (1978) find that separation in the workplace decreases informal 
communication. Oldham and Rotchford (1983) demonstrate that openness has a positive impact on 
perceived task significance. Zalesny and Farace (1987) show that openness has a positive, significant 
impact on perceived task identity. Finally, by showing that cohesion and physical closeness represent 
some of the main drivers of top performance in specific high-pressure work situations, Mark (2002) 
demonstrates that separation may seriously inhibit collaboration in situations that require rapid 
problem solving and decision making (see also Elsbach & Pratt, 2007).  
Perceived Causality: Autonomy and Control  
As argued above, research on the physical environment in the workplace offers a number of 
predictions about the potential effects of physical separation. On the one hand, separation may 
trigger behavioral responses that are highly beneficial to the organization. On the other hand, 
separation can foster responses that are detrimental to the organization. Although these results are 
not in conflict, as the dependent variables (and moderators) differ across the studies we have 
reviewed, we lack an overarching theory that explains the circumstances under which the 
introduction of separation is more likely to be beneficial than detrimental. A key reason for this gap 
is the extant literature’s lack of appreciation of the role of “separation awareness”—that is, the 
specific attributes a person applies to the nature of his physical separation from others.  
The distinction between autonomy and control in an agent’s perceived locus of causality 
(PLOC) (Ryan & Connell, 1989) helps us introduce two opposed, mutually exclusive psychological 
states that embody individuals’ awareness of their separation in the workplace. This distinction 
derives from self-determination theory—the overarching theory that determines our modeling in this 
research—which posits that motivation differs not only by level but also by kind depending on the 
actor’s degree of autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Gagné & Deci, 2005). When an individual is 
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autonomously motivated, the elements that give rise to effort (i.e., the perceived locus of causality) 
are internal. In other words, an autonomously motivated actor perceives himself as the originator of 
the behavior. Autonomous motivation naturally triggers behaviors that are self endorsed, and 
consistent with personal attitudes and values (Weinstein & Ryan, 2010). In the case of controlled 
motivation, on the other hand, the perceived locus of causality is external to the individual. 
Accordingly, the individual does not feel that she is the originator of the behavior but feels forced in 
some way to adopt the behavior (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Connell, 1989).  
Motivational psychology strongly suggests that autonomous and controlled motivational 
attitudes are mutually exclusive (but not necessarily stable across time), and highly reactive to 
external stimuli (depending on how stimuli are interpreted by the recipient) (Deci & Ryan, 2000; 
Gagné & Deci, 2005; Ryan & Deci, 2000). For example, intrinsic motivation—the prototype of 
autonomous motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000)—is easily disrupted by signals of control, such as 
extrinsic rewards (Deci, Koestner & Ryan, 1999; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997), evaluations 
(Harackiewicz, Manderlink & Sansone, 1984), and imposed deadlines (Amabile, DeJong & Lepper, 
1976). On the other hand, signals of trustworthiness and competence affirmation are required for 
autonomous motivation to emerge (Ryan & Deci, 2000). In sum, perceptions of trust and competence 
affirmation foster the emergence of autonomous motivation, while perceptions of mistrust and 
control trigger the emergence of controlled motivation.  
Separation as Control versus Separation as Competence Affirmation  
 Depending on an agent’s specific PLOC (i.e., external versus internal), a state of physical 
separation from others may be experienced as controlling or as indicating competence. Abundant 
theoretical and empirical evidence demonstrates that perceptions of autonomy and control are, in 
fact, opposite and mutually exclusive psychological states. More specifically, they are mutually 
exclusive at any fixed point in time but can vary across time (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 
2000). Consistent with self-determination research, we thus proffer separation-as-control and 
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separation-as-competence-affirmation as distinct, mutually exclusive forms of separation awareness 
with distinct motivational consequences: separation-as-control strengthens controlled motivation, 
while separation-as-competence-affirmation strengthens autonomous motivation.  
 Separation-as-control describes a state of separation awareness in which individuals interpret 
the presence of separation artifacts as a means to limit and, thereby, to direct their behavior. For 
instance, an employee who is given a private office may interpret her newly introduced separation 
from her coworkers as a means of decreasing interpersonal interactions so as to increase her focus on 
personal productivity—that is, as a means to control her behavior. In support of this view, evidence 
indicates that the introduction of separation artifacts that increases physical separation may reduce 
employees’ willingness to freely communicate with peers (Pile, 1971) and, in turn, to collaborate 
with each other (Mark, 2002). An awareness of separation as control prompts the emergence of 
controlled motivation, which involves a sense of pressure and a feeling of being forced to engage in a 
given activity (Gagné & Deci, 2005).  
 In contrast, separation-as-competence-affirmation describes a cognitive state of separation 
awareness in which individuals interpret the presence of separation artifacts as an affirmation of their 
competence. For instance, an employee who is given a private office may ceteris paribus perceive 
this introduction of separation in her workspace as a means to protect her from external disturbances 
and, therefore, as an acknowledgment of the importance of her task. Consistent with this view, 
separation artifacts have been found to signal the intention to protect the employee from intrusions 
and overstimulation (Cohen, 1980; Oldham, 1988), or to recognize an employee’s status (Elsbach, 
2003). An awareness of separation-as-competence-affirmation leads to the satisfaction of the basic 
need for competence affirmation (Ryan & Deci, 2000). This, in turn, stimulates the emergence of 
autonomous motivation (Gagné & Deci, 2005). This reasoning suggests the following proposition:  
Proposition 1: Separation-as-control and separation-as-competence-affirmation are distinct, 
mutually exclusive forms of separation awareness with different motivational consequences: 
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separation-as-control leads to controlled motivation, whereas separation-as-competence-
affirmation leads to autonomous motivation. 
SEPARATION AWARENESS IN THE WORKPLACE 
Given that separation-as-control and separation-as-competence affirmation can exist as two distinct 
forms of separation awareness, it is pertinent to ask what triggers these forms of separation 
awareness. In the following, therefore, we move one step backwards to consider the triggers of 
separation awareness, which we refer to as “separation cues.”  
From Cues to Awareness  
 Numerous artifacts can be used to create separation between employees: cubicles, partitions, 
walls, doors, and separate floors and buildings are just a few examples (Elsbach & Pratt, 2007). All 
of these physical elements make employees aware of separation by transmitting separation cues—
that is, manifestations of physical separation in the organization.  
 Signaling theory addresses the reduction of information asymmetry between parties (Riley, 
2001; Spence, 2002). A first party (the sender) sends out a signal to a second party (the receiver). 
The reduction of information asymmetry between the parties depends on the reliability of the signal 
and on the receiver’s capability to correctly interpret it (Connelly et al., 2010). Signaling (on the side 
of the sender) can be intentional or unintentional (see Feldman & March, 1981). The number of 
situations in which information asymmetry is reduced by means of signaling is high and, not 
surprisingly, signaling theory has been applied to a large number of different contexts, including 
labor markets (Spence, 1973), entrepreneurship (Certo, 2003), corporate governance (Zhang & 
Wiersema, 2003), and human resource management (Suazo, Martinez & Sandoval, 2009).  
 We argue that the effects of separation artifacts should be considered in the light of signaling 
theory. Consider the following example: a manager introduces an artifact (e.g., cubicles) to separate 
employees who were initially located in an open office. All of the basic elements of the classic 
signaling model are in place: we have (for simplicity) two parties—manager and employee—and we 
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have asymmetrical information about the intentions (control versus competence affirmation; see P1) 
behind the introduction of the separation artifact. In fact, these intentions are clear to the manager, 
but they are not necessarily clear to the employee. The (intentional or unintentional) signal sender is 
the individual who introduced the separation artifact—in this example, the manager. The signal 
receivers are the employees who experiences separation because of the artifact.  
 Manifestations of physical separation in the organization can thus be seen as separation cues 
that carry potentially ambiguous messages about the sender’s intentions—control versus competence 
affirmation. To capture the variety of the organizational situations in which these cues of separation 
may be introduced, we dimensionalize them depending on where the cue originates and how strong it 
is. Figure 2 represents the core dimensions in a two-by-two diagram, which indicates their predicted 
impact on awareness of separation-as-competence affirmation and on awareness of separation-as-
control.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 here 
-------------------------------------- 
 Origin. When the employee is exposed to a separation artifact, he will most likely ask himself: 
“Why did my boss introduce this partition [substitute with any separation artifact]?” Our first 
dimension therefore categorizes separation cues depending on the mechanisms that brought about 
their implementation. Thus, while we assume that separation artifacts are always introduced by the 
employer (or by an employee who ranks higher than the focal employee), we differentiate separation 
cues depending on whether they originate from artifacts that the employer introduced in a 
discretionary manner and on his own initiative, or in response to the employee’s request, or simply 
because of a standard operating procedure (e.g., by default, certain types of middle managers have 
the “right” to an office of a certain size).  
 
	  
129 
 Thus, top-down cues originate as a consequence of managerial discretion (e.g., the boss decides 
to separate two employees by introducing a partition between them). In contrast, bottom-up cues 
originate from the employee (e.g., the boss separates two employees because the employees ask him 
to do so). Task-related cues are a natural consequence of standard operating procedures in the 
organization (e.g., a promotion that comes with a private office).  
 We argue that top-down cues are more likely than bottom-up and task-related cues to trigger 
separation awareness in terms of control and information. In organizations, power relations are 
highly asymmetrical (i.e., top down). As a result, employees watch for signals that reveal 
management’s intentions (Mühlau & Lindenberg, 2003; Takeuchi, Chen, & Lepak, 2009). Thus, the 
informational or controlling nature of a separation cue will be more evident to employees if the cue 
is imposed from above. For instance, an employee who is given a private office by his boss will be 
more likely to perceive that move as cueing control or competence affirmation than an employee 
who receives a private office as a natural consequence of career advancement. In other words, top-
down cues are more likely than bottom-up and task-related cues to stimulate separation awareness in 
the form of separation-as-control and separation-as-competence-affirmation.  
 Strength. When faced with a separation cue, the employee also asks himself: “Does being 
separated from others make a real difference for me?”. If it does not, then the employee is likely to 
dismiss the separation artifact as negligible. In turn, he will perceive the cue that is attached to such 
an artifact as weak and uninteresting. In contrast, a strong separation cue—that is, a cue that 
originates from a separation artifact that “makes a difference” for the employee—is difficult to 
disregard. For example, an employee who is given a private office will appreciate his separateness 
more if visual and acoustic isolation strongly affect the quality of her work. In turn, she will 
speculate more about the intentional connotations of the cue, which will reinforce the development 
of one form of separation awareness. Thus, we propose that strong cues have greater potential to 
trigger separation awareness in terms of control and competence affirmation.  
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 By combining the above ideas, we conclude that, in terms of awareness-generation potential, 
the most powerful combination is when a cue scores high in both dimensions (origin and strength). A 
moderately powerful combination is when one dimension scores high and the other scores low. The 
weakest combination is when a cue scores low in both dimensions. More specifically,  
Proposition 2: Strong cues with a top-down origin have the greatest potential for stimulating 
separation awareness in terms of both control and competence affirmation, while strong cues 
with a bottom-up or task-related origin have moderate potential for doing so. Similarly, weak 
cues with a bottom-up or task-related origin have the lowest potential for stimulating 
separation awareness in terms of both control and competence affirmation, while weak cues 
with a top-down origin have moderate potential for doing so.  
Making Sense of Separation Cues: The Moderating Effect of Freedom to Move and Self-
Monitoring 
 Separation cues may lead to awareness of separation in terms of control and in terms of 
competence affirmation. What predicts the emergence of one kind of awareness? In line with 
research on organizational sensemaking (Weick et al., 2005), we argue that the development of 
specific types of awareness rests on cognitive simplifying mechanisms (Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008). 
This need for simplification derives from bounded rationality (Simon, 1955, 1978): individuals 
attempt to specify causal relations between complex sets of variables but are limited in doing so by 
the bounds on their rationality (Lant & Shapira, 2001; Hodgkison & Healey, 2008). Thus, individuals 
make sense of ambiguous information environments by applying mental frames that allow them to 
simplify and give meaning to ambiguous scenarios (Walsh, 1995; Weick et al., 2005).  
 As they can be perceived in terms of both control and competence affirmation, separation 
cues are potentially ambiguous signals. Thus, when confronted with separation artifacts, employees 
may ask themselves: “Has this partition, cubicle, door, etc., been introduced in order to protect me 
from external disturbance and let me perform my task in the best possible way (i.e., competence 
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affirmation), or to determine and de facto control my behavior?” Answering this question may be far 
from easy. First, simple (decontextualized) observation of the cue is insufficient in terms of enabling 
the employee to make accurate deductions about what the cue is intended to do. In addition, 
limitations in the employee’s capability for rational processing impede her ability to consider all of 
the variables that may potentially interact so as to logically indicate the motivational nature of the 
cue. Thus, in line with research on sensemaking, we expect the employee to focus on some specific 
elements that she will use as interpretive frames in order to make sense of ambiguous cues 
(Hodgkison & Healey, 2008).  
 Research on the physical environment in organizations points to the nature of the task and 
social characteristics as the most important moderators between physical variations in the workspace 
and employees’ responses to these changes. Thus, the extent to which separation artifacts (and, more 
generally, workplace (re-)design) influence an employee’s behavior greatly depend on the 
employee’s task characteristics and activities, as well as on social characteristics, such as her work 
orientation (Fayard & Weeks, 2007; Maher & Von Hippel, 2005; McElroy & Morrow, 2010).  
 In our model, we highlight one specific task-related element and one specific social 
characteristic that moderate the emergence of separation awareness. As these elements allow for the 
emergence of specific interpretations (control or competence affirmation) of potentially ambiguous 
cues, we propose that perceived freedom to move and self-monitoring are two fundamentals 
interpretive frames that are used to cognitively process separation cues. In introducing these 
moderators, we suggest that employees’ sensemaking of their separation is highly contingent on 
person-specific orientations and on the nature of the task.  
 Perceived freedom to move. First, we propose that whether separation cues engender 
awareness of control or competence affirmation depends on what we call the employee’s “perceived 
freedom to move”—that is, the employee’s perceptions about his freedom to physically move within 
and even beyond (e.g., working from home) the workspace to basically decide on the location of his 
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own work place. High perceived freedom to move implies that the employee will think that he can 
avoid the separation artifact, if necessary. This, in turn, will increase the perceived informational 
nature of such an artifact. On the other hand, low perceived freedom to move will lead the employee 
to believe that she will be unable to avoid the separation artifact, which will favor an interpretation of 
the artifact as a controlling tool. We focus on a perceptional (rather than objective) conceptualization 
of freedom precisely because of the psychological, interpretive nature of the processes under 
analysis. Specifically, we predict that high perceived freedom to move will increase awareness of 
separation in terms of support and competence affirmation, and that low perceived freedom will 
increase awareness of separation in terms of control and pressure.  
 The hallmark of control is a perception of pressure to behave in a certain way (Gagné & Deci, 
2005). When a separation artifact is introduced into a context in which the employee feels that he has 
limited possibility to move, he will believe that he cannot decide whether he wants to take advantage 
of his separateness. He will therefore experience an overall feeling of pressure and control in 
association with the cue. For instance, imagine that cubicles are introduced in a call center that was 
initially open spaced. Call-center workers are normally required to perform all of their tasks from 
their workstations and are likely to think they have limited freedom to move. As employee 
communication will be impaired by the introduction of the cubicles and as employees will probably 
feel that they cannot avoid the separation artifact, they will come to view the artifact as a controlling 
instrument aimed at reducing their interaction with other employees (rather than as a supportive 
instrument aimed at, e.g., protecting them from environmental disturbances).  
 When the pattern is reversed, the possibility of avoiding the separation artifact because of high 
perceived freedom to move gives rise to a mainly informational interpretation of separation cues. 
Thus, under conditions characterized by a high freedom to move, a separation artifact has limited 
power to affect the employee’s behavior and is likely to be seen as an instrument that the employee is 
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free to benefit from as he wishes. To a large extent, the separation artifact becomes a tool in the 
hands of the employee rather than in those of the employer.  
 In sum, we expect separation cues to trigger a high perception of control and a low perception 
of competence affirmation among those employees who feel that they have limited freedom to move. 
Similarly, we expect separation cues to elicit a low perception of control and a high perception of 
competence affirmation among those employees who feel that they have considerable freedom to 
move.  
Proposition 3: Perceived freedom to move moderates the effect of separation cues on 
separation awareness, such that low perceived freedom increases awareness of separation-as-
control and decreases awareness of separation-as-competence-affirmation, and high perceived 
freedom decreases awareness of separation-as-control and increases awareness of separation-
as-competence-affirmation.  
 Self-monitoring. Self-monitoring is another determinant of the extent to which employees 
develop awareness of their separation in terms of control or competence affirmation. Specifically, we 
argue that individuals who engage in self-monitoring to a great extent (“high self-monitors”) are 
more sensitive to the signaling potential of separation cues than those who engage in self-monitoring 
to a lesser extent (“low self-monitors”). The former will therefore develop more awareness of 
separation (both in terms of control and in terms of competence affirmation). In social settings, some 
individuals, namely “low self-monitors,” behave in accordance with internal sources, such as 
feelings, attitudes, and beliefs. As they “march to their own drums,” low self-monitors are likely to 
be less attentive to cues in general, and less prone to link cues to mental representations of what 
others think about them. In contrast, “high self-monitors” adjust their behaviors to the demands of 
the situation in question. In particular, they tend to read cues intensively, and to transmit numerous 
signals about appropriate behavior, competence, and status (Mehra, Kilduff & Brass, 2001; Snyder 
1987).   
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 We propose that an employee’s tendency toward low or high self-monitoring influences the 
importance that the employee attributes to a given separation cue. In other words, high and low self-
monitors look at separation cues differently. Low self-monitors are not easily influenced by 
separation cues; they tend to exclude the possibility that their exposure to separation artifacts are 
instrumental to how others perceive them. In contrast, high self-monitors are intensely occupied with 
the cues represented by separation artifacts. For example, high self-monitors are frustrated by 
controlling cues, while they are highly favorable to competence-affirming cues, which imply a 
potential for beneficial signaling to others. Thus, a high self-monitor will be particularly pleased with 
a separation artifact that he interprets as competence-affirming and particularly unhappy with a 
separation artifact that he interprets as controlling because he believes others will interpret the cue in 
the same way.  
Proposition 4: Self-monitoring positively moderates the effect of separation cues on 
separation awareness of both kinds. Specifically, for individuals that are high in self-
monitoring, the moderation effect on the link between separation cues and awareness is 
greater. For individuals that are low in self-monitoring, the moderation effect is weak or non-
existent.   
BEHAVIORAL CONSEQUENCES OF SEPARATION AWARENESS 
Thus far, we have theorized that separation cues interact with perceived freedom to move and self-
monitoring, such that they trigger the emergence of separation awareness in terms of control or 
competence affirmation. We now turn to a discussion of the behavioral consequences of these two 
types of awareness. We focus on two fundamental and orthogonal types of work behavior: 
organizational misbehavior (OMB), which refers to intentional action by members of the 
organization that violate formal organizational rules, norms, and expectations (Bennett & Robinson, 
2000; Robinson & Bennett, 1995; Vardi & Wiener, 1996; Vardi, 2001; Vardi & Weitz, 2004), and 
organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), which refers to extra-role, non-enforceable behaviors that 
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benefit the organization to which the individual belongs (LePine, Erez & Johnson, 2002; Organ, 
1988; Organ & Ryan, 1995).  
 Given the prevalence, importance, and constructive and destructive implications of these 
behaviors, there is a growing interest in understanding the mechanisms that trigger OMB and OCB. 
Extant theory and research clearly indicate that the emergence of OCB and OMB is contingent on 
employees’ cognitive and affective perceptions of their work (Lee & Allen, 2002). Specifically, 
OMB is fueled by perceptions of exploitation and inequity, as well as feelings of dissatisfaction and 
frustration (Hollinger & Clark, 1982; Lee & Allen, 2002; Vardi, 2001; Vardi & Wiener, 1996). OCB, 
in contrast, is driven by perceptions of fairness and organizational support, as well as job satisfaction 
(Andreoli & Lefkowitz, 2008; Fassina, Jones & Uggerslev, 2008; George & Brief, 1992; LePine, 
Erez & Johnson, 2002; Konovsky & Organ, 1996; Moorman, Blakely & Niehoff, 1998; Organ, 
1988).  
 These psychological states parallel our distinction between awareness of separation-as-control 
and awareness of separation-as-competence-affirmation. In the following, we link awareness of 
separation-as-control with OMB and awareness of separation-as-competence-affirmation with OCB. 
Furthermore, we introduce individual and contextual factors that moderate these relations.  
Awareness of Separation-as-Control and Organizational Misbehaviors  
 First, we expect awareness of separation-as-control to, ceteris paribus, increase the likelihood 
of employee engagement in OMB. OMB is defined as “any intentional action by members of 
organizations that defies and violates (a) shared organizational norms and expectations, and/or (b) 
core societal values, mores and standards of proper conduct” (Vardi & Wiener, 1996: 153; see also 
Robinson & Bennet, 1995, and Vardi, 2001). These violations can be directed at the organization 
itself, at its members, or both (Bennett & Robinson, 2000). The seriousness of OMB varies, ranging 
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from behavior that involves a moderate waste of organizational resources to the outright stealing or 
sabotaging of equipment (Robinson & Bennet, 1995).1  
 We link awareness of separation-as-control to OMB via feelings of injustice, exploitation, and 
mistreatment. In fact, subjective perceptions of injustice, exploitation, and mistreatment in the 
workplace have been shown to significantly affect employee deviance (Hollinger & Clark, 1982; 
Vardi & Wiener, 1996; Vardi, 2001; Ambrose, Seabright & Schminke, 2002). OMB has consistently 
been depicted as behavior that reflects resentment, dissatisfaction, or protest (Vardi & Wiener, 1996; 
Vardi, 2001). When employees perceive a separation artifact as controlling, they are likely to 
experience feelings of dissatisfaction, pressure, and injustice, and react by engaging in OMB (Lee & 
Allen, 2002; Robinson & Bennett, 1997). Along this line, Judge and Bono (2001) find that an 
individual’s perceived locus of control is one of the strongest predictors of job satisfaction. For 
example, after controlling for dispositional negative affect and work status, Fitzgerald, 
Haythornthwaite, Suchday, and Ewart (2003) find that the job strain induced by control leads to an 
OMB of directing anger at coworkers, supervisors, and customers. Similarly, research has explained 
employee theft and sabotage in the workplace (types of OMB) as deliberate reactions to perceived 
inequities (Greenberg, 1990; Greenberg & Scott, 1996; Ambrose, Seabright, & Schminke, 2002; 
Kelloway, Francis, Prosser & Cameron, 2010). More generally, evidence indicates that negative 
affect and negative behavior tend to arise from stressful conditions (Lee & Allen, 2002; 
Haythornwaite et al., 2003) that may be rooted in perceptions of injustice and mistreatment. In sum, 
we propose that the awareness of separation-as-control is linked to feelings of injustice, exploitation, 
and mistreatment, and that it thus fosters employees’ engagement in OMB.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Vardi and Wiener’s (1996) OMB construct includes three types of misbehaviors: misbehavior intended to 
benefit oneself, misbehavior intended to benefit the organization, and misbehavior intended to inflict damage 
on the organization or its members. Clearly, the second category is inconsistent with the underlying behaviors 
we are trying to predict in the sense that we are concerned with dysfunctional workplace behaviors. As most 
OMBs are, in fact, dysfunctional (Vardi, 2001), we maintain OMB as our focal construct but control for those 
instances in which a misbehavior actually benefits the organization.  
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Proposition 5: Awareness of separation-as-control increases employees’ engagement in 
organizational misbehaviors.  
Awareness of Separation-as-Competence-Affirmation and Organizational Citizenship 
Behaviors  
 We have proposed that awareness of separation-as-control triggers OMB. Likewise, we expect 
separation-as-competence-affirmation to, ceteris paribus, increase the likelihood of employee 
engagement in OCB. OCB has been conceptualized as individual, extra-role, non-enforceable 
behaviors that often go unrecognized by formal evaluation systems but still contribute to effective 
organizational functioning (LePine, Erez & Johnson, 2002; Organ, 1988, 1997; Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Paine & Bachrach, 2000; Van Dyne, Graham & Dienesh, 1994). Typical OCB-minded 
individuals show loyalty to the organization, help colleagues, and generally go the extra mile for the 
organization. OCB may increase quality (Podsakoff, Ahearne & MacKenzie, 1997), sales 
performance (Podsakoff & MacKenzie, 1994), coordination, organizational development, and 
cohesion (Organ, Podsakoff & MacKenzie, 2006).  
 We base our prediction that awareness of separation-as-competence-affirmation fuels OCB on 
evidence that links perceptions of fairness, job satisfaction, and organizational support to employees’ 
engagement in OCB. In fact, research shows that perceived fairness, organizational support, and job 
satisfaction are among the most robust predictors of OCB (Andreoli & Lefkowitz, 2008; Fassina et 
al., 2008; Ehrhart, 2004; Organ & Lingl, 1995; Organ & Ryan, 1995; Podsakoff et al., 2000; Tepper 
& Taylor, 2003). Employees who perceive their work environment as generally supportive and fair 
develop a social exchange relationship with their employers and, in line with the norm of reciprocity 
(Gouldner, 1960), tend to repay the organization by engaging in OCB (Organ, 1988).  
 An awareness of separation-as-competence-affirmation stimulates the employee’s autonomous 
motivation (see P1). In this regard, research based on self-determination theory has demonstrated 
that autonomous motivation is superior to controlled motivation in promoting increased behavioral 
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effort and persistence (Gagné & Deci, 2005; Ryan & Deci, 2000). The superiority of autonomous 
motivation is particularly pronounced when behaviors involve helping others, organizational loyalty, 
sportsmanship, or civic virtue (Podsakoff et al., 2000; Lindenberg & Foss, 2011). In other words, 
autonomous motivation is an important determinant of OCB.  
 In sum, we propose that awareness of separation-as-competence-affirmation is linked to 
feelings of fairness and satisfaction, and that it therefore fosters employees’ engagement in OCB.  
Proposition 6: Awareness of separation-as-competence-affirmation increases employees’ 
engagement in organizational citizenship behaviors.  
The Moderating Effect of Employees’ Psychological Attachments to the Organization  
 Clearly, there are conditions under which the aforementioned relationships are likely to vary. 
The arguments that perceived separation-as-control triggers OMB and that perceived separation-as-
competence-affirmation stimulates OCB are based on the idea that perceived control is naturally 
associated with feelings of dissatisfaction and perceptions of injustice, while competence affirmation 
is naturally associated with positive feelings and perceptions of fairness (Earley & Lind, 1987; Schat 
& Kelloway, 2000; Judge & Bono, 2001). However, different mechanisms influence the extent to 
which these psychological associations occur. Organizational identification and (affective) 
commitment—two fundamental dimensions of employees’ psychological attachment to their 
organizations (Meyer, Becker & Van Dick, 2006)—play a fundamental role in this respect.  
 Organizational identification captures employees’ self-definition in terms of organizational 
membership (Ashforth, Harrison & Corley, 2008; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Mael & Ashforth, 1992). 
In other words, when the employee identifies with the organization, she links her organizational 
membership to her self-concept either cognitively (e.g., the conscious internalization of 
organizational values) or emotionally (e.g., an experience of pride in membership) (Riketta, 2005). In 
both cases, organizational identification rests on the employee’s perceived oneness with the 
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organization (different foci of identification are possible, but are not of interest for our model; see 
Johnson, Morgeson, Ilgen, Meyer & Lloyd, 2006).  
 A related construct is organizational affective commitment. Employees can commit themselves 
to an organization because of necessity (continuance commitment), obligation (normative 
commitment), or affection (affective commitment). Organizational affective commitment captures an 
employee’s emotional attachment to and involvement in an organization (Allen & Meyer, 1990, 
1996; Meyer & Allen, 1991; Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch & Topolnytsky, 2002). Research indicates 
that although organizational identification and affective commitment are similar, they are distinct 
constructs. Identification implies that employee and organization are not separate psychological 
entities (i.e., the organization is part of the individual’s self-conception). Commitment, on the other 
hand, refers to a psychological relationship between two distinct entities (the individual and the 
organization) (Meyer, Becker & Van Dick, 2006; Van Knippenberg & Sleebos, 2006). All in all, 
identification and commitment are the main indicators of employees’ psychological attachments to 
their organizations (Meyer, Becker & Van Dick, 2006; Van Knippenberg & Sleebos, 2006).  
 An employee’s psychological attachment to the organization moderates the relationship 
between separation awareness and behavioral outcomes. This happens because a high level of 
psychological attachment most likely influences employees’ sentiments about controlling and 
informational cues. Specifically, employees who are psychologically attached to the organization 
will perceive controlling artifacts as less arbitrary and, in turn, engage in less OMB. In fact, high 
attachment does not alter the perception of the separation cue per se but it will justify the presence of 
control, at least to some extent. For example, consider a call-center worker who perceives her cubicle 
as an instrument of control. In a situation of high attachment, the employee will think that this form 
of control is necessary and instrumental to the organization (to which she is emotionally attached). 
This in turn, will negatively moderate the likelihood of that employee’s engagement in OMB. In a 
similar vein, employees who are psychologically attached to their organizations will perceive 
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informational instruments as even more credible, satisfactory, and equitable. This, in turn, will 
positively influence employees’ propensity to engage in OCB.  
 It might be argued that perceptions of control could be more harmful for employees who 
perceive controlling policies as highly unfair because they are psychologically attached to the 
organization. However, psychological attachment to the organization is associated with loyalty to the 
organization and, as Hirschman (1970) argued, loyalty to the organization activates a “voice 
strategy” rather than an “exit strategy.” This means that the employee will dedicate her energy to 
fully contributing to the organization rather than to investing in external options. In situations in 
which organizational members experience unfairness—such as when they are relocated from a single 
office to an open plan office—the loyal employee will attempt to voice her dissatisfaction rather than 
exit the organization. Thus, compared with a less psychologically attached employee, a more 
psychologically attached employee will be more likely to accept the rearrangement for the benefit of 
the organization.  
 In sum, we expect the proposed relationships between employees’ awareness of separation and 
behavioral responses (P5 and P6) to be highly sensitive to the degree of psychological attachment 
among employees. Specifically, employees’ attachment to their organizations (in terms of both 
identification and commitment) influences perceptions of fairness, exploitation, and satisfaction, 
such that an employee with a high level of attachment will perceive controlling instruments as less 
arbitrary (and, in turn, engage in less OMB) and informational instruments as more equitable and 
satisfactory (and, in turn, engage in more OCB). Hence,  
Proposition 7: Employees’ psychological attachment to their organizations negatively 
moderates the effect of awareness of separation-as-control on OMB and positively moderates 
the effect of awareness of separation-as-competence-affirmation on OCB.  
The Moderating Effect of Perceived Inconsistency  
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 The proposition that awareness of separation-as-competence-affirmation leads to OCB is based 
on the argument that an affirmation of competence triggers the emergence of autonomous motivation 
(see P1), as well as feelings of fairness, support, and satisfaction (see P6). These result in OCB. 
However, autonomous motivation is fragile and is sensitive to various environmental factors. 
Specifically, motivation-crowding research demonstrates that autonomously driven behaviors are 
easily compromised by formal, extrinsic rewards (Deci et al., 1999; Frey & Jegen, 2001; Frey & 
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997), controlling communication (Ryan et al., 1983), and evaluations 
(Harackiewicz et al., 1984). In other words, the maintenance of autonomous motivation requires the 
absence of strong controlling signals (Gagné & Deci, 2005).  
 These findings are consistent with evidence in signaling research (Connelly et al., 2010), which 
stresses that employees seek consistency among multiple signals originating from the same source 
(Lindenberg, 2003). In fact, human actors need consistency in their beliefs, values, and attitudes 
(Festinger, 1957), and a lack of consistency has been proven to threaten the motivation to initiate 
tasks and persist in their execution (Thomas & Velthouse, 1990). Accordingly, we expect 
employees’ (autonomous) inclination to engage in OCB to be highly sensitive to cues in and signals 
from the work environment that may indicate controlling attitudes towards the employee.   
Proposition 8: The positive relationship between awareness of separation-as-competence-
affirmation and OCB is negatively moderated by environmental signals that are perceived as 
controlling (e.g., a formal, extrinsic incentive system).  
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
The building of new theory often involves the development of new constructs. In this article, we 
have focused on the cognitive and motivational (as distinct from the instrumental and aesthetic; see 
Elsbach & Pratt, 2007) consequences of physical separation in organizations. We have organized our 
discussion around the novel construct of separation awareness. Although the construct has merit in 
its own right, in this article it helps in the development of a comprehensive model of the behavioral 
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consequences of separation management in organizations. Our theoretical framework clarifies and 
expands the understanding of the antecedents, nature, and behavioral implications of separation 
awareness in organizations. In highlighting the importance of awareness of separation-as-control 
versus separation-as-competence-affirmation, we have developed new theory that contributes to the 
understanding of the potentially functional and dysfunctional consequences of an organization’s 
physical space.  
 Our analysis proceeded through three stages. First, we made use of self-determination research 
in motivational psychology to conceptualize awareness of separation in terms of control versus 
competence affirmation. We also linked these types of awareness to distinct motivational attitudes. 
Second, we moved a causal step backwards to examine the mechanisms that trigger the emergence of 
separation awareness in its two forms. Finally, we turned our attention to the behavioral 
consequences of separation awareness, arguing that individual and organizational contingencies 
moderate the distinct relationships that link the awareness of separation-as-control to OMB and the 
awareness of separation-as-competence-affirmation to OCB. In the following, we discuss the 
contributions and implications of our research, as well as desirable directions for future research.  
Theoretical Contribution  
 This article contributes to management research in several ways. First, we introduce the 
construct of separation awareness in the context of management research on the physical 
environment in organizations. By highlighting the cognitions that environmental cuing gives rise to, 
we developed theory that significantly improves our understanding of why and how employees’ 
relative separateness within an organization influences their motivational and behavioral inclinations. 
This builds on the assumption that cognition and motivations are highly intertwined and fundamental 
drivers of behavior (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997). The management of physical separation in 
organizations has been characterized as having great potential for both positive and negative 
outcomes, and as being an extremely complex practice with multiple trade-offs and challenges 
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(Elsbach & Pratt, 2007). Our main contribution in this regard is our model, which attempts to 
organize those complexities and behavioral potential into a parsimonious framework.  
 Second, by combining the dichotomous conceptualization of separation awareness with 
individual and organizational moderators, we were able to propose unique associations between 
separation artifacts (i.e., environmental cues) and orthogonal work behaviors (i.e., OCB and OMB). 
This allowed us to cast new light on a variety of findings in research on the motivational, affective, 
and behavioral consequences of the physical environment in organizations (see Elsbach & Pratt, 
2007). Specifically, our analysis of the separation-awareness construct suggested that it is highly 
meaningful to distinguish between separation that employees perceive as controlling and separation 
that employees perceive as affirming their fundamental competences. Self-determination theory 
predicts widely different outcomes, which we link to OCB and OMB. These outcomes include the 
very different behavioral outcomes identified in the extant literature on the effects of the physical 
environment in organizations. 
Directions for Future Research 
 This article’s contributions can be elaborated and extended in several ways. Specifically, we 
envision eight interesting avenues for future research.  
 Individual-level heterogeneity. Research indicates that sensitivity to environmental 
stimulation, and the propensity to engage in OMB or OCB may differ from person to person (Maher 
& Von Hippel, 2005; Vardi & Wiener, 1996). Thus, individual differences may play an important 
role in determining the effect of a given separation cue. The overall importance of the individual is 
captured by our model. For instance, perceptions of freedom to move (P3), self-monitoring (P4), 
psychological attachment (P7), and signal inconsistency (P8) directly involve the dynamics of 
individual cognition. However, other aspects of the individual are black-boxed in our model. In 
particular, we do not theorize about the effect of individual heterogeneity in terms of, for example, 
personality traits.  
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 Thus, an interesting avenue for future research would be to build individual aspects, such as 
values, attitudes, age, and personality traits, into the model, perhaps as moderators of the postulated 
relations. One way to accomplish this would be to draw on self-determination theory as it is pertains 
to individual heterogeneity. Notably, self-determination theory explicitly suggests that individuals 
differ in their need for competence, autonomy, and relatedness (Deci & Ryan, 1985). However, 
individuals also differ in cognitive terms, and, as we clarify below, this may influence how they 
perceive environmental cues, such as separation artifacts.  
 Level of analysis and social-comparison mechanisms. Not only do individuals differ, but they 
also engage in what has been termed “social comparison” (Nickerson & Zenger, 2008). Theories on 
social comparison assume that individuals compare their rewards—such as financial rewards or 
items with symbolic value—to those received by salient referents, and that people care about 
inequities. Whenever individuals perceive inequity, they will engage in behaviors that attenuate that 
perception (Nickerson & Zenger, 2008). In other words, inequity perceived in unfavorable social 
comparisons is painful, and can lead to envy; negative behaviors, such as social undermining (i.e., 
noncooperative behavior or even attempts to sabotage coworkers’ productivity); and reduced 
organizational citizenship. For example, Tai, Narayanan, and McAllister (2012) report on what they 
term “office-chair envy”—an inequity based on individuals believing that a better office chair is 
symbolic of higher status. They find that office-chair envy may have negative behavioral 
consequences (at least for the organization), such as reduced organizational citizenship behavior.  
 In this article, our individual-level construct of “separation awareness” focuses on physical 
structures. In this regard, we focus on a dyadic manager-employee scenario, thereby omitting how 
physical structures may also be an object of social comparison across multiple employees. Future 
research should apply our model to the group level of analysis. In so doing, it should also address 
how inequity and envy moderate the main relations that we have described.  
 
	  
145 
 Managerial narratives. Employees’ sensemaking of separation cues can be affected by the 
narratives (Clark & Salaman, 1998) that managers (may) use to justify the introduction of a given 
separation artifact. For instance, the perception of control that may be associated with a given 
separation artifact can be reduced if management explicitly describes that artifact as a means to 
protect employees from external disturbances. Similarly, the perception of competence affirmation 
that an employee may attach to another separation artifact may be compromised if management 
explicitly describes that artifact as, for instance, an instrument to measure and stimulate the 
employee’s productivity.  
 Specific targets of organizational citizenship behavior and organizational misbehavior. Both 
OCB and OMB may have distinct targets. These behaviors can be directed towards the organization, 
towards individual employees, or both (e.g., Ehrhart, 2004; Lee & Allen, 2002). In our model, we 
treat OMB and OCB as unified and relatively consistent behaviors. Furthermore, in line with the 
findings of extant research, we link them to perceived control and competence affirmation. It seems 
possible, however, that awareness of separation may be particularly conducive to individual- versus 
organization-oriented OCB and OMB under certain circumstances. For instance, depending on the 
size of the organization, an employee who experiences separation-as-control may be more or less 
prone to direct his misbehavior towards his boss or towards the entire organization. An 
implementation of this distinction would certainly be an interesting avenue for future research.  
 Degrees of awareness and cue strength. Employees’ cognitive processing of ambiguous 
scenarios can be more or less conscious (Daft & Macintosh, 1981). Our model, however, does not 
capture variability in the degree of consciousness in employees’ interpretations of ambiguous 
separation cues, even though such variability may exist—some employees may be more aware of 
separation artifacts than other employees. Accordingly, the former would be more influenced by 
such artifacts than the latter. This again indicates a need to take individual-level heterogeneity more 
fully into account. Specifically, individual heterogeneity, as it pertains to the cognitive processing of 
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the cues represented by separation artifacts, matters. The cognitive schema that individuals apply for 
such processing are likely to be influenced by their cultural background, upbringing, education, 
tenure in the organization, and work experience. Furthermore, variability in awareness also exists on 
the level of the individual employee. For instance, a given employee may be more or less attentive to 
a given separation artifact at different times.  
 Separation management and organizational value creation. Our model suggests that 
separation management may have significant implications for value-generating potential in 
organizations. OCB and OMB have been repeatedly associated with constructive and destructive 
consequences. These behaviors translate rather directly into implications for organizational value 
creation; knowledge sharing (an example of OCB) has positive value-creation implications, while 
physical sabotage (an example of OMB) has negative implications. By clarifying the role of 
separation management, and individual and organizational contingencies in triggering these work 
behaviors, we significantly improve the understanding of the value-generating potential of the 
management of separation in organizations and, more generally, the strategic use of physical 
structures. However, much remains to be done to improve our understanding of this potential. 
Overall, the exact linkages between OCB and OMB and organizational value creation need to be 
more fully theorized before a satisfactory understanding of the relationship between separation 
management and organizational value creation can be derived.  
 Organizational heterogeneity. If such an enhanced understanding can be achieved, a next step 
would be to nuance the understanding of the organizations in which separation management is 
practiced. Is the relation between separation management and organizational value creation 
influenced by the kind of organization in which separation management is implemented? 
Organizations differ along multiple dimensions, and it may be hypothesized that, for example, the 
age and industry dimensions are highly relevant moderators of the relation between separation 
management and organizational value creation. In other words, variance in age and industry 
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introduce variance in roles, status hierarchies, how authority and expertise are linked, and a host of 
other dimensions that are highly relevant to our understanding of the organizational ramifications of 
distance tools.  
 Short- versus long-term effects of separation. Although control and competence affirmation 
are distinct and mutually exclusive psychological states (Gagné & Deci, 2005), they are not 
necessarily stable across time. Thus, employees may experience a shift in their awareness of 
separation—perhaps when they come to better understand the narratives that accompany the 
introduction of separation, or when they realize that others of similar status are in the same situation 
within or across organizations. A discussion of these short-term and long-term effects—or, more 
broadly, the adoption of a dynamic approach to the analysis—seems essential to the development of 
our theoretical model.  
Conclusion  
 In recent decades, separation management has become an increasingly important aspect of 
organizational life. We believe that the introduction of a perceptual stance supports the development 
of a more theoretically consistent and managerially relevant understanding of the role of physical 
separation in organizations. We trust that the theory developed in this paper will stimulate future 
explorations of this fundamental research theme. 
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ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN AND THE CREDIBILITY OF  
DELEGATED DECISION RIGHTS 
 
 
Abstract  
Managers delegate the right to make decisions to employees because such delegation may 
economize on scarce attention and may positively impact motivation, increasing 
organizational value creation. However, managers often renege on delegation. The 
withdrawal of delegated rights may have negative consequences for the motivation of 
organizational members. Therefore, making delegation credible is essential for sustaining 
the advantages that flow from delegation. We argue that  organizational design—
specifically, the internal fit between key organizational elements—plays a key role in 
making delegation credible. Our theory introduces a neglected incentive dimension to 
organizational design exercises, and sheds new light on the relation between organizational 
design, credible delegation, and value creation.  
 163 
INTRODUCTION 
Organizational research increasingly highlights the importance of human motivation in leveraging the 
value creation potential of human resources, and points to motivators such as reward systems and 
organizational structure and transparency (e.g., Bridoux, Coeurderoy & Durand, 2011; Coff, 1997; 
Gottschalg & Zollo, 2007; Lindenberg & Foss, 2011). Research has also long recognized that delegation 
of decision authority to employees can foster organizational value creation. For example, delegation 
facilitates efficient decision-making in changing and complex environments, economizing with scarce 
managerial attention (Galbraith, 1974; Jensen & Meckling, 1992; Radner, 1993). However, 
organizational value creation can also be fostered by delegation as a means to increase the autonomous 
motivation of employees (Thomas & Velthouse, 1990; Spreitzer, 1995) resulting in increased 
behavioural effort, persistence, helping behaviours, and problem-solving (Gagné & Deci, 2005; Ryan & 
Deci, 2000; Weinstein & Ryan, 2010).  
 The key question we raise and address is: What is the contribution of organizational design to 
create and sustain such motivation-based value creation? In posing this question, we link up with a 
tradition of research on employee participation, involvement, and empowerment which has long 
recognized that the formal organization can be designed to motivate employees by empowering them or 
granting them decision authority (e.g., Harley, 1999; Labianca, Gray & Brass; 2000; Liao, Toya, Lepak 
& Hong, 2009). The contribution of our research lies in proffering different, and more oblique, reasons 
why specific configurations of organizational coordination mechanisms and organizational design matter 
for employee motivation and, hence, overall value creation.  
 The basic idea is the following. When employees are delegated discretion they have the formal 
rights to choose which actions they prefer within specified limits. Delegation of discretion fosters 
feelings of competence and autonomy in employees (Bénabou & Tirole, 2003; Liao et al., 2009), and 
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these feelings have been shown to be supportive of autonomous motivation and, in turn, value creation 
(Gagné & Deci, 2005; Ryan & Deci, 2000). However, in organizations delegated decision rights are 
loaned, but now owned (Baker, Gibbons & Murphy, 1999). Thus, employees to whom decision rights 
have been delegated understand that their decisions can be overruled, and that the discretion delegated to 
them can be reduced (Coyle-Shapiro, Jackie & Ian Kessler, 2000; Williamson, 1996). From a 
motivational perspective, this potentially raises problems. Autonomous motivation is highly sensitive to 
perceived control (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Gagné & Deci, 2005; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Employees that think 
that promises to delegate discretion are non-credible will fear being controlled by means of ex post 
reductions in the level of delegation, perhaps amounting to opportunistic reneging on the part of 
managers. A loss of autonomous motivation may be the result, leading to smaller contributions of effort 
and creativity in work and problem solving. For this reason, making delegated discretion credible is 
highly important to sustained value creation through delegation.  
The question therefore is: How can (promises to respect) delegation of discretion be made 
credible? That is, how can managers make it credible to employees that they will not renege on 
agreements to delegate discretion to those employees? Clearly, employees may have different levels of 
discretion across industries and organizations because distinct environmental circumstances 
differentially determine the level of discretion that can be delegated (Carpenter & Golden, 1997; 
Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995). However, while the relation between organizational design and 
delegation has been widely discussed in contingency theories of organizations (Burns & Stalker, 1961; 
Woodward, 1965; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Mintzberg, 1983; Galbraith, 1974, 
1977, 1995; Grandori 2001), little is known about the relation between organizational design and the 
credibility of delegation. This silence is problematic because lacking understanding of how 
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organizational design contributes to credible delegation of discretion deprives managers of an important 
instrument for protecting employee motivation that foster value creation.  
We focus on cross-level influences of organizational systems (organizational design) on individual 
employee perceptions and behaviours associated with motivation. A key argument in contingency theory 
is that there is a positive relationship between organizational performance and fit configurations of 
organizational elements (e.g. Child, 1975; Galbraith 1977). We consider issues of credibility and 
delegation through multiple lenses (Okhuysen & Bonardi, 2011), and generate hypothesis regarding the 
fit between key organizational elements (i.e., organizational structure, coordination mechanisms, and 
contingencies) that reduce the probability of managerial intervention, and hence increase the credibility 
of delegated discretion, and in turn value creation.  
 In building our argument, we rely on related streams of literature. Classical contributions to the 
contingency theory of organizational design supply the fundamental understanding of the fit that must be 
created between an organization’s need to coordinate the work of employees, the particular coordination 
mechanisms in use, the extent to which employees will be delegated discretion in the way they carry out 
their job functions, and the structure of the organization (Burton & Obel 1988, 2004; Galbraith, 1974, 
1995; Hinnings, 1993; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Meyer, Tsui &; Mintzberg, 1983; Thompson, 1967; 
Van de Ven & Drazin, 1985). Organizational economics offers a basic framing of the notion of credible 
delegation (Baker et al., 1999). Organizational behaviour research provides insights on the relation 
between psychological factors, work motivation, and employee effort (Gagné & Deci, 2005; Osterloh & 
Frey, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Rousseau, 1989). Figure 1 depicts the model of credible delegation that 
we propose in this article.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 here 
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DELEGATION, MOTIVATION, AND VALUE CREATION:  
THE PROBLEM OF CREDIBILITY 
Delegation of Discretion  
Specialization in an organization is naturally accompanied by some degree of delegation—that is, 
empowering one person to act on behalf of another (Sengul, Gimeno & Dial, 2012)—because any 
organizational division of labour must imply the delegation of rights to use or commit organizational 
resources. While organizations always increase delegation when they increase specialization, they do not 
necessarily increase delegation of discretion (Caza, 2012). Organizations can delegate well-defined 
activities that leave hardly any discretion to employees. Thus, in principle, a completely standardized 
job where all the tasks are exhaustively described would imply delegation but not delegation of 
discretion, as in Taylorist work practices (Littler, 1978). Usually, however, more delegation implies 
more discretion. In sum, delegation of discretion obtains when a set of choices are left to the employee.  
Two distinct theoretical perspectives—namely, contingency theory and organizational 
economics—offer important insights on the determinants of the discretion that is delegated to employees 
in organizations. Contingency theory suggests that the amount of discretion that is delegated to 
employees who carry out the primary functions of the firm (employees at the work flow level) is 
affected by the job design. For example, increasing the number of tasks in a job over which the 
employee can exercise discretion sacrifices specialization advantages (Blau, 1970, 1972; Mintzberg, 
1983). Moreover, at the work flow level there may be no discretionary choice to make because of 
characteristics of the production technology (e.g., highly routine technology or highly automatized work 
processes) (Perrow, 1967; Edwards, 1979). In short, discretion may be constrained by the very nature of 
the technology itself.  
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In addition to such fundamental factors—which are likely to be industry- and organization-
specific—knowledge conditions play a key role. Thus, if an employee possesses superior knowledge, 
this speaks in favour of delegating decision rights to her, because she (and not the manager) will have 
the right knowledge about which action should optimally be taken in response to a contingency (Aghion 
& Tirole, 1997; Jensen & Meckling, 1992). In principle, knowledge can be communicated from the 
employee to the manager (divisional management, corporate headquarters, etc.), but at a cost. Part of the 
cost is the slowing down of decision-making that such communication inevitably implies (Casson, 1994; 
Radner, 1993). Thus, a classic argument in favour of delegating discretion is the high costs of making 
centralized decisions when a firm is facing an environment characterized by rapid and unpredictable 
changes (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Casson, 1994; Galbraith, 1977; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). The costs 
of transmitting information within the hierarchy, the risk of managerial overload, and the losses from 
lagging decision-making may become prohibitive in dynamic environments. Knowledge and 
information may be utilized more efficiently by letting those who possess the relevant local information 
make the local decisions (Jensen & Meckling, 1992).  
Finally, delegation is affected by the degree of decentralization in organizations. The 
decentralization dimension is an important structural characteristic of organizations, which according to 
contingency theory depends on the size of the organization and the complexity and uncertainty of the 
environment (e.g., Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). We argue that decentralization of decisions is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for delegation of discretion. Whether decentralization also means delegation 
of discretion to employees depends on how tasks are coordinated at the work-flow level.  
Extant research suggests several classifications of coordination mechanism (e.g., Astley, 1985; 
Grandori, 2001; Thompson, 1967; Van De Ven, Delbecq & Koening, 1976). However, we rely on 
Mintzberg (1983) who distinguishes between mutual adjustment, direct supervision, standardization of 
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work processes through planning, standardization of output by means of goals, and standardization of 
skills. Some coordination mechanisms allow for more delegation of discretion to employees than do 
others. For example, direct supervision, or tight planning, are consistent with little delegation of 
discretion. On the other hand, the use of broadly defined rules supplemented by goals and mutual 
adjustment allows for more delegation of discretion. Rules and regulation circumscribe employee 
discretion by defining legitimate boundaries of decision-making responsibility (Perrow, 1967), while 
goals substitute detailed descriptions of tasks or personal direction with control of the output of that task, 
leaving it up to the employee how to carry out the task (Astley, 1985). Finally mutual adjustment 
represents a delegation of discretion to those employees who hold important complementary knowledge 
and information allowing employees to directly consult one another and make a decision rather than 
confer the decision to a superior (Casson, 1994; Mintzberg, 1983). In sum, goal planning and mutual 
adjustment are the coordination mechanisms that allow for the highest level of delegation of discretion.  
These coordination mechanisms vary with respect to the level of formalization—that is, the extent 
to which they are codified—leaving more or less discretion to the direct supervisors or to the 
administrative staff of the entire organization.  For example, direct supervision, which is among the least 
formalized type of coordination mechanism, may be carried out on a discretionary basis by a supervisor 
but tends to leave little discretion to employees. Work planning is likely to be a highly formalized 
coordination mechanism, which leaves little room for discretion to either supervisors or employees, 
whereas goal planning may also be formalized but allows for much discretion to be delegated to 
employees and/or supervisors. Thus, the extent to which a coordination mechanism is formalized does 
not by itself indicate if it allows for discretion at the work-flow level. However, as we shall argue later, 
formalization may impact on the credibility in the delegation of discretion.   
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Costs of Delegation  
Along with its positive implications, delegation of discretion comes with costs. For example, 
Jensen and Meckling (1992) postulate that organization-level costs caused by the agency problem 
positively depends on the degree of delegation in a firm. Agency costs rise to the extent that employees 
who are given more freedom also reduce the level of effort they choose or because they choose the 
wrong activities. Additional costs of delegated discretion include costs stemming from reduced 
coordination of interdependencies within the organization (Galbraith, 1974). The need for 
coordination—that is, a reciprocal modification of behaviour among members of an organization 
(Grandori, 2001)—arises because there are interdependencies between activities and actions of 
organizational members. For instance, interdependencies emerge when decisions call for the use of 
knowledge possessed by different members of the organization, when organizational members carry out 
work activities that are physically interconnected, and when there are complementarities among the 
effort levels exerted by organization members. Increased delegation of discretion may result in 
coordination problems, such as product cannibalization, actions that are out of sync with the actions of 
other employees (Roberts, 2004), overuse of common pool resources (Vining, 2003), and, more 
generally, reduced flexibility (Sengul et al., 2011).  
 Delegation of discretion makes sense as long as the organizational benefits in terms of increased 
and/or improved use of local knowledge and improvements in employee motivation exceed the costs in 
terms of agency costs, coordination costs, and costs resulting from attempts to remedy these problems. 
Thus, the efficient amount of delegation in a firm is determined where the (discounted) marginal costs 
are balanced against (discounted) marginal benefits of delegation of discretion.  
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Delegation of Discretion, Autonomous Motivation, and Value Creation  
Discretion may be delegated for motivational reasons (e.g., Conger & Kanungo, 1988; Liao et al., 
2009; Sliwka, 2001). Self-determination theory highlights that motivation differs in kind (and not just 
intensity), depending on its degree of autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Gagné & Deci, 2005; Ryan & 
Deci, 2000). Autonomously motivated agents perceive themselves as originators of their behaviour. That 
is, what gives rise to the behavioural effort of an autonomously motivated agent (i.e., her perceived 
locus of causality) is internal. For this reason, autonomously driven behaviours tend to be self-endorsed 
and consistent with personal values and attitudes (Weinstein & Ryan, 2010). On the other hand, 
controlled motivation comes with an externally perceived locus of causality, and an agent that is 
motivated in a controlled way does not feel as the originator of her behaviour, but rather feels pressured 
to engage in it (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Autonomous motivation is highly sensitive to external stimulations. 
Specifically, it can be disrupted by more or less overt manifestations of control such as extrinsic rewards 
and deadlines (Amabile, DeJong & Lepper, 1976; Deci, Koestner & Ryan, 1999; Frey & Oberholzer-
Gee, 1997). Similarly, autonomous motivation can be stimulated and maintained by signals of trustiness 
and competence affirmation (Deci & Ryan, 2000).  
Delegation of discretion stimulates an employee’s (perceived) personal efficacy. By delegating 
discretion, the manager demonstrates his confidence in the employee—that is, he shows that he regards 
the employee to be competent and trustworthy enough to give her the right to make her own decisions 
and choices (Bénabou & Tirole, 2003; Liao et al., 2009). Perceptions of autonomy and competence 
affirmation are the main determinants of the emergence of autonomous motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000). 
Autonomous motivation, in turn, makes it more likely that the employee exerts effort. Specifically, 
autonomous motivation has been repeatedly shown to be conducive to higher interest, confidence, 
excitement and, in turn, creativity, persistence, effort, general well-being, and, ultimately, performance 
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(Deci & Ryan, 2000; Gagné & Deci, 2005). This relation has been shown to be particularly significant in 
the context of complex tasks that require creativity in problem-solving and in the context of certain types 
of sharing behaviours, such as knowledge sharing (Baron & Kreps, 1999; Hill & Amabile 1993; 
Osterloh & Frey, 2000). It is consistent with research that argues that delegation of discretion is a 
strategic tool that triggers behaviours that benefit the organization (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; 
Sengul et al., 2011).  
Managerial Intervention  
Managerial intervention can be directed both at increasing and reducing delegated discretion. 
Given the positive effect of delegation of discretion on autonomous motivation (and motivation-driven 
value creation), however, we are here concerned with those managerial acts that reduce the discretion 
that is delegated to an employee—that is, with those acts that may compromise employees’ autonomous 
motivation. Such intervention may take two forms. First, it can amount to overruling employee decisions 
that have been made on the basis of delegated decision rights. Second, it can be a matter of reducing the 
level of discretion that is delegated to employees—for example, by substituting or complementing 
mutual adjustment and goal planning with direct supervision or detailed work plans. Both types of 
intervention are effectively instances of reneging on an implicit contract to delegate discretion.  
Managerial intervention has been classified as taking place for “good causes” or for “bad causes” 
(Williamson, 1996). The former refers to intervention that is intended to benefit the organization. For 
instance, intervention may be exercised in an attempt to eliminate or reduce the costs that may arise 
from coordination failures (Foss, 2001; Malmgren, 1961). The latter refers to harmful sub-goal pursuit 
(Williamson, 1993). While relatively clear-cut in practice, it may often be difficult to place actual 
managerial practice unambiguously in one of the two categories, not the least for those employees that 
are subject to intervention. For example, managers may delegate substantial discretion to employees in 
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an attempt to rejuvenate the organization. Employees, happy with their new increased discretion, come 
up with profit-improving ideas, and many of these ideas are implemented. Management then decides 
that the organization is now fully occupied with implementing the ideas. As a consequence, the level of 
delegated discretion is reduced, because the need for costly idea-generation is smaller. We will argue 
that both “good” and “bad” intervention (cf. Williamson, 1996) introduces a problem of credibility 
regarding delegated discretion.  
Credible Delegation 
Organizational economics (Aghion & Tirole, 1997; Baker et al., 1999; Milgrom, 1988; Miller, 
1992; Williamson, 1985, 1993) suggests a basic framing of the issue of credible delegation. Consider, 
for example, Baker et al.’s (1999) game theoretic framing. In their model, delegation of discretion gives 
employees the informal right to search for and initiate projects (i.e., any activity to which decisions 
rights may be allocated). Delegation of discretion is “informal” in the sense that the formal right to ratify 
remains in the hands of the manager, and cannot be allocated to the employee through a court-
enforceable contract. The effort that an employee will expend on searching for and starting projects 
depends on his expected benefits. These benefits are influenced by the probability of being overruled. 
Whether overruling takes place depends on the value that employees and managers place on their 
reputation and on what the manager knows about the projects. Thus, the manager may have all 
information necessary to ratify a project, but may still decide to delegate discretion to employees, even if 
this is not always in the best interests of the manager (or the firm). If this promise is believed, it induces 
superior effort on the part of the employee with respect to searching for and starting projects. The snag, 
however, is that while the benefits of increased search may outweigh the costs of bad projects, the 
manager has the information to assess a particular project, and may be “tempted to renege on the 
promise by rejecting a project that is not in her (or the firm’s) interest” (Baker et al., 1999: 57). In sum, 
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credible delegation obtains when it is a dominant strategy for a manager not to intervene in the 
discretion that she has delegated to the employee, and the employee knows it.  
Motivational Implications of Credible Delegation  
By delegating decision rights, managers strengthen employees’ autonomous motivation. However, 
this type of motivation is easily disrupted. Specifically, perceived control has been repeatedly shown to 
“crowd out” autonomous motivation (Deci, Eghrari, Patrick & Leone, 1994; Frey & Jegen, 2001; Frey 
& Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Grolnic & Ryan, 1989). For instance, managers may substitute broadly 
defined goals with a more obtrusive type of coordination mechanism such as direct supervision, thus 
reducing employees’ delegated discretion. Reductions in an employee’s delegated discretion may 
increase his perception of being controlled, and similarly reduce his perceived autonomy. Thus, low 
perceived credibility regarding delegated discretion—that is, an employee’s perception that the manager 
may, in fact, renege on promises to delegate discretion—will (negatively) moderate the positive 
influence of delegation of discretion on autonomous motivation.  
Much research evidence supports this line of thought. For instance, Heath et al. (1993) argue that 
employees develop implicit and explicit expectations to the contract governing the relationship, and 
particularly to the benefits that they believe they deserve under the implicit contract—that is, their 
“entitlements.” In general, negative motivational consequences can be expected to follow from 
managerial intervention that interferes with employee entitlements. As the discretion that is delegated to 
employees becomes part of their perceived entitlements, reneging on delegation is arguably an instance 
of such interference. Similar conclusions may be derived from the literature on psychological contracts, 
which also predicts negative motivational effects of managerial intervention that is perceived as being 
unfair, arbitrary, and that in other ways breaks with established psychological or implicit contracts. For 
example, Rousseau and Parks (1993: 36) argue that “contract violation erodes trust [and] undermines the 
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employment relationship yielding lower employee contributions (e.g., performance and attendance) and 
lower employer investments (e.g., retention, promotion).” Empirical work has reached similar 
conclusions (Foss, 2003; Robinson, 1996). In sum, serious organizational harm may be caused by low 
credibility regarding delegation of discretion to the extent that a lack of credibility reduces the positive 
motivational effect of delegation on overall value creation (Labianca et al., 2000; Liao et al., 2009).  
Autonomous motivation is compromised whenever managerial intervention reduces the degree of 
delegated discretion (Gagné & Deci, 2005). Thus, even if an employee recognizes the potential 
intervention as being undertaken for the sake of the organization (i.e., “good” managerial intervention; 
cf. Williamson, 1993, 1996), we expect that she will still suffer a loss of autonomous motivation because 
of the concrete reduction in her autonomy.  
Given the complexity of the causal chain between delegation of discretion, credibility regarding 
delegation, motivation, and organizational value creation, we argue that organizations that want to foster 
value creation via delegation of discretion need to make delegation credible. In fact, it is exactly because 
the causal connections between intervention, motivation, and value creation are complex and 
unpredictable that it is crucial to make delegation credible. Assume as thought experiment that 
management had perfect knowledge of these connections. It would then be possible to precisely assess 
the motivational consequences associated with any intervention, and calculate the impact of credibility 
on organizational value creation. Given this, only value-increasing intervention would be performed. In 
fact, intervention could be “fine-tuned” to reach the maximum organizational value-creation.  
However, such a “first-best” situation is in general not attainable, because of the problem of 
predicting the effects on employee motivation of intervention. An important implication is that at least 
some opportunities for value-creating intervention that would obtain in a situation of full information 
must be forsaken; thus, some inefficiency is unavoidable. However, while the “first-best” solution 
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cannot be reached, organizations may aim at reaching a “second-best” solution where intervention is 
reduced to a level where value creation is maximized subject to the constraints represented by 
motivation loss and the need for adaptability. In other words, under conditions of delegated discretion, 
organizations that want to maximize the motivation-driven value creation potential of delegation of 
discretion need to safeguard employee motivation by making delegation credible.  
MAKING DELEGATION CREDIBLE THROUGH ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
Coordination Failure and Managerial Intervention  
 Managers may be defined as employees that are given decision rights to take actions that support 
internal coordination, that is, the consistency of internal plans and actions (Coase, 1937; Barnard 1938; 
Simon, 1951; Malmgren, 1961). Thus, much of the rationale of management is coordination (Mintzberg, 
1973). Since managers are responsible for coordination, a likely reason for them to intervene and reduce 
delegated discretion are coordination failures, such as suboptimal sequencing of activities, or lack of 
mutual compatibility among activities.1  
 Coordination failures may be rooted in delegation of discretion. For instance, the discretion that 
management has delegated to a given employee may turn out to be too much (e.g., because management 
underestimated the extent to which discretion interferes with a need for strict scheduling) or too little 
(e.g., to ensure smooth adaptation to changes in internal or external contingencies). Whether this results 
from an initial mistake or from changing circumstances, a coordination failure is the result. In order to 
solve the coordination failure, the manager will likely intervene by reducing (or augmenting, but this is 
not problematic from a motivational perspective) the discretion delegated to the employee. This suggests 
that there are two important means of making delegation of discretion credible: 1) to reduce the 
                                                
1 Clearly, managers may also intervene for other reasons, such as observing that employees lack the required skills to perform 
their individual tasks or do not deliver the expected effort. However, we focus on managerial intervention that is aimed at 
solving coordination failures, as distinct from intervention that may be aimed at solving problems driven by employee-
specific behaviors. 
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incidence of coordination failures that may result in reductions of delegated decision rights by means of 
the organizational design, and 2) to increase the cost of managerial intervention aimed at reducing 
delegated decision rights. In the first case, delegated discretion is credible because the employee knows 
that intervention is unlikely to be needed. In the second case, it is credible because she knows that 
intervention is unlikely to be a cost-efficient strategy for the manager. We discuss both options below, 
after having introduced the three factors that combine with a given coordination mechanism so as to 
make it stable or unstable—namely, interdependencies, uncertainty, and organizational structure.  
Interdependencies, Uncertainty, Organizational Structure and Coordination Mechanisms  
Contingency theory broadly suggests that the effectiveness of an organization depends on the 
achievement of a fit between the constellation of contingency factors (such as the size of the 
organization, the degree of environmental and task-related uncertainty), and organizational structure 
variables (such as the degree of specialization, formalization and decentralization). Moreover, 
organizational effectiveness also depends on the internal consistency among the structural elements 
themselves (Mintzberg, 1979, 1983; Van de Ven & Drazin, 1985; Siggelkow, 2001).    
We start from the choice of coordination mechanism, which is one of the most important system 
elements of organization design, and asks what constellation of contingencies and structural elements 
are most likely to create a fit with the coordination mechanisms that allow for a great deal of delegation 
of discretion to employees—that is, goal planning and mutual adjustment. These mechanisms will be 
stable over time when they fit with other structural elements and with the contingencies that most 
influence the need for coordination. Creating a fit between coordination mechanism and contingencies 
that influence coordination needs reduces the likelihood of coordination failures, and, in turn, 
managerial intervention. In sum, delegation of discretion is likely to be credible if there are stable 
conditions under which goal planning and mutual adjustment become the most effective coordination 
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mechanisms.  
Among the important contingencies that influence the choice of coordination mechanism are 
interdependencies, uncertainty, and the structural design variable of job specialization. We discuss the 
relationship between coordination mechanism and each of these three factors one by one.  
Interdependencies. The technology contingency has been characterized and operationalized in 
many different ways. For example, Woodward (1965) and the Aston Group focused on the overall 
system level of the organization and emphasized the transformation process itself, whereas others have 
focused on the work flow level and emphasized the extent to which the technology must be adapted to 
changes in input and required output (Bell, 1967; Hage & Aiken, 1969; Mohr 1971; Perrow, 1967). 
However, most research considers technology an important contingency because of the different kind of 
interdependencies that characterize different technologies. In turn, interdependencies in decisions and 
activities create a need for coordination among tasks (Mintzberg, 1983).  
Thompson (1967) proffers a widely used classification of interdependencies as pooled, sequential 
and reciprocal. Pooled interdependencies occur when each task can be carried out separately and with 
no need for interaction between tasks. The interdependency arises only because all tasks build on a 
common, limited pool of resources (funds, employees, equipment, etc.). Sequential interdependencies 
imply that one task needs to be finished (or a decision taken) before another one takes place. Reciprocal 
interdependencies are characterized by the fact that two or more tasks need to adjust their efforts 
simultaneously and/or in similar directions. Different types of interdependencies differ with respect to 
the extent to which they require modifications of organizational members’ behaviours. Pooled 
interdependencies allow for independent experimentation and learning-by-doing. With sequential 
interdependencies, task coordination requires sequential exchange of items or information. Finally, if 
there are strong complementarities between tasks as in the case of reciprocal interdependencies, only 
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reciprocal patterns of exchange of items and information result in coordination (Milgrom & Roberts, 
1990).  
Coordination mechanisms differ in their capacity to solve the coordination problems that arise 
from different kinds of interdependencies (Thompson, 1967; Grandori, 2001). For example, the choice 
between direct supervision and planning one the one hand, and the use of goal planning on the other 
hand depends on the extent to which coordination takes place by directing the input (actions) or by 
setting standards for the output (goals). One factor that influences this choice is the extent to which it is 
possible to define measurable goals and sub-goals in a way that ensures that employees’ discretionary 
choices result in coordination at the task level. This is easily achieved when interdependencies are 
pooled, as opposed to when they are complex (i.e., they are sequential or reciprocal). In sum, the use of 
goal planning is more likely to be effective with pooled interdependencies.  
Another factor that influences the choice of coordination mechanism is the extent to which 
managers have relevant knowledge of the interdependencies. Extensive work planning requires that 
most interdependencies are relatively well known, whereas mutual adjustment only requires that 
employees know whom to coordinate with. Again, the type of interdependencies influences the choice of 
coordination mechanism. As sequential interdependencies are more easily identified than reciprocal 
interdependencies, the use of work planning is more likely to be effective with sequential 
interdependencies whereas the use of mutual adjustment is more likely to be effective with reciprocal 
interdependencies. Further, interdependencies also influence the amount of interaction needed in order 
to achieve coordination. Limited interaction is needed with pooled interdependencies, whereas 
substantial high degrees of interaction are needed with reciprocal interdependencies. Thus the choice of 
the coordination mechanism impacts on the need for interaction. Specifically, mutual adjustment can 
save costs of communication of information to a supervisor. Mutual adjustment may thus be preferred 
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when interdependencies are reciprocal because this mechanism saves communication cost as employees 
adjust locally. In sum, the use of mutual adjustment is more likely to be effective with reciprocal 
interdependencies.  
Uncertainty. Task uncertainty refers to how programmable a particular work activity is and how 
many exceptions the work activity must handle. Uncertainty impacts the choice of mutual adjustment 
and direct supervision over detailed work planning or goal planning as the latter requires low task 
uncertainty. When task uncertainty is low—that is, when there is full knowledge of interdependencies 
and all sources of variation in the work process—, a complete contingent plan could, in principle, be 
devised. When task uncertainty is high—in the sense that most important interdependencies among 
activities are not well known, and there may be many exceptions to be handled—mutual adjustment and 
direct supervision are the more effective coordination mechanisms. Although mutual adjustment or 
direct supervision may be the dominant way of adjusting tasks, these mechanisms must be 
complemented by an overall goal for the work to be carried out in order to give direction to the 
adjustment processes. In short, the use of goal planning and mutual adjustment is more likely to be 
effective with high levels of uncertainty.   
Organizational structure. Finally, the effectiveness of specific coordination mechanisms also 
depends on the organizational structure as defined by the criteria for specialization and grouping of 
activities into units. Organizations can contain functional as well as process-based units. We speak of 
functional structures when the permanent supra-units (i.e., departments) are formed on the basis of 
functional criteria (e.g., marketing, production, research and development) and of process-based 
structures when the permanent supra-units are based on work flow interdependencies (e.g., a team is 
responsible for developing, producing and marketing a new device). The grouping of activities in either 
functional or process-based unit influences at what level of the organization the interdependencies 
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emerge (Astley, 1985).  
Organizations with functional units typically have fewer interdependencies within units than 
across units. Thus, tight rules or narrowly defined goals tend to regulate inter-unit relations, while intra-
unit coordination mechanisms tend to be characterized by high degrees of discretion. In fact, intra-unit 
interdependencies may be pooled, allowing for much delegation of discretion. Moreover, in accordance 
with what Gulick (1937) termed the “principle of homogeneity,” functional units tend to reduce the 
degree of intra-unit diversity of skills and activities so as to foster high effectiveness in the functions.  
On the other hand, in process-based units employees are grouped to contain the most complex or 
sequential flow interdependencies, which in turn minimizes the interdependencies among different units. 
Thus, with most interdependencies contained within units, each unit can set general performance goals. 
In other words, organizations with process-based units typically have fewer interdependencies across 
units than within units. As a consequence, inter-unit coordination mechanisms tend to be characterized 
by high degrees of discretion, while direct supervision or strict plans tend to regulate intra-unit relations, 
depending on the technology and task uncertainty faced by the unit.  
In sum, organizations with functional units are likely to have high levels of delegated discretion in 
inter-unit activities, and low levels of delegated discretion in intra-unit activities. Organizations with 
process-based units are likely to have high levels of delegated discretion in intra-unit activities, and low 
levels of delegated discretion in inter-unit activities.  
Finally, it is worth noting that employees in process units are more likely to be delegated 
discretion than employees in functional units when the unit faces high task uncertainty. The reason is 
that process-based units can better use mutual adjustment as a coordination mechanism because they 
contain the main problem-solving or work flow interdependencies (Casson, 1994).   
Credible Delegation through Organizational Fit 
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 The perspective just outlined implies that the creation of fit between those coordination 
mechanisms that are consistent with a high degree of delegation of discretion (i.e., goal planning and 
mutual adjustment) and the aforementioned contingencies and structural elements (i.e., 
interdependencies, uncertainty, organizational structure) requires consistency among coordination 
mechanisms, contingencies, and the organizational elements. We now discuss the consistency 
requirement for goal planning and mutual adjustment. We also discuss how skill standardization 
complements the use of these two coordination mechanisms.  
 Creating a fit for goal planning. Goals may be set in terms of the kind, quality, quantity, or some 
other measurable attributes of outputs. In the following we discuss the use of plans that allow employees 
to choose how to achieve goals (where the resources needed to fulfill the goals do not strictly limit 
employees’ choice of actions).  
 The contingencies that support delegation of discretion to employees through the use of goal 
planning consists of a technology characterized by pooled interdependencies and task uncertainty. Task 
uncertainty makes it costly to specify the input needed in the work processes. Given uncertainty, goal 
planning is particularly consistent with delegation of discretion in organizations that are characterized by 
pooled interdependencies at the work flow level of the organization. This happens because—within the 
limits defined by the goal—employees are free to select their actions, to experiment, and learn as 
coordination is achieved as long as goals are met. Pooled interdependencies at the unit level depend on 
such factors as the scale of the technology used and the job specialization among employees. These are 
factors that managers can influence. When the technology can be operated by a single employee who 
can perform all the relevant tasks of a particular job, there will be no negative spillovers among 
employees as long as each of them adheres to his or her goals. Furthermore, over time employees are 
likely to learn how to best meet goals, and this is likely to increase the asymmetry of information 
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between employees and superiors. This raises managers’ expected benefit from not intervening, and in 
turn the credibility of delegated discretion. Thus:  
Proposition 1: Delegation of discretion by means of goal planning is likely to be credible in an 
organization that is simultaneously characterized by pooled interdependencies and task 
uncertainty at the work flow level of the organization.  
 When firms make extensive use of goal planning, it is important that there is congruency between 
both inter- and intra-unit goals, as goal incongruences create incentives for managers to intervene and 
change goals. For example, incongruence between a product development unit’s goal of optimizing 
product design, and a purchase unit’s goal of reducing costs may seem to require a redefinition of the 
goal of at least one of the units via managerial intervention. The incongruence appears because of the 
interdependency between the two units’ overall performance target. In classical contingency theory, 
interdependencies are perceived of as given, but they may appear at different levels of the organization 
depending on whether the firm groups activities into functional or process-based units. Thus, a way for 
reducing inter-unit goal incongruence is to group activities in process-based units rather than in 
functional units.  
 Interdependency, however, is a variable that firms can influence. For example, Thompson (1967) 
argued that organizations influence the interdependency between the environmental and the production 
core by creating buffers (for example, stocks or other type of organizational slack resources). Moreover, 
some scholars have argued that firms can create modular organizations where interdependencies are 
reduced both at the unit and the system level of the organization. For example, organizations can set 
goal levels, create buffers, invest in small scale equipment and specify interface standards between 
organizational units in a way that allows unit to pursue individual goals without scarifying too much of 
the benefits from exploiting inter-unit synergies and scale advantages (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). 
 183 
Many of these measures require sunk cost investments. Managers incentive to intervene in the discretion 
delegated to the unit level will be curbed by the presence of high sunk costs investments, and low 
degrees of coordination failures due to the pooled interdependencies between units (Ghemawat, 1991). 
The creation of pooled interdependencies at the inter-unit level is most likely to take place in process-
based organizations.  
 In functional organizations managers’ incentives to intervene can be reduced by the presence of 
congruency among goals of highly complementary units, so that goals cannot be changed independently 
of other goals. Complementarity implies that managers would need to consider many constraints in 
order to identify the feasible set of changes in organizational goals. This reduces the expected benefits 
from intervention, increasing the credibility of delegated discretion. This reasoning yields the following 
proposition:  
Proposition 2: Delegation of discretion by means of goal planning is more credible in 
organizations with process-based structures where inter-unit interdependencies are pooled, or in 
organizations with functional structures where inter-unit interdependencies are characterized by 
strong complementarities among congruent goals.  
 Creating a fit for mutual adjustment. Mutual adjustment is a coordination mechanism where 
employees consult one another before making a decision on actions, or resource commitments. For 
example, employees may search for new projects or evaluate projects based on a joint set of criteria. 
This differs from direct supervision, where employees communicate their information or decision 
criteria to a manger who decides on actions or resource commitments (Casson, 1994; Mintzberg, 1983). 
Clearly, mutual adjustment leads to higher levels of delegation of discretion precisely because 
employees are left to autonomously decide, or search for new projects. Similar to goal planning, mutual 
adjustment can imply more or less discretion to employees—for example, employees can be delegated 
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rights to make decisions only on a very narrow and well-defined set of activities, or their decisions may 
be limited by lack of access to resources. In the following, we discuss mutual adjustment where 
employees have a real choice of actions.  
 The contingencies that support delegation of discretion to employees through mutual adjustment 
consists of a technology characterized by reciprocal interdependencies and task uncertainty. Given task 
uncertainty, mutual adjustment is particularly likely to support delegation of discretion in organizations 
where reciprocal interdependencies at the work flow level of the organization creates informational 
asymmetries with supervisors. Managers can create those conditions by defining jobs in ways that make 
coordination contingent on the information possessed by more than one person—that is, by creating 
reciprocal interdependencies. 
 Managers may be tempted to substitute mutual adjustment with direct supervision if they believe 
they have more decision-relevant knowledge and know more about the relevant interdependencies. At 
the unit level it is possible to create informational and knowledge distances between managers and 
employees through staffing processes (e.g., selecting supervisors without relevant knowledge and low 
degrees of experience with the work activities of the unit). Moreover, the implementation of mutual 
adjustment as a coordination mechanism is likely to result in increased information asymmetry between 
managers and employees as employees learn about the important work-flow interdependencies through 
their direct involvement in the coordination processes. Informational overload due to reciprocal 
interdependencies and lack of relevant knowledge raises managers’ expected benefit from not 
substituting mutual adjustment with direct supervision. This increases the credibility of delegated 
discretion. Thus:  
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Proposition 3: Delegation of discretion by means of mutual adjustment is likely to be credible in 
an organization that is simultaneously characterized by reciprocal interdependencies and task 
uncertainty at the work-flow level of the organization.  
 Mutual adjustment processes are notoriously costly in terms of time and sacrificed specialization 
in decisions (Miller, 1992). These costs may be reduced by adopting a process-based structure, where 
departments are based on workflow interdependencies (as opposed to functional criteria). Such a 
structure, in fact, reduces employee search costs to the extent that information and/or workflow 
interdependencies are contained within relatively small units. Mutual adjustment is also eased when 
organization use standardization of skills as a coordination mechanisms within a unit because 
coordination among employees with same knowledge and training is eased.  
 At the system level, managers’ knowledge of interdependencies among units may create a 
temptation to either overrule decision at the unit level, or to directly supervise that unit. Thus, mutual 
adjustment at the unit level is credible when inter-unit interdependencies are pooled, such that system 
knowledge becomes less important. Again, this condition is most easily met in organizations with a 
process-based structure. If all the relevant interdependencies cannot be contained within units, the basic 
organizational structure can be supplemented with lateral relationships such as temporary teams with 
members from different units who are responsible for solving inter-unit coordination problems. When 
such teams (or other forms of lateral coordination mechanisms) are set up, they make it less costly to 
make use of mutual adjustment processes among units. Implementing a process organization and setting 
up lateral coordination mechanisms, represent large sunk costs investments. Again, large sunk cost 
investments create a situation in which mutual adjustment is the preferred coordination mechanism, 
making delegated discretion credible.  
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Proposition 4: Delegation of discretion by means of mutual adjustment is likely to be credible in 
organizations with process-based structures with pooled interdependencies at the system level, or 
where interdependencies are handled through formal lateral coordination mechanisms among 
units.  
Credible Delegation Through Increased Costs of Intervention  
 As suggested earlier, delegation of discretion can also be made credible by simply increasing 
managers’ costs of intervention. Of relevance here are specific decision procedures and information 
structures. These design variables are to some extent complementary to the choice of organization 
structure and coordination mechanism, because the efficiency with which they can be utilized depends 
on these factors.  
 Formal decision procedures. Defining formal decision procedures that allow employees to 
influence decisions can be an important means of supporting credible delegation of discretion. For 
instance, creating formal liaison roles, committees and procedures that allow employees to influence the 
planning and control processes (Milgrom, 1988) may make decisions to be considered legitimate by the 
employees because they are seen as procedurally just. To the extent that employees care about 
procedural justice, it becomes more costly for managers to circumvent these processes in order to 
implement new projects—that is to overrule or renege on delegated decision rights. This reduces the 
managers’ incentives to intervene. In other words:  
Proposition 5: The more an organization makes use of formal decision procedures that involve 
employees in decisions, the more delegation of discretion is likely to be credible. 
 Informational distance.  Managers’ information about the need for coordination and about the 
solution to coordination problems is also a factor that influences their incentives to intervene. In other 
words, the design of the information and reporting procedures in the organization impacts on the 
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managerial perceived need for intervention. Reporting systems can be designed to create informational 
distance between managers and the employees to whom discretion has been delegated. If, because of 
informational distance, a manager is not in a position to rationally decide whether to overrule or not, he 
will likely not overrule (Aghion & Tirole, 1997). Informational distance can be created by having 
reporting systems that only allow managers to gain access to limited information, by having information 
pass multiple hierarchical layers, or by increasing the span of control (i.e., the number of employees in a 
unit for which a unit manager is responsible). If the span of control is sufficiently large, detailed 
supervision will create a heavy work overload for the manager. This is particularly so when there are 
intensive interdependencies within the unit, many different specialities, and where each member of the 
unit carries out different activities (Galbraith, 1995). These are the same conditions under which mutual 
adjustment processes are effective in achieving coordination. Thus, under such conditions credible 
delegation of discretion is reinforced by informational distance.   
Proposition 6: The more an organization has created a large informational distance in the 
hierarchy the more delegation of discretion is likely to be credible.  
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION  
Autonomous motivation is a fundamental determinant of value creation that can emerge from the 
delegation of decision rights to employees. This type of motivation, however, is fragile, and needs to be 
protected by adding credibility to delegated discretion. Thus, the very fact of giving credibility to 
delegated discretion represents an additional source of value creation that applies under conditions of 
delegated discretion. The strategic effects of credible delegation are very relevant for both theory and 
practice. Many strategically important decisions are taken by employees to whom decision rights have 
been delegated. By focusing specifically on organizational-level determinants of credible discretion, we 
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developed novel theory on how organizations are to be designed so as to give credibility to delegated 
decision rights, and in turn foster value creation.  
Our analysis proceeded through three different stages. First, we explained why delegation of 
discretion fosters employee autonomous motivation, and in turn value creation. Second, we clarified the 
idea of credible delegation of discretion, and conceptualized credibility as a fundamental moderator of 
the relation between delegation of discretion and autonomous motivation. Third, we theorized that 
particular constellations of contingencies and organizational structural variables give credibility to 
delegated discretion. We close by discussing our model’s contributions, implications, and potential 
future developments.  
Contribution to Theory  
This article contributes to management research in a number of ways. Our main contribution is to 
indicate that by designing organizations in specific ways, management can foster value creation by 
making the promise of delegation look credible to the eyes of the employee. We focused on managerial 
reneging on promises, and on how the temptation to renege can be controlled, preserving employee 
motivation. Research suggests that it is inherent in the nature of firm organization that a promise to 
delegate discretion from managers to employees is not in itself credible (Baker et al., 1999; Williamson, 
1996). For this reason firms that want to protect employee motivation ought to be designed in ways that 
add credibility to the promise to delegate discretion.  
 Second, the analysis in this article implies that in general, some of the opportunities for value-
creating intervention that would obtain in a situation of full information must be forsaken, because the 
effects of managerial intervention on employee motivation are partly unpredictable. The resulting hands-
off recommendation implies that inefficiencies are unavoidable, and this adds a new dimension to 
Williamson’s (1985, 1996) argument that efficient “selective intervention” is in general not attainable.  
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 Third, Baker et al. (1999) analyze credible delegation in terms of self-enforcing, relational 
contracts. However, their treatment is very abstract. In particular, it is not obvious to which 
organizational phenomena such contracts relate, and how they can be influenced by managers. In this 
article we proffer two alternative, and arguably more operational ways of making delegation of 
discretion credible. The first one is to create a stable configuration of coordination mechanisms, 
contingencies, and organization structure. Such a configuration reduces coordination failure in the 
organization, and diminishes the incentives of managers to intervene. The second one is to choose 
design variables such as information structure, and decision procedures so that the managerial cost of 
(and resistance of employees to) intervention is increased. All in all, our research provides concrete 
indications of how firms can manipulate organizational design variables so as to reduce the negative 
externalities and increase the benefits to the firm of employee discretionary activities.  
Limitations and Future Research  
 Individual-specific factors and perceived discretion. For simplicity, we decided not to include 
individual-specific factors in our model. Consistently, and in line with self-determination theory (Gagné 
& Deci, 2005), we argued that any constraints placed on an employee’s discretion lessen her 
autonomous motivation. However, research suggests that subject-specific, and situational characteristics 
may interact to affect the discretion that employees perceive themselves to possess (Carpenter & 
Golden, 1997). Furthermore, some employees may actually want or need some form of boundary on 
their discretion—e.g., so that they can clearly define their work roles, appropriately structure their daily 
activities, or establish an identity at work. Such arguments are prevalent in role theory, and in work on 
empowerment climates—a key dimension of which has been defined as “autonomy through boundaries” 
(Seibert, Silver & Randolph, 2004). This suggests that—under person- and context-specific 
circumstances—some degree of managerial intervention might be harmless, or even appropriate relative 
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to motivation. For instance, employees who do not perceive that they have discretion in the first place 
(regardless of what their managers or the organization might say) cannot feel that it has been overruled 
(although they might be unhappy that they have never been given any discretion). Those who believe 
they have, and should have substantial discretion will be more sensitive to that discretion being 
overruled. Future research should incorporate an analysis of how much discretion specific employees 
may expect, and how they differentially interpret that discretion and reductions in it.  
 Sub-domains of discretion. In line with standard empirical definition of discretion, we have 
treated the construct as a single domain encompassing multiple aspects of an individual’s work (cf. 
Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Karasek, 1979; Morgeson, Delaney-Klinger & Hemmingway, 2005; 
Spreitzer, 1995). Recent research, however, suggests that specific sub-domains of discretion—i.e., 
specific aspects of work with respect to which an employee may have discretion, such as effort, goals, 
staffing, etc.—may have unique relationships with some antecedents and consequences, and should thus 
be distinguished (Caza, 2012). Consequently, our model may be further developed by considering 
whether organizational design differentially impacts on the credibility of specific subdomains of 
discretion.  
 The process perspective. This work is not a comprehensive analysis of all relevant aspects of 
making delegation of discretion credible. Our focus has been on some salient characteristics of an 
organization in which delegated discretion is credible. In contrast, the process by which an organization 
reaches such a state—including issues of management rhetoric and how employees perceive the process 
of persuasion they are subject to—has been suppressed. A limitation is that we have neglected the way 
in which an intervention is motivated and communicated to employees. Instead of refraining from 
intervention, it is conceivable that managers can motivate and communicate an act of intervention to 
employees in such a manner that loss of motivation may be lessened.  
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 This notwithstanding, our model has also implications for a process perspective. The analysis 
implies that, when firms make delegation credible at a certain level of the organization, it becomes much 
more costly for managers at higher levels to reallocate discretion to different levels. This has 
implications for the ability of firms to react to changes in their environment. For example, sudden 
changes in the environment may call for top-down coordination of many activities simultaneously. 
When discretion has been made credible at low levels of the organization, firms will not only loose 
motivation from such top down coordination, they will also face high costs in terms of, for example, 
greater employee resistance to the intervention, costs of re-designing the organization, etc. Similarly, the 
analysis here also harmonizes with process analyses of the growth strategies of firms in terms of 
engaging in mergers and acquisitions. Often, firms need to make great alterations in business practices 
and in organizational structure in order to realize the potential synergies in mergers and acquisitions. 
Firms that have invested in making delegation credible may find it more costly to engage in such 
activities.  
Empirical work. There is as yet no empirical work on the model that we have presented.  
However, empirical evidence speaks to some of the causal mechanisms we have postulated. For 
example, there is evidence for the negative impact that managerial intervention has on employee 
motivation (Robinson, 1996; Rousseau, 1989). The perhaps most directly relevant empirical work is 
Foss et al. (2006). They show that delegation improves motivation, that managerial intervention harms 
overall firm performance, but that mechanisms such as managers staking their personal reputation, 
employees controlling important assets and strong trade unions can keep managerial proclivities to 
intervene at bay. However, they concentrate less on organizational design. We take this to be first 
indications that the line of inquiry that has been pursued in this article is a promising one.  
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Abstract  
We combine structural and psychological perspectives on prosocial behaviors in 
organizations. Employees are expected to be more likely to engage in prosocial 
organizational behaviors if they have a large social network that gets them in contact 
with several colleagues. However, drawing on bounded rationality arguments, we argue 
that this effect depends on the focal employee’s ability to focus and concentrate in the 
workplace, and thereby give attention to the need for prosocial action. Data from 69 
employees in a single firm suggest that the interaction between egocentric network size 
and attention has a significant and positive effect on employees’ engagement in 
prosocial organizational behaviors.  
 
  
! 203 
INTRODUCTION 
Within an organization, employees can decide to engage in behaviors that are intended to help or 
benefit other employees, groups of employees, or the entire organization. Prosocial organizational 
behaviors—such as helping colleagues, donating, cooperating, volunteering, or showing loyalty to 
the organization—are crucially important for the organization’s effective functioning. Such 
behaviors are clearly desirable, but often cannot be called forth by overt means, such as rewards. 
Specifically, prosocial organizational behaviors are associated with higher job performance and 
satisfaction, improved interorganizational communication and coordination, and overall 
organizational efficiency (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986; Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin and Schroeder, 
2005; Weinstein and Ryan, 2010). Yet, prosocial organizational behaviors are discretionary, are 
normally not triggered by formal extrinsic incentives and motivators, and are mostly unrecognized 
by formal evaluations systems (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Gagné, 2003; Weinstein and Ryan, 2010).   
 Prior research has suggested that employees’ engagement in prosocial organizational 
behaviors is partly determined by structural factors that characterize the informal organization. 
Specifically, a large egocentric network enables the focal individual to access numerous others 
(Freeman, 1979; Tsai, 2000; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Contact with others has been established 
as an important antecedent of prosocial motivation (Grant, 2007; Kilduff and Brass, 2010) and 
behaviors (Baer, Goldman and Juhnke, 1977; Goldman and Fordyce, 1983). In turn, employees with 
large egocentric networks are expected to be more likely to engage in prosocial organizational 
behaviors than individuals with small networks (Amato, 1990; Tong, Hung and Yuen 2011; Wilson 
2000; Wilson and Musick, 1998). In other words, research considering the relational antecedents of 
prosocial behaviors has used specific network configurations to explain prosocial behaviors in the 
organizational setting.  
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However, this approach has drawn critique in recent contributions to network research 
where a given network position has been depicted as providing potential opportunities from which 
the focal actor may differentially benefit from depending on characteristics specific to the 
individual, such as her personality, motivation, or ability (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Anderson, 2008; 
Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994; Kilduff and Krackhardt, 1994; Mehra, Kilduff and Brass, 2001, 
Reinholt, Pedersen and Foss, 2011; Stevenson and Greenberg, 2000). However, in the context of 
prosocial organizational behaviors, very little attention has been dedicated to researching the 
psychological contingencies that influence whether having a large network may, or may not result 
in an employee’s engagement in prosocial behaviors.  
Employees with a large egocentric network have many ties through which they can access 
information and other resources. However, bounded rational agents have limited attention resources 
to allocate across their many contacts and to dedicate to the behaviors they engage in (Simon, 1947; 
Ocasio, 1997). Thus, a large egocentric network already pushes the bounded rationality of the focal 
employee in terms of how many individuals she can deal with in terms of engaging in prosocial 
behaviors relative to those individuals. Furthermore, factors that limit the ability of an employee to 
concentrate on the task at hand diminish that employee’s ability to engage in prosocial tasks as 
oppurtunities to help colleagues may go unnoticed. Therefore, while large egocentric networks may 
generally provide the focal employee with opportunities for conducting prosocial behaviors, this 
relation is moderated by the cognitive and psychological limitations that characterize boundedly 
rational actors.  
In this research, we examine how social structuralist perspectives and psychological insights 
on limited attention combine to predict prosocial organizational behaviors. We consider an 
interaction model of the effects of attention and social network characteristics on employees’ 
engagement in prosocial behaviors. Although large networks may allow centrally positioned 
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employees to engage in more prosocial behaviors, this effect is contingent on the focal employee’s 
ability to focus in her workplace. Data from a survey of 69 employees in one single firm suggest 
that the interaction between network size and attention has a significant and positive effect on 
employees’ engagement in prosocial organizational behaviors.  
STRUCTURAL AND ATTENTION-BASED ANTECEDENTS OF PROSOCIAL 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIORS 
Prosocial organizational behaviors are positive social acts that an organization member may carry 
out with the intention of benefitting her peers, a part of the organization, such as a team or a 
department, or the entire organization (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986; Penner et al., 2005). A growing 
literature conceptualizes the organizational context as one of network relations where employees or 
units are represented by nodes that are linked to one another by relational ties (e.g., Brass, 
Galaskiewicz, Greve and Tsai 2004; Cross and Cummings, 2004; Tsai, 2001). Research has 
revealed specific associations between network characteristics and several important outcomes, 
such as productivity (Hansen, 2002; Reagans and Zuckerman, 2001), creativity (Burt, 2004; 
Fleming, Mingo and Chen 2007) innovation (Tsai, 2001; Tsai and Ghoshal 1998), and job 
performance (Cross and Cummings, 2004). Lately, the explanatory logic that underlies network 
studies of organizations has been applied to the context of prosocial organizational behaviors. 
Different network positions link ego and alters in different ways, and this results in different 
opportunities to engage in prosocial behaviors. Specifically, the size of a network has been 
theorized and shown to be positively associated with prosocial behaviors such as volunteering 
(Tong et al., 2011; Wilson, 2000; Wilson and Musick, 1998), and helping (Amato 1990).  
The idea that attention and rationality are bounded (Dearborn and Simon, 1958; Ocasio, 
1997; Simon, 1947, 1955), however, suggests that employees are also exposed to the cognitive 
costs that come from having large, egocentric networks. The higher the number of ties, the higher 
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the amount of information transferred through those ties, and, in turn, the more the attention 
required for cognitively processing that information (Simon, 1947).  
Combining structural and psychological perspectives on prosocial behaviors in 
organizations, we consider two important constructs—actual network size and attention—that both 
influence an employee’s engagement in prosocial organizational behaviors. Actual network size 
(also called “degree centrality,” cf. Anderson, 2008)—that is, the number of contacts of an 
employee in a network (Freeman, 1979; Tsai, 2000; Wasserman and Faust, 1994)—describes that 
employee’s access to other employees, and in turn, the employee’s opportunity to establish a 
contact with potential beneficiaries of her prosocial actions. Attention, the “focused mental 
engagement on a particular item of information” (Davenport and Beck, 2001: 20) is a proxy for an 
employee’s capacity for recognizing the need for her prosocial action. Employees that occupy 
different positions within a network may differentially allocate attention to the need for prosocial 
action. In turn, they may engage in different levels of prosocial behaviors. An important reason is 
that employees are exposed to different levels of noise and disruption which directly influences 
their available attention and how it is allocated (Davies and Jones, 1975; Jones, 1990; Smith, 1991). 
Specifically, noise and disruption influence the attention that employees can allocate to noticing the 
need for prosocial action and engaging in prosocial behaviors. As a result, employees that are 
exposed to different levels of noise and disruption (and have different capabilities for reacting to 
such noise and disruption) are not equally efficient with respect to attending to the need for 
prosocial action, whether this need is something they figure out on their own, or something that is 
communicated to them by other members of their networks. Our key argument is that this will 
influence employees’ actual prosocial organizational behaviors.  
Network Size  
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 Given the prevalence, importance, and potentially constructive implications of prosocial 
behaviors in organizations, prior research has investigated the drivers of such behaviors, 
highlighting that both individual (e.g., emphaty, neuroticism, educational level, and mood) and 
contextual factors (e.g., work environment, group cohesiveness, organizational climate, leadership 
style) may impact on employees’ engagement in prosocial behaviors (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986; 
Weinstein and Ryan, 2010). Notably, research highlights as important predictors of prosocial 
behaviors the focal employee’s motivational intentions (Gagné, 2003; Grant, 2007, 2008; Weinstein, 
and Ryan, 2010) as well as her position within the social structure (Amato, 1990; Tong et al., 2011; 
Wilson, 2000; Wilson and Musick, 1998). According to the network perspective, different network 
structures link actors in different ways, and this provides them with different opportunities to 
engage in prosocial behaviors (Amato, 1990; Tong, et al. 2011).  
The size of an employee’s network is a widely researched structural characteristic (Sparrowe, 
Liden and Kraimer, 2001). The actors that, because of their network position, have privileged 
access to information (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) are often argued to be the most prominent and 
active ones in the network, and to represent major channels of information. Employees that occupy 
central network positions and have many ties—that is, those that have large egocentric networks 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994)—are in “the thick of things” and are focal points of communication 
(Freeman, 1979). Actual network size, also called “degree centrality,” counts the number of contacts 
that an actor has (Anderson, 2008; Freeman, 1979).  
 Because of her many network ties, a centrally located employee with a large network (high 
degree centrality) has a substantially higher degree of contact with her coworkers than an employee 
with a small network (low degree centrality). Research highlights that providing an employee with 
contact with the beneficiaries of her work strengthens that employee’s prosocial attitudes and 
behaviors (Baer et al., 1977, Goldman and Fordyce, 1983; Grant, 2007; Grant et al., 2007; Guéguen 
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and Fisher-Lokou, 2003). Building on this logic, research has proposed actual network size as an 
important predictor of prosocial behavior. Employees that have access to several others have more 
opportunities for both establishing contact with coworkers, and for recognizing the need for 
prosocial interventions. Since contact is an important driver of prosocial action, and large 
egocentric networks provide the focal employee with more contact with coworkers, employees with 
large egocentric networks are more likely to engage in prosocial organizational behaviors than 
employees with small networks (Amato, 1990; Tong et al., 2011; Wilson, 2000; Wilson and Musick, 
1998; cf. Reinholt et al., 2011).  
Attention  
Organizational actors also differ in their ability to attend to relevant stimuli that originate 
from external sources. Attention is not in unlimited supply, and boundedly rational actors can only 
allocate a certain amount of attention to a certain number of activities (Ocasio, 2007). As Simon 
observes, information “consumes the attention of its recipients” (1971: 40, 1947, 1955). Thus, 
overabundance of information tends to be associated with overall scarcity of attention. Further, 
limited attention hinders accurate information processing (Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 1955). Centrally 
positioned employees with large networks are exposed to high volumes of information. As a result, 
it is particularly important for employees with large egocentric networks to avoid factors that may 
weaken their ability to attentively process the information that flows through their many network 
ties.  
Individual attention is influenced by a firm’s activities and procedures (March and Olsen, 
1976; Ocasio, 1997). Thus, aside from differences due to person-specific capabilities, an 
employee’s attention is determined by environmental contingencies, and channeled by the 
organization’s socio-cultural structures (Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren 1990; Fiske and Taylor, 1991; 
Ocasio, 1997). Specifically, instances of environmental disturbance in the workplace such as noise 
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or disruption have been shown to negatively influence attentional ability, and in turn performance 
(Boggs and Simon, 1968; Davies and  Jones, 1975;  Jones, 1990; Smith, 1991).  
Interaction between Network Size and Attention  
The above arguments indicate that attention moderates the relation between actual network 
size (degree centrality) and prosocial behavior. Although high degree centrality provides the focal 
actor with contact with, and information about several others, its impact on that actor’s engagement 
in prosocial behaviors depends on the extent to which she can carefully attend to, and process that 
information. A large egocentric network may give the focal employee access to relevant 
information from her coworkers, but she will likely not engage in prosocial actions if she fails to 
recognize a need for prosocial intervention.  
When employees are high in degree centrality, their many network ties provide the 
opportunity to interact with many different colleagues (Burt, 1992). In order to benefit from this 
potentially valuable structural asset, however, the focal employee needs to be able to process the 
information that can originate from such a large pool of people. Employees differ in their ability to 
do so. Specifically, they vary in their ability to attend to information because the extent to which 
they can focus on tasks varies.  
The more ties an employee has in her network, the more attention she needs to dedicate to 
the processing of the information that flows through those ties. An employee with a large egocentric 
network can access new information from many other employees. Some of that information may 
signal a need for prosocial action on the part of the focal employee. However, such a network 
configuration will have a positive impact on the focal employee’s engagement in prosocial behavior 
only if that employee can accurately process the information that flows through her contacts. The 
interaction between actual network size and attention is thus critical to prosocial organizational 
behaviors. Without a simultaneous consideration of her network size and attention, an employee 
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with a large egocentric network may encounter a bounded-rationality driven problem where she 
fails to fruitfully process the information that she can access through her network. Thus, the larger 
the size of an employee’s egocentric network, the more information sources that employee has, and 
the higher the attention needed to cognitively process that information to recognize the need for 
prosocial organizational behavior. In other words, network size and attention represent a 
fundamental combination of structural and psychological factors that predict high levels of 
prosocial behaviors in the workplace. Hence,  
Hypothesis: The size of an employee’s network is positively related to her engagement 
in prosocial organizational behaviors when the employee also has high attention.  
METHODS 
Data Collection and Research Site 
The data used in this analysis were collected in a single firm in order to keep constant 
external factors and firm-varying factors that might affect prosocial behaviors. This research design 
means that we can avoid the influence of factors like firm culture or growth, the attractiveness of 
the industry, etc. that might all affect prosocial behavior, as these are kept constant by design for all 
respondents in our study (Siggelkow, 2007). This implies that the variation we observe in prosocial 
behaviors can only be explained at lower level of disaggregation than the firm-level, for example, at 
the level of the individual, the relationship or the department. 
The firm that formed the site for our data collection is FeF Chemicals, a 120 employees, 
highly specialized, international chemical firm that focuses on manufacturing and supply of 
Quaternary Ammonium Compounds (Quats) for pharmaceutical and personal care products. It is a 
highly vertically integrated firm that covers large parts of the value chain, including Research and 
Development, Quality Assurance, Regulatory Affairs, Production and Environment, and Sales and 
Customer Service. However, all activities are co-located on the same site. Though manufacturing, 
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laboratories and service activities are in separate buildings, they are placed in very close vicinity 
(generally, all buildings are within 3 minutes of walking distance). The close vicinity of the 
activities is seen as central to the firm, because it puts strong emphasis on creating the best possible 
conditions for promoting creativity, knowledge sharing and prosocial behaviors among employees. 
The data collection was conducted in close collaboration with the firm. At the time of data 
collection effort (early 2012), FeF Chemical was planning a major re-organization, and was 
interested in learning more about the determinants of knowledge sharing, creativity and prosocial 
behaviors in the firm in order to factor this insight into the reorganization of the firm. The firm 
provided full access to all employees and managers for the purposes of the surveys, as well as 
access to employees and managers for the purpose of conducting interviews. 
Preliminary interviews with the management team provided us with detailed information on 
how managers aim at promoting prosocial behaviors—for example, through the design of the 
physical workspace and the creation of a more collegial environment. The HR-director was our 
main point of contact in the firm, but we also conducted a number of interviews with employees, 
middle-managers and top-managers of the firm, both before submitting the questionnaire, and after 
conducting the survey. As part of the ongoing dialogue with the firm we pretested and adjusted the 
questionnaire to ensure that each item was easily understood and that the wording made sense 
within the firm.  
In March 2012, a questionnaire was distributed to all 120 employees using a web-based 
questionnaire developed on the basis of a focused literature review. The invitation to respond to the 
questionnaire was uploaded on the front-page of the intra-net of the firm with a link to the used 
survey-instrument. In addition, all employees in the firm received a personal email from the CEO 
and HR Director urging them to respond to the questionnaire. After one week a reminder was 
submitted to all employees that had not responded at that time and they were given one more week 
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to respond to the questionnaire before closing the survey. A total of 80 employees answered and 
returned the questionnaire, which corresponds to a response rate of 67 percent. However, because of 
missing values (in particular, on the network-related questions), the sample size was further 
reduced: 69 responses were used in the final data analysis (i.e., a final response rate of 58 percent). 
In addition to the questionnaire submitted individually to all employees we also submitted a 
shorter version of the questionnaire to all managers in the firm that had employees referring directly 
to them. The managers were asked to assess the behavioral variables including creativity, 
knowledge sharing, prosocial behavior of each employee that refers to them. 15 managers were 
approached and 12 responded and provided information on their assessment of behavior for a total 
of 87 employees (i.e., 73 percent of all employees in the firm). For 45 employees we received both 
the individual self-assessment and the manager’s assessments of the same employee.   
Although we thus have a high response rate (of 58 percent), we examined the risk of 
nonresponse bias in different ways. We discussed the results and demographic breakdown of 
respondents (e.g., on age, education, tenure, gender) with firm representatives that assured us that 
there were no visible biases differentiating those responding to the survey from the overall 
distribution of employees in terms of demography. Furthermore, we conducted a wave analysis in 
terms of comparing the demographic variables for early (1st week respondents) and late respondents 
(2nd week respondents) (Rogelberg and Stanton, 2007). The assumption here is that the group of late 
respondents will be more similar to the nonresponding group than the group of early respondents. 
However, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the difference in means for the two groups for the 
demographic variables showed that the hypotheses of differences in the means can all be rejected 
(F-values < 2). The combination of the high response rate and the additional test makes us confident 
that our data do not suffer from major problems of nonresponse bias. 
Measures 
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The survey data includes both individual employee’s self-reported perceptions and self-
assessment of behavior and their manager’s assessment of their behavior. Each employee provided 
demographic information and perceptual responses on a number of items related to collaborative 
climate, satisfaction with own office, etc., as well as a self-assessment of their (prosocial) behavior. 
For the latter type of questions (i.e., those that assess behaviors), managers provided their 
assessment of each employee in terms of behavior for some key items. 
All the applied variables in our model were operationalized through the self-reported 
employee survey in order to maximize the number of included observations. Although such 
measures have well-known weaknesses—for example, that individuals may have biased perceptions 
and a somewhat biased view on their actual behavior—they remain the accepted way of capturing 
perceptions and behaviors among employees (Howard, 1994).  
Common method bias is an obvious limitation of such measures. However, the questionnaire 
consisted of different scales and some of them were reversed, which diminishes the risk of biases. 
In addition, we performed a number of statistical analyses to assess the severity of common method 
bias. In particularly, a Harman’s one-factor test on the items indicated that common methods bias 
was not an issue. That is, multiple factors were detected and the variance did not merely stem from 
the first factors (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). In fact, the items included in the model form several 
factors with an eigenvalue > 1, and the first two factors only capture 18 percent and 13 percent of 
the total variance, respectively. In addition, we ran a confirmatory factor analysis where all 32 items 
loaded on the same factor (a Single Factor Model). The assumption is that the existence of a single 
factor that is the common denominator across all items reflects the presence of a common method 
bias (Podsakoff et. al, 2003). However, in our case the goodness-of-fit statistics is highly 
unsatisfactory for the Single Factor Model capturing the common method bias, which indicates that 
we do not have a major problem of common method bias in the data. 
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Furthermore, the fact that we have data from both employees and managers on the assessment 
of employees’ behaviors allows us to test for inter-rater reliability and to assess the potential bias, as 
we for the dependent variable, namely prosocial behavior, can match individual employee self-
assessments with the manager’s assessment of prosocial behavior for the same individuals. When 
conducting this type inter-rater reliability tests we obtain high and satisfactory values for the Kappa-
coefficient which is a measure of the agreement between the two raters (Gwet, 2010). This 
comparison further indicates that our data does not suffer from common methods bias. The 
statistical tests do not eliminate the threat of common method bias; however, they suggest that our 
results are not driven predominantly by common method variance. Moreover, our results are based 
on complex estimations that involve multiple independent variables and interaction terms. It has 
been argued that it is highly unlikely that the results of such models emerge solely as a result of 
common methods bias (Evans, 1985; Siemsen et al., 2010). 
While management urged employees to respond to the questionnaire in order to reduce 
potential social desirability bias, respondents were ensured that the survey software prevented 
identification of the individual employee. The applied survey instrument, surveyXact, and the 
server was located outside the firm, and all questionnaires were returned directly to the researchers. 
Only aggregate-level data was reported back to the firm. The employees knowledge of this further 
reduces the likelihood of biased responses (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  
Most measures used in this study were adapted from existing scales and for all multi-item 
variables, a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to test for reliability. In all the multi-item 
latent variables respondents was asked to respond on a 7-point Likert scale that had the following 
values and accompanying text: 1=completely disagree, 2=disagree, 3=partly disagree, 4=neutral, 
5=partly agree, 6=agree and 7=fully agree.  
Dependent Variable 
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Prosocial behavior is a multi-item measure that is based on the employees self-assessment of 
their prosocial behavior. The individual employee was asked to indicate on a 7-point Likert scale 
(with the values listed above) their assessment concerning the following questions on interpersonal 
helping (scale adapted from Van Der Vegt, Bunderson and Oosterhof, 2006; cf. Grant and Gino, 
2010; Grant, 2007): “I often help colleagues with work-related issues”, “I am happy to help 
colleagues to reduce their workload when they have been absent” and “I am willing to help others, 
that have a substantial workload.” The obtained Cronbach alpha-value for this construct was 0.74, 
and in the confirmatory factor analysis the construct obtained strong reliability, with values of 0.81 
for composite reliability and 0.58 for average variance extracted (AVE) as shown in Table 1. All 
these measures indicate that the construct is highly reliable and characterized by convergent validity.  
In addition, managers have been asked to assess each employee on the same 7-point Likert 
scale for two of the above listed items, namely: “The employee often helps collogues with work-
related issues” and “The employee is willing to help others with a substantial workload”. For 45 
employees we could match the responses from employees and managers and when conducting the 
inter-rater reliability analysis on these two items we found a Kappa-coefficient of 0.58 and 0.65, 
respectively, which is highly satisfactory (Gwet, 2010). 
Independent Variables 
Network size. Each individual was asked to point to maximum ten colleagues (giving their 
name and department) in FeF with whom they had communicated on work-related issues in the last 
year. On average respondents listed 9 network relations providing us with a total of 953 
relationships. Based on this information we created a matrix on the network relations (relation or 
nor = 1/0) among the 105 employees that have either responded themselves or been listed by others. 
We include the undirected ties (i.e. both the ties mentioned by the focal respondent itself and the 
ties to the focal respondent mentioned by others) as all ties might be vehicles for prosocial behavior. 
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The total number of ties varies between 2 and 22. Network size is then calculated in UCINET for 
each employee as the number of ties that a node has when corrected for the potential number of 
ties—this measure is denoted “degree centrality” or “actual network size” (Anderson, 2008; 
Freeman, 1979).  
Attention is a multi-item measure capturing the employees’ perception of their ability to give 
attention to work-related tasks. The individual employees were asked to indicate on a 7-point Likert 
scale (with the values listed above) their assessment on the following items (scale adapted from Lee 
and Brand, 2005): “It is possible for me to concentrate in my office”, “I have sufficient possibilities 
for avoiding disturbances in my office” and “There is only limited noise in my office”. The 
obtained Cronbach alpha-value for this construct was 0.88, and in the confirmatory factor analysis 
the construct obtained strong reliability, with values of 0.91 for composite reliability and 0.77 for 
average variance extracted (AVE). All these measures indicate that the construct is highly reliable 
and characterized by convergent validity.  
----------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
----------------------- 
Control Variables 
We include a number of control variables (the items and exact wording are listed in the 
Appendix). The first group of control variables captures the perceptions of the respondents in terms 
of autonomous motivation, collaborative climate, and satisfaction with the office. Self-
determination theory (Deci and Ryan, 2000; Ryan and Deci, 2000) posits that motivation differs in 
terms of how autonomous it is. Autonomously motivated individuals have the feeling that their 
behavior is self-endorsed and congruent with their own interests and values (Weinstein and Ryan, 
2010). On the other hand, individuals can also be motivated in a controlled way. When this is the 
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case, the feeling is one of pressure, and tasks are performed because of some external end (Deci and 
Ryan, 1985). Autonomous motivation leads to higher behavioral effort and persistence (Ryan and 
Deci, 2000), and is an important driver of prosocial behaviors (Gagné, 2003; Weinstein and Ryan, 
2010). Research also highlights that organizational context and work environment impact on 
employees’ engagement in prosocial organizational behaviors. Specifically, a work environment 
where communication, cooperation and mutual respect are promoted may reinforce feelings of 
reciprocity and cohesiveness which in turn may facilitate prosocial behaviors (Brief and Motowidlo, 
1986). Similarly, feelings of satisfaction have been highlighted as another potentially important 
antecedent of prosocial organizational behaviors (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986). The variable of 
autonomous motivation is based on five items (scale from Ryan and Connell, 1989; Gagné, Forest, 
Gilbert, Aube, Morin and Malorni, 2010) that form a strong construct (CR=0.91, AVE=0.67). The 
same is the case for the variable “satisfaction with the office” that is also a five item construct (scale 
adapted from Brennan, Chugh and Kline, 2002) with very good properties (CR=0.87, AVE=0.59). 
Collaborative climate consists of three items (scale from Ramaswami, 1996) that also perform very 
well in forming a construct for collaborative climate (CR=0.90, AVE=0.74). These perceptually 
oriented variables control out the effect on prosocial behavior that stems from the respondents’ own 
motivation, positive attitude, and awareness of what is appreciated. 
The second group of control variables is based on relationships between employees, 
specifically on each employee’s self-reporting of relationships. For each relationship respondents 
were asked five additional questions characterizing the individual relationships. The five 
characteristics of the relationships included: the frequency, closeness, and duration of relationship, 
as well as the tacitness of knowledge exchanged and the extent of written communication in the 
relationship. For each individual respondent that have listed more than one relationship we take the 
average of the listed relationships for each of these five relationship-based variables. Relational 
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factors, such as the frequency of interactions, as well as the closeness and duration of relationships 
also matter in terms of facilitating cohesiveness within the group (Burt, 1997)—and in turn 
engagement in prosocial behaviors (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986). Thus, these five variables control 
out the effect that the specific relationship might have on prosocial behavior—for instance, close 
relations with a long duration might be more conducive to prosocial behavior than recent and 
distant relationships.  
Research on volunteering—an important type of prosocial behavior (Brief and Motowidlo 
1986, Penner et al. 2005; Wilson, 2000)—also highlights education, age, gender, occupational 
status and expertise as important predictors of volunteering (Grant 2011, Hofmann et al. 2009, 
Penner et al. 2005, Wilson and Musick 1998). Thus, the last group of control variables includes 
more demographic variables like age, gender, education and tenure that tease out the variation in 
prosocial behavior that may emerge from these characteristics. In addition, two more control 
variables are added. One indicates whether the respondent has a leadership role or not, and controls 
for the fact that leaders typically conduct more prosocial behavior qua their position of having 
responsibility for managing people. The other is the betweenness centrality which is an alternative 
network measure (to the network size) that puts more weight on the non-redundancy part of the 
network than the sheer size of the network. In that sense, the betweenness centrality controls for the 
employees network benefits in terms of knowledge search and contacts.  
Statistical Model 
The proposed model was tested using a PLS analysis. PLS is a type of structural equation 
modeling (SEM) that applies regression-based calculation methods and not the maximum likelihood 
estimation methods used in other SEMs (like LISREL). PLS is a causal modeling approach aimed 
at maximizing the explained variance (R-square) of the dependent latent construct—in our case 
prosocial behavior. The advantage of PLS is that it requires fewer data assumptions (especially the 
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multivariate normality assumptions), it provides more accurate coefficient results with smaller 
sample size than other SEM methods, and it is better suited for more complex models (Hair et. al, 
2011; Hulland, 1999). All these features make the PLS-analysis highly suitable for testing our 
model. As can be seen in the Appendix, our models include many single-item measures and two 
control variables—namely, gender and leadership role—that are binary and therefore violate the 
normality assumption. However, these variables can be included in the PLS-model (unlike 
covariance based SEMs) that do not require the variables to be normally distributed. The other key 
feature of PLS also speaks to our analysis as with relatively few observations (69) we are able to 
obtain accurate coefficients in PLS.  
 PLS allows developing complex models with latent variables that cannot be directly 
measured, such as attention, motivation and satisfaction, but must be analyzed through indirect 
means. PLS uses manifest variables, such as a respondent’s answer to a set of questions on the 
manifestation of the underlying construct, to estimate a given latent variable (Fornell and Larcker, 
1981). The latent variable estimators can then be used to analyze relationship between various 
hypothesized constructs. This may include complex models with moderated relationships like in 
this case.   
RESULTS 
The proposed model (shown in Figure 1) was analyzed using SmartPLS – version 2.0. SmartPLS 
assesses the properties of the measurement model and estimates the coefficients of the structural 
model taking into account the moderating latent constructs (Ringle et. al, 2005). The first step is to 
establish confidence in our measures (the measurement model) as these forms the basis of the 
structural model where our hypothesis is tested. Our model includes twelwe single item constructs 
and five multi-item constructs. To ensure reliability and validity of our measures used for the 
various multi-item constructs, we calculated composite reliabilities and report them in Table 1. The 
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Cronbach alpha and composite reliability measures both provide information on how well the 
manifest variables measure the latent variables. For examining measure adequacy, these metrics 
should both be higher than 0.70 for reliable scales (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). As can be seen in 
Table 1, all the listed values for Cronbach alpha and composite reliability are above 0.70. The 
AVE-score on the other hand provides evidence concerning whether a set of manifest variables is a 
reasonable representation of the underlying latent construct. When the AVE score is greater than 
0.50, there is a reasonable amount of confidence that the manifest variables are doing a good job in 
measuring the latent variable (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). In our case all five constructs have AVE-
scores well above 0.50. 
To confirm that there is adequate discriminant validity among the various latent variables, 
the correlations among all the variables included in the model is reported in Table 2. None of the 
binary correlations are above 0.5 and only few are above 0.4 like the correlation between 
satisfaction and attention and the correlation between age and tenure, which are as expected. The 
fact that the correlation coefficients are small or moderate indicates that the latent variables have 
adequate discriminant validity. In the diagonal element of Table 2, we show the square root of the 
AVE-score for each of the five multi-item constructs (Fornell and Larcker criterion). As can be seen 
from Table 2, the square root of the AVE-score by each latent variable is much higher than the 
correlation between the latent variable and all other latent variables. This demonstrates that the 
different multi-item variables extract a higher share of variances from their own items than from 
other latent variables. 
------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 here 
------------------------ 
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After having reached at a satisfactory measurement model, we can proceed to evaluate the 
structural model including the model path coefficients. Model path coefficients are equivalent to 
standardized regression coefficients, and can be interpreted in the same way. A one-unit increase in 
an independent variable will be expected to cause an increase in the dependent variable equal to the 
path coefficient.     
Standard errors of the path coefficients are obtained by bootstrapping the sample 5,000 
times (Hair et. al, 2011; Hulland, 1999). The model converge after only 8 iterations and the R-
square for predicting prosocial behavior is as high as 0.42-0.45 (see Table 3) indicating that almost 
half of the variation in the prosocial behavior are explained in our model. In addition, the cross-
validated redundancy measure (Q2 scores) were positive for all constructs (Hair et. al, 2011). Based 
on the results, the model appears to be an adequate fit to the data.  
----------------------- 
Insert Table 3 here 
----------------------- 
The PLS results with the path coefficients of the structural model are reported in Table 3. 
Two models are presented where Model 1 includes the main effects of all variables, while the 
interaction effect between network size and attention is added in Model 2 in order to test for the 
moderation effect. In Model 1 neither network size (β= 0.14, p > 0.10) nor attention (β= -0.09, p > 
0.10) come out significant, indicating that in themselves they are not having a strong impact on 
prosocial behaviors. However, in Model 2 the interaction term between network size and attention 
(β= 0.32, p = 0.03) becomes significantly positive, while the main effects remains insignificant. As 
such, the PLS results support out hypothesis of a moderating effect between the size of the network 
and the attention to work-related tasks. 
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It is noticeable that some of the control variables that turns out to affect the prosocial 
behavior positive and significant are autonomous motivation, closeness of relationship and 
collaborative climate. These results are fully consistent with research in self-determination theory, 
where autonomy, relatedness, and social-contextual factors have been identified as drivers of self-
endorsed behaviors in general (Gagné and Deci, 2005), and prosocial behaviors in particular (Gagné 
2003, Weinstein and Ryan, 2010). A few factors also have a significant negative impact hindering 
prosocial behavior like betweenness centrality (5% level of significance), age and if the 
communication in the relationship is mainly based on tacit knowledge (10% level of significance).  
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION  
What antecedes employees’ engagement in prosocial organizational behaviors? Our research 
suggests that contacts with coworkers together with the possibility to focus and concentrate in the 
workplace are critical parts of an answer to this question.  
Contact with the beneficiaries of an employee’s work has been shown to strengthen that 
employee’s prosocial attitudes and behaviors (Baer et al., 1977; Goldman and Fordyce, 1983; Grant, 
2007; Grant et al., 2007; Guéguen and Fisher-Lokou, 2003). Employees with large egocentric 
networks have access to several coworkers (Wasserman and Faust, 1994), thus they are likely to 
have knowledge of more coworkers with specific needs and problems. In sum, centrally located 
employees with large networks are ideally positioned for engaging in prosocial behaviors towards 
their colleagues. This research, however, does not show a significant association between network 
size and prosocial behaviors in the workplace. This finding is consistent with the argument that, 
because of bounds in human rationality, the benefit of having access to high volumes of information 
can be outweighed by the costs associated with the cognitive burden of processing that information. 
Although a large egocentric network gives to the focal employee a better opportunity for 
recognizing the need for her prosocial action, this opportunity requires cognitive processing in order 
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to be realized. Given the prevalence and importance of prosocial behaviors in organizations (Brief 
and Motowidlo, 1986; Weinstein and Ryan, 2010) it is important to better understand the impact of 
psychological processes on the relation between network size and prosocial behaviors.  
In line with research taking an attention-based perspective on organizational behavior 
(March and Simon, 1958), we proposed attention as a fundamental factor that determines the extent 
to which an employee with a large egocentric network can process, and benefit from the 
information that flows through her network ties. We find that the interaction between actual 
network size and attention significantly affects engagement in prosocial organizational behaviors. 
Specifically, actual network size predicts engagement in prosocial behaviors only when it is 
combined with the possibility to focus and concentrate in the workplace. This finding is interesting, 
given that previous research on the structural antecedents of prosocial behaviors has looked at the 
direct effect of the network structure in explaining prosocial behavior only, without addressing the 
extent to which this effect depends on employees’ cognitive bounds (e.g., Amato, 1990).  
The main insight of this research is that, in terms of facilitating employees’ engagement in 
prosocial organizational behaviors, the better an employee can access her coworkers, the more 
crucial it becomes that the employee can also dedicate attention to the processing of the information 
that flows through her social ties. With our finding, we contribute to two different areas of research. 
First, by investigating how structural and attentional factors interact in anteceding prosocial 
behaviors, we confirm and support Adler and Kwon’s insight that: “The mere fact of a tie implies 
little about the likelihood that social capital effects will materialize” (2002: 25), and contribute to 
the trend in network research that emphasizes the importance of looking at patterns of social 
relationships in conjunction with individual characterisitcs and psychological processes (e.g., Adler 
and Kwon 2002, Anderson 2008, Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994, Mehra et al. 2001). Second, we 
contribute to research on predictors of prosocial behaviors in organizations (e.g., Grant 2007, Grant 
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and Gino 2010, Weinstein and Ryan 2010). Controlling for factors that have already been shown to 
be conducive to prosocial behaviors such as work motivation and climate, we highlight that 
structural factors are important when they are considered jointly with psychological factors.  
The contributions of this study should be considered in the light of its limitations. Attention 
allocation has been described as a multilevel process that is co-determined by individual, 
organizational, and environmental factors (Ocasio 1997). Further, attentional processes focus 
energy and mindfulness on a limited number of elements at any given time. Focused attention 
facilitates perception and action towards those issues and activities being attended to, and hinders 
action towards those that are not (Kahneman 1973). For this reason, an employee that is selectively 
focusing her attention on potential opportunities for prosocial intervention may be able to benefit 
from a large egocentric network even in the presence of a relatively low level of attention. While 
our model controls for individual-specific, organizational and environmental factors that may 
impact on an employee’s ability to dedicate attention to tasks, we do not look at mechanisms of 
selective attention allocation. In other words, we assume that a decrease in overall attention leads to 
a proportional decrease in attention that is dedicated to recognizing opportunities for prosocial 
behavior in the workplace.  
Because we rely on cross-sectional data, the direction of causality in our model cannot be 
fully substantiated. While our arguments run in the direction from network size and attention to 
prosocial organizational behaviors, it is also possible to derive alternative causal explanations. For 
example, employees that behave prosocially may be more likely to be perceived as accessible or 
trustworthy. Thus, they may be more likely to be approached by colleagues in need of help 
(Hofmann et al. 2009), and in turn, to develop large egocentric networks. Further research based on 
experimental or longitudinal data is needed to investigate the direction of causality that we propose 
in this research.  
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Our results also carry important practical implications. Our framework suggests that, in 
order to foster prosocial behaviors in organizations, managers need to do more than merely 
encourage social interactions among employees. Engagement in prosocial behaviors requires not 
only establishing more social ties, but also nurturing employees’s attention in the workplace. This 
defines an important role for the design of the lay-out of the office space, the way communication is 
carried out within the firm (e.g., some firms adopt policies that restrict the use of e-mails for certain 
periods during the work day), the scheduling of meetings that may interrupt the normal workflow, 
and numerous other factors that influence the attention that employees allocate to their tasks and 
behaviors, including those prosocial behaviors that are vital to the functioning of virtually any 
organization. A better understanding of how structural and attentional factors combine in triggering 
prosocial organizational behaviors not only enriches our theoretical understanding of these 
fundamental behaviors, but also provides managers with refined guidance for value maximization. 
Prosocial behaviors positively affect the organizational functioning, as well as the well-being of 
both helpers and help recipients (Weinstein and Ryan, 2010). We trust that the analysis presented 
here will encourage future explorations of this important path towards organizational helping, well-
being, and performance.  
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Table 1:  Assessment of the applied multi-item constructs 
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Table 3: Structural path coefficients (standard error in parentheses) 
  ! Model!1!! Model!2!Network!size! 0.14!(0.08)! 70.08!(0.09)!Attention! 70.09!(0.06)! 70.11!(0.08)!Network!size*!Attention! ! 0.32**!(0.10)!!Control!variables!! ! !Autonomous!motivation! 0.49***!(0.08)! 0.54***!(0.08)!Satisfied!with!own!office! 0.03!(0.12)! 0.01!(0.13)!Collaborative!climate! 0.13*!(0.05)! 0.12*!(0.06)!Frequency!of!interaction! 0.07!(0.06)! 0.07!(0.06)!Closeness!of!relationship! 0.23***!(0.06)! 0.19**!(0.06)!Duration!of!relationship! 0.09!(0.09)! 0.11!(0.09)!Extent!of!tacitness!! 70.12ϯ!(0.07)! 70.12ϯ!(0.07)!Extent!of!written!communication! 70.02!(0.06)! 70.07!(0.06)!Age! 70.18ϯ!(0.09)! 70.15ϯ!(0.09)!Gender! 70.07!(0.06)! 70.11ϯ!(0.07)!Education! 0.01!(0.09)! 0.04!(0.09)!Tenure! 70.03!(0.09)! 70.05!(0.09)!Leadership!role! 70.01!(0.05)! 70.03!(0.06)!Betweenness!centrality! 70.22*!(0.10)! 70.21*!(0.11)!!N!R7square! !69!!0.42! !69!0.45!! Ϯ,!*,!**!and!***!indicates!a!level!of!significance!of!10%,!5%,!1%!and!0.1%,!respectively!
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Appendix – Wording and operationalization of control variables 
 
Perceptual variables 
All measured on a 7-point Likert scale with the following values and text: 
1=completely disagree, 2=disagree, 3=partly disagree, 4=neutral, 5=partly disagree, 6=agree and 7=fully agree. 
 
Autonomous motivation 
Why do you perform in your job?  
1. Because the tasks I work on is exciting 
2. Because my job is interesting 
3. Because I find it personally satisfactory 
4. Because I feel good when I conduct my work 
5. Because I like to conduct my work 
 
Satisfaction  
To what extent do you agree with the following statements on your own office:  
1. I have sufficient space in my office 
2. In my office it is easy to conduct conversations with others  
3. I can easily have a guest in my office 
4. I have sufficient storage space in my office 
5. I have the possibility for personalizing my office 
 
Collaborative climate 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements on the work climate:  
1. Managers invites for collaboration among employees 
2. Managers invites for climate where employees respect each other 
3. Managers invites for work-related discussions 
 
 
Tie based variables 
All variables are calculated as the average over the listed ties for each respondents 
 
Frequency of interaction 
How often do you communicate with this colleague? (1=never, 9=many times in a day) 
 
Closeness of relationship 
How close is your relationship with this colleague? (1=distant, 7=very close) 
 
Duration of relationship 
How many years have you known this colleague? (1= < half year, 6= > 10 years) 
 
Tacitness of knowledge exchange 
To what extent is the conversation with this colleague on simple information (=1) or critical knowhow (=7) ? 
 
Written communication 
To what extent is the conversation with this colleague face-to-face (=1) or through written or electronic medias (=7) ? 
 
Demographic variables 
 
Age.  The age of respondent in years  
 
Gender. Take the value 0 for male and 1 for female 
 
Education. Take the value 1 for below university level, 2=bachelor-level and 3=master level and above 
 
Tenure.  The age of employment at FeF in years  
 
Leadership role. Is coded 1 if respondent has a leadership role and 0 if not 
 
Betweenness centrality. Calculated in UCINET based on the network matrix of relations  
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A BOUNDED RATIONALITY PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
Abstract  
We combine structural and psychological perspectives on creativity in 
organizations. Employees are expected to be more likely to be creative if they 
occupy a brokerage position that provides them with access to non-redundant 
information. However, we draw on bounded rationality arguments and propose 
that being exposed to diverse information also carries cognitive costs. Data from 
68 employees in a single firm suggest that the relation between brokerage and 
creativity is curvilinear (inverted U shape), and contingent on the focal 
employee’s ability to focus and concentrate in the workplace.  
 
Keywords: Networks, cognition, creativity, attention.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Within an organization, employees may come up with new ideas to optimize processes, solve 
organizational problems, and more generally improve the quality of their own and others’ 
work. Clearly, individual creativity in the workplace—that is, the generation of novel, useful 
and actionable solutions and processes (Amabile, 1996; Ford, 1996, Hennessey & Amabile, 
2010)—is crucially important for organizational innovation, survival and success, particularly 
in uncertain and turbulent environments (Ford, 1996; Woodman, Sawyer & Griffin, 1993). 
Yet, creativity is difficult to encourage and even easy to stifle (Amabile, 1998). Thus, 
abundant research attention has been dedicated to understanding which factors may favor or 
hinder the emergence of individual creativity in organizations (Amabile, 1983, 1996; 
Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby & Herron, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996).  
An important part of this research proposes social interactions as fundamental drivers 
of individual-level creativity (Amabile, 1983, 1996; Fleming, Mingo & Cheng, 2007; Ford, 
1996; Leonard & Swap, Obstfeld, 2005; 1999; Perry-Smith, 2006; Perry-Smith & Shalley, 
2003; Shalley, Zhou & Oldham, 2004; Woodman et al., 1993). Specifically, structural holes 
theory (Burt, 1992, 2004), one of the most well known network theories, posits access to non-
redundant information as the fundamental benefit of the lack of ties among an actor’s alters, a 
condition that is named brokerage. According to the theory, ties that link otherwise 
disconnected people in the network provide access to non-redundant knowledge and 
information, and constitute a fundamental source of novel ideas (Brass, 1995; Burt, 2004). 
This reasoning is built on the widely accepted idea that novel combinations of heterogeneous 
knowledge are a fundamental driver of creativity and innovation (Amabile, 1996; Rodan & 
Galunic, 2004; Simonton, 1999; Turner & Fauconnier, 1999). In other words, research 
looking at the relational antecedents of creativity has depicted a positive relation between 
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brokerage and creativity (Allen, 1977; Nerkar & Paruchuri, 2005; Rodan & Galunic, 2004; 
Tushman, 1977), in fact, providing an entirely structural explanation for creativity.  
However, this approach has been criticized in recent network research, where network 
positions have been described as providing opportunities from which actors differentially 
benefit from depending on their individual characteristics, such as personality, motivation, or 
ability (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Anderson, 2008; Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Kilduff & 
Krackhardt, 1994; Mehra, Kilduff & Brass, 2001, Reinholt, Pedersen & Foss, 2011; 
Stevenson & Greenberg, 2000). Consistently, recent research has taken a more social-
psychological approach, and started to investigate whether individual-specific factors such as 
personal attributes, heterogeneity of knowledge, or career experiences interact with brokerage 
opportunities in determining creativity outputs in the workplace (Fleming et al., 2007; 
Fleming & Waguespack, 2007; Mors, 2010; Obstfeld, 2005; Rodan & Galunic, 2004). Yet, 
little attention has been dedicated to understanding how the cognitive and attentional 
limitations that are inborn in human nature (Simon, 1955, 1978) constrain and shape this 
fundamental relation. This is problematic, as an imperfect understanding of these constraints 
may provide researchers and practitioners alike with an overly optimistic view of the creative 
implications of brokerage. We ask whether there is a point of diminishing returns where too 
many ties bridging structural holes become difficult to manage, and hence are no longer 
advantageous.1  
People normally learn new ideas by associating those ideas with what they already 
know. Thus, meaningful communication—a precondition of knowledge exchange—requires 
some sharing of context between the subjects involved in the exchange in order to take place 
(Boland & Tenkasi, 1995). For this reason, transferring ideas that belong to disparate areas of 
expertise is more difficult than transferring ideas that belong to a relatively narrow area 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For a similar perspective on different structural features cf. McFadyen and Cannella (2004), and Zhou, Shin, 
Brass, Choi and Zhang (2009).  
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(Reagans & McEvily, 2003). In sum, knowledge flows are complicated by cognitive distance 
(Nooteboom, 2000), and the processing of non-redundant information is more difficult than 
the processing of redundant information.  
While employees bridging structural holes have many ties through which they can 
access non-redundant information and, in turn, generate creative insights (Brass, 1995; Burt, 
2004), they also have limited attention resources to allocate across their contacts, and to 
dedicate to the processing of novel information (Simon, 1947; Ocasio, 1997). Thus, 
brokerage pushes the bounded rationality of the focal employee in terms of how many 
individuals she can deal with in terms of meaningfully exchanging information with them. 
Furthermore, factors that limit the ability of an employee to concentrate on the task at hand 
may further complicate the scenario. Therefore, while brokerage may generally provide the 
focal employee with opportunities for being creative in the workplace, this relation is likely 
to be contingent on the cognitive and attentional limitations that characterize boundedly 
rational actors.  
In this research, we examine how social structuralist perspectives and psychological 
insights on limited attention combine to predict creativity in the workplace. We consider a 
model of the effects of attention and social network characteristics on individual-level 
creativity. Data from a survey of 68 employees in one single firm confirm that brokerage 
opportunities lead to the generation of creative ideas, and suggest that this effect is 
curvilinear in nature and contingent on the broker’s attention.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Brokerage, Creativity, and Bounded Rationality  
A growing literature conceptualizes the organizational context as one of network 
relations where employees are represented by nodes linked to one another by relational ties 
(e.g., Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve & Tsai 
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2004). This research has revealed specific associations between structural characteristics of 
the informal organization and important outcomes such as productivity (Hansen, 2002; 
Reagans and Zuckerman, 2001), innovation (Tsai, 2001; Tsai and Ghoshal 1998), and job 
performance (Cross and Cummings, 2004). In particular, in line with the idea that social 
interactions are important predictors of creativity (Amabile, 1983, 1996; Ford, 1996; Leonard 
& Swap, 1999; Simonton, 1999), the logic that underlies network research has been applied 
to the context of individual-level creativity in organizations (Perry-Smith, 2006; Perry-Smith 
& Shalley, 2003; Shalley et al., 2004).   
Specifically, those actors that connect otherwise disconnected people in the 
network—that is, brokers connected across structural holes—have been argued to benefit 
from information control, first access to non-redundant information, and, in turn, better 
opportunities to recombine ideas (Burt, 1992, 2004; Fleming et al., 2007). In other words, 
because of the nature of her ties, an employee that links several otherwise disconnected 
employees has access to more non-redundant information than an employee linking a small 
number of otherwise disconnected actors. Disconnected actors, in fact, are assumed to belong 
to distant social worlds, and hence to possess distinct knowledge and information (Borgatti & 
Halgin, 2011; Granovetter, 1973). Further, research highlights that access to non-redundant 
information and novel combinations of that information is a fundamental ingredient of 
creativity (Amabile, 1996; Burt, 2004; Fleming et al., 2007; Perry-Smith, 2006; Rodan & 
Galunic, 2004; Simonton, 1999). Thus, since employees that link otherwise disconnected 
others have more opportunities to obtain non-redundant information, and since access to non-
redundant information is a fundamental driver of creativity, brokered social structures are 
more likely than cohesive social structures to lead to individual-level creativity (Borgatti & 
Halgin, 2011; Brass, 1995; Burt, 2004; Fleming et al., 2007; Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001).  
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 However, the idea that attention and rationality are bounded, and hence that 
individuals can only meaningfully process limited amounts of information (Dearborn and 
Simon, 1958; Ocasio, 1997, 2011; Simon, 1955, 1978) suggests that brokers are also exposed 
to the cognitive costs that come with their specific positioning in the social structure. The 
higher the number of ties bridging structural holes, the higher the volume of non-redundant 
information that can be transferred through those ties, and, in turn, the greater the cognitive 
load involved in processing that information. Additionally, research indicates that the 
exploitation of new knowledge is in part a function of the amount of prior related knowledge 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Obstfeld, 2005). People normally learn new ideas by means of 
associating those ideas with their preexisting knowledge. Thus, it is more difficult to process 
non-redundant knowledge that originates from nodes belonging to distant social worlds 
(Reagans & McEvily, 2003). In other words, because of their specific position in the social 
structure, brokers get access to novel information that is at the same time very valuable, and 
yet difficult to process.  
Given the limited absorptive capabilities of individuals, and the higher complexity 
associated with the processing of non-redundant information, we expect that the realization of 
the potential for creative outputs of brokers is contingent on their ability to process the 
information that flows through their network ties. That is, there should be a trade-off between 
information load and processing capacity resulting in different levels of creativity. 
Specifically, we investigate a curvilinear relation between brokerage and creativity: our thesis 
is that too few or too many ties linking otherwise disconnected nodes in the network may not 
result in high creativity levels.  
Nodes linking otherwise disconnected others get access to different knowledge and 
perspectives. Thus, more ties of that type should provide access to more sources of novel 
information, and hence higher creativity (Burt, 1992). However, there may be a point of 
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diminishing returns on the number of ties linking otherwise disconnected others. Clearly, 
nodes that are connecting few otherwise disconnected others will only have access to little 
non-redundant information. On the other hand, nodes that are connecting too many otherwise 
disconnected others are likely to experience information overload. Too much non-redundant 
information may be cognitively demanding to the point that the focal employee may 
experience confusion, and this in turn would negatively impact on her likelihood of being 
creative (Ward, Smith & Finke, 1999). Additionally, establishing and maintaining social 
relationships are costly activities, and the amount of time and attention that the focal node 
can dedicate to her contacts is likely to decrease after the number of contacts exceeds some 
optimal level (McFadyen & Cannella, 2004; Zhou et al., 2009). Hence,  
Hypothesis 1: There is a curvilinear relation between brokerage and creativity 
such that employees exhibit greater creativity when bridging is at intermediate 
levels than when it is at lower or higher levels.  
The Importance of Attention  
 A great deal of research has been dedicated to the idea of attention in organization 
science (Ocasio, 2011). Attention shapes organizational actors’ judgments and behaviors 
(Dane, 2013). Individual-level attention—the “noticing and focusing of time and effort on 
both the environmental stimuli requiring action and the available repertoire of responses 
which define that action” (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001: 415; Ocasio, 1997)—is a scarce 
resource, and boundedly rational actors can only allocate a limited amount of attention to a 
given number of activities (March & Simon, 1958; Ocasio, 2011; Simon, 1978). Further, 
information “consumes the attention of its recipients” (Simon, 1971: 40), and limited 
attention inhibits accurate information processing (Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 1955). Brokers are 
exposed to high volumes of novel information. Thus, it is particularly important for them to 
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avoid factors that may weaken their ability to attentively process the information that flows 
through their network ties.  
Aside from individual-specific differences, an employee’s attention is influenced by a 
firm’s activities, procedures, and environmental contingencies (Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren 
1990; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Ocasio, 1997). In particular, employees are exposed to 
environmental stressors such as noise and disturbance in the workplace, and these have been 
shown to hinder information processing, memory and overall performance (Boggs & Simon, 
1968; Hartley, 1973; Rotton, Olszewski, Charleton & Soler, 1978; Szalma & Hancock, 2011).  
Noise and disruption influence the attention that brokers can allocate to the processing 
of the information that—because of their network position—they get access to. As a result, 
brokers that are exposed to different levels of environmental stressors are not equally 
efficient with respect to making the most out of their structural opportunities. The above 
arguments suggest that the curvilinear relation between brokerage and creativity (H1) is 
contingent on the focal employee’s attention. Although intermediate levels of brokerage 
provide the focal actor with the opportunity to make the most out of her structural position (in 
terms of creativity outputs), this relation is subject to the extent to which that actor can 
carefully attend to the information that flows through her ties. High attention will allow the 
focal employee to better deal with the processing of non-redundant information. Additionally, 
high attention should also push the focal employee’s absorptive limitations a bit further in the 
sense of allowing her to successfully deal with higher amounts of non-redundant information. 
On the other hand, brokers with low attention levels will encounter problems both in 
recognizing the possibility to obtain non-redundant information from their contacts, and in 
processing that information. For this reason, we expect the curvilinear relation between 
brokerage and creativity to be contingent on the focal employee’s attentional capability. 
Hence,  
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Hypothesis 2: The curvilinear relation between brokerage and creativity (H1) 
is contingent on the broker’s attention: Intermediate levels of brokerage result 
in higher creativity when the broker’s attention is high than when it is low.  
METHODS 
Data Collection and Research Site 
We collected data on behavior of employees in a single firm in order to keep constant 
external factors and firm-varying factors that might affect the creativity of employees. This 
implies that the variation we observe in individual-level employee creativity should be 
explained by factors at lower level than the firm-level, for example, at the level of the 
individual, the network or the department.  
The firm that formed the site for our data collection is FeF Chemicals, a highly 
specialized, international chemical firm (with 120 employees) that focuses on manufacturing 
and supply of Quaternary Ammonium Compounds (Quats) for pharmaceutical and personal 
care products. FeF Chemicals is a highly vertically integrated firm that covers large parts of 
the value chain, including Research and Development, Quality Assurance, Regulatory Affairs, 
Production and Environment, and Sales and Customer Service. However, all activities are co-
located on the same site. The close vicinity of the activities is seen as of central importance 
by the firm, which puts strong emphasis on creating the best possible conditions for 
promoting knowledge sharing and creativity among employees. 
The data collection was conducted in close collaboration with the firm. At the time of 
the data collection effort (early 2012), FeF Chemical was planning a major reorganization, 
and was interested in learning more about the determinants of employee creativity and 
knowledge sharing in order to factor this insight into the reorganization of the firm. The firm 
provided full access to all employees and managers for the purpose of the survey, as well as 
for the purpose of conducting interviews. 
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In March 2012, a web-based questionnaire was distributed to all 120 employees. The 
invitation to respond to the questionnaire was uploaded on the front-page of the intra-net of 
the firm with a link to the used survey-instrument. In addition, all employees in the firm 
received a personal email from the CEO and HR Director urging them to respond to the 
questionnaire. After one week, a reminder was submitted to all employees that had not 
responded. Before closing the survey, these employees were given one more week to respond 
to the questionnaire. A total of 80 employees answered and returned the questionnaire, which 
corresponds to a response rate of 67 percent. However, because of missing values (in 
particular, on the network-related questions), the sample size was further reduced: 68 
responses were used in the final data analysis (i.e., a final response rate of 57 percent). 
In addition to the questionnaire submitted individually to all employees, we also 
submitted a shortened version of it to all managers in the firm that had employees referring 
directly to them. The managers were asked to assess the behavioral variables (including 
creativity and knowledge sharing) of each employee that referred to them. We approached 15 
managers, and 12 of them provided their assessment of behavior for a total of 87 employees 
(i.e., 73 percent of all employees in the firm). For 45 employees of those 68 whose responses 
we use in this research we received both individual self-assessment of behavior, and the 
manager’s assessments of (the same) behavior.  
Although we have a high response rate (of 57 percent), we examined the risk of 
nonresponse bias in different ways. First, we discussed the results and demographic 
breakdown of respondents (e.g., on age, education, tenure, gender) with firm representatives 
that assured us that there were no visible biases differentiating those responding to the survey 
from the overall distribution of employees in terms of demography. Furthermore, we 
conducted a wave analysis in terms of comparing the demographic variables for early (1st 
week) and late (2nd week) respondents (Rogelberg and Stanton, 2007). The assumption here 
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is that the group of late respondents will be more similar to the nonresponding group than the 
group of early respondents. However, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the difference in 
means for the two groups for the demographic variables showed that the hypotheses of 
differences in the means can all be rejected (F-values < 2). These tests together with the high 
response rate make us confident that our data do not suffer from major problems of 
nonresponse bias.  
Measures 
In addition to employees’ demographic and relational (network) information, the 
survey data includes individual employees’ self-reported perceptions, their self-assessment of 
behavior, and managers’ assessment of employee behavior. Specifically, each employee 
provided perceptual responses on a number of items related to work motivation and 
collaborative climate, as well as self-assessment of their knowledge sharing and creative 
behaviors. Additionally, these employee behaviors were also assessed by managers.  
All the applied variables in our model were operationalized through the self-reported 
employee survey in order to maximize the number of included observations. Although such 
measures have well-known weaknesses—for example, that individuals may have biased 
perceptions, and biased views on their actual behavior—they remain the accepted way of 
capturing perceptions and behaviors among employees (Howard, 1994).  
Common method bias is an obvious limitation of such measures. However, the 
questionnaire consisted of different scales and some of them were reversed, which diminishes 
the risk of biases. In addition, we performed a number of statistical analyses to assess the 
severity of common method bias. First, a Harman’s one-factor test on the items indicated that 
common methods bias was not a major issue. That is, multiple factors were detected and the 
variance did not merely stem from the first factors (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). In fact, the 
nine variables included in the model (listed in Table 1) form several factors with an 
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eigenvalue > 1, and the first two factors only capture 24 percent and 18 percent of the total 
variance, respectively. Second, we ran a confirmatory factor analysis including all the 
underlying 25 items (that together form the nine variables) loaded on the same factor (a 
Single Factor Model). The assumption is that the existence of a single factor that is the 
common denominator across all items reflects the presence of a common method bias 
(Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003). However, in our case the goodness-of-fit 
statistics is highly unsatisfactory for the Single Factor Model capturing the common method 
bias (RMSEA = 0.19, GFI = 0.47, and NFI = 0.23), which indicates that we do not have a 
major problem of common method bias in the data. Third, the fact that for the dependent 
variable (creative behavior) we can match individual employee self-assessments with 
managers’ assessment for the same individuals allows us to test for inter-rater reliability. 
When conducting this type inter-rater reliability tests we obtain high and satisfactory values 
for the Kappa-coefficient which is a measure of the agreement between the two raters (Gwet, 
2010). This comparison further indicates that our data does not suffer from common methods 
bias.  
These statistical tests do not eliminate the threat of common method bias. However, 
they suggest that our results are not driven predominantly by common method variance. 
Moreover, our results are based on complex estimations that involve multiple independent 
variables and a squared term. It has been argued that it is highly unlikely that the results of 
such models emerge solely as a result of common methods bias (Evans, 1985; Siemsen, Roth 
& Oliveira, 2010). Finally, while management urged employees to respond to the 
questionnaire in order to reduce potential social desirability bias, respondents were ensured 
that the survey software prevented identification of the individual employee. The applied 
survey instrument, surveyXact, and the server was located outside the firm, and all 
questionnaires were returned directly to the researchers. Only aggregate-level data was 
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reported back to the firm. Employees’ knowledge of this further reduces the likelihood of 
biased responses (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  
Most measures used in this study were adapted from existing scales. For reflective 
multi-item variables a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to test for reliability.  
Dependent Variable  
Creativity is a multi-item measure that is based on the employees’ self-assessment of 
their creative behavior. Individual employees were asked to indicate on a seven-point scale (1 
= completely disagree and 7 = fully agree) their assessment concerning the following 
questions on creative behavior (four items adapted from Zhou & George, 2001; see also 
George & Zhou, 2001): “I provide new ideas to improve the department’s performance”, “I 
suggest new ways to increase quality”, “I suggest new ways of optimizing processes and 
routines” and “I come up with creative solutions to emerging problems.” The obtained 
Cronbach alpha-value for this construct was 0.83, and in the confirmatory factor analysis the 
construct obtained strong reliability, with values of 0.82 for composite reliability and 0.53 for 
average variance extracted (AVE). All these measures indicate that the construct is highly 
reliable and characterized by convergent validity.  
In addition, managers have been asked to assess each employee on the same seven-
point scale for three out of the four items listed above, namely: “The employee provides new 
ideas to improve the department’s performance”, “The employee suggests new ways to 
increase quality” and “The employee comes up with creative solutions to emerging problems.” 
For 45 employees we could match the responses from employees and managers. When 
conducting the inter-rater reliability analysis on these three items we found a Kappa-
coefficient of 0.56, 0.64 and 0.59, respectively, which is highly satisfactory (Gwet, 2010). 
The average level of creativity is 5.7 for the self-assessment of the 68 employees, 
which seems relatively high on the seven-point scale. However, the managers’ assessment of 
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the creative behavior of the employees was on the same high level with an average of 5.5. 
The reason for the high average value is that it is mainly the upper part of the seven-point 
scale that has been applied in the assessment both by employees and by their managers. 
However, there is still substantial variation around the median value of 5.5 in employees’ 
assessment of their creative behavior.  
Independent Variables  
Brokerage. Each individual was asked to point to maximum ten colleagues (indicating 
their name and department) in FeF with whom they had communicated on work-related 
issues in the last year. On average, respondents listed 9 network relations providing us with a 
total of 953 relationships. Based on this information, we created a matrix on the network 
relations (relation or not = 1/0) among the 105 employees that have either responded 
themselves, or have been listed by others. We included the undirected ties (i.e., both the ties 
mentioned by the focal respondent itself, and the ties to the focal respondent mentioned by 
others) as all ties might be vehicles for creative behavior. Brokerage is measured as 
betweenness centrality. An actor’s betweenness centrality (Freeman, 1979; Wasserman and 
Faust, 1994) captures the volume of traffic in a network “moving from each node to every 
other node that would pass through a given node” whose centrality is being measured 
(Borgatti, 2005: 60). Betweenness centrality is calculated in UCINET (version 6.436) for 
each employee as the number of times the focal employee acts as a bridge along the shortest 
path between two other employees. The value of betweenness centrality varies between 0 and 
8.66, but with a median value of 2. The squared value of betweenness centrality is added in 
some of the models in order to test the proposed non-linear relationship between brokerage 
and creativity. 
Attention, the “focused mental engagement on a particular item of information” 
(Davenport & Beck, 2001: 20, Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001), is a multi-item measure capturing 
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the employees’ perception of their ability to attend to work-related tasks. The individual 
employees were asked to indicate on a seven-point scale (1 = completely disagree and 7 = 
fully agree) their assessment on the following items (adapted from Lee and Brand, 2005): “It 
is possible for me to concentrate in my office”, “I have sufficient possibilities for avoiding 
disturbances in my office” and “There is only limited noise in my office”. The obtained 
Cronbach alpha-value for this construct was 0.88, and in the confirmatory factor analysis the 
construct obtained strong reliability, with values of 0.88 for composite reliability and 0.72 for 
average variance extracted (AVE). These measures suggest that the construct is highly 
reliable and characterized by convergent validity.  
Control Variables 
Tie strength. An important debate on social capital has been looking at different 
benefits of sparse and dense networks (e.g., Fleming et al., 2007; Obstfeld, 2005). While 
sparse networks present an opportunity for accessing non-redundant information and in turn 
generating new ideas (Burt, 1992, 2004), cohesive structures may foster creativity in other 
ways. In particular, cohesive structures may lead to higher trust and better information flow 
because of the redundant and strong ties that tend to develop in such structures (Coleman, 
1988; Reagans & McEvily, 2003). This facilitates knowledge sharing, which in turn may 
enhance creativity (Fleming, Mingo & Chen, 2007; Milliken, Bartel, & Kurtzberg, 2003). 
Thus, we controlled for tie strength as a potential alternative driver of employee creativity.  
While tie strength has previously been dichotomized into strong and weak (e.g., Zhou 
et. al, 2009), we follow the recent line of research that treats it as a continuous variable 
(Anderson, 2008; Hansen, Mors & Lovas, 2005). Specifically, tie strength was 
operationalized as an index of three formative items measuring frequency of communication, 
closeness of relationship, and duration of relationship (Anderson, 2008). For each tie listed, 
employees responded to these three items. The item for frequency of communication was: 
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“How often do you communicate with this person on work-related issues?” and it was 
measured on a nine-point scale with endpoints anchors being “never” (= 1) to “multiple times 
a day” (= 9). The closeness item was: “How close is your relation with this colleague?” and 
was measured on a seven-point scale (1 = very distant and 7 = very close). The item for 
duration was: “How many years have you known this colleague?” and it was measured as 
intervals on a six-point scale (1 = less than six months and 6 = more than 10 years). The three 
items were standardized and averaged in order to create an index of tie strength for each 
employee. The correlations between the items in this index were as follows: frequency and 
closeness were significantly correlated (r = 0.37, p = 0.002), while duration was 
insignificantly related with both frequency (r = -0.03, p = 0.80) and closeness (r = -0.19, p = 
0.12). Given that tie strength is theoretically argued to be a construct based on these 
formative indicators, the low correlation among the items does not weaken the properties of 
the construct (cf. Anderson, 2008).  
Tacitness of knowledge. For each tie listed, the respondents were asked to indicate on 
a seven-point scale: “To what extent is the communication with this person about codified 
knowledge [= 1] or tacit knowledge [= 7]”. This variable controls for the different effects that 
the character of the exchanged knowledge may have on creativity, where exchange of tacit 
knowledge is expected to be more valuable and conducive of creative behavior (Lam, 2000).  
Outflow of knowledge. We hypothesized a curvilinear effect of brokerage on 
creativity (H1) based on a bounded rationality logic. Brokers that are exposed to too much 
non-redundant information may experience cognitive overload, and this in turn would 
negatively impact on their likelihood of being creative. Although we do not exclude the 
possibility that brokers may experience overload because of the combination of knowledge 
inflow and outflow, it seems natural to suppose that overload is mainly driven by an 
excessive intake of information. We thus wanted to rule out the possibility that our brokerage 
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measure captures scenarios where the broker is highly engaged in sending out (rather than 
receiving) information. For this reason, we control for knowledge outflow.  
The level of knowledge outflow was captured through four items where each 
employee was asked to indicate the degree to which “colleagues in your department have 
received work-related knowledge transferred by you”, “colleagues in your department have 
made use of work-related knowledge transferred by you”, “colleagues in other departments in 
FeF have received work-related knowledge transferred by you”, and “colleagues in other 
departments in FeF have made use of work-related knowledge transferred by you”. All four 
items were measured on a seven-point scale (1 = very limited extent and 7 = very high 
extent) and added together to form an index variable for outflow of knowledge (Alpha = 0.90, 
CR = 0.88, AVE = 0.65).  
Autonomous work motivation. Self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan, 2000; 
Ryan and Deci, 2000) posits that motivation differs in terms of how autonomous it is. 
Autonomously motivated individuals see their behavior as one that is self-endorsed and 
congruent with their own interests and values (Weinstein and Ryan, 2010). Individuals, 
however, can also be motivated in a controlled way. When this is the case, the feeling is one 
of pressure, and tasks are performed because of some external end (Deci and Ryan, 1985). 
Autonomous motivation in the workplace leads to higher behavioral effort and persistence 
(Ryan and Deci, 2000), and is a fundamental driver of creativity (Amabile, 1983, 1986; 
Amabile et al., 1996; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Mumford & Hunter, 2005). The variable 
of autonomous work motivation is based on five items (scale from Ryan and Connell, 1989; 
Gagné, Forest, Gilbert, Aube, Morin and Malorni, 2010) that form a strong construct (Alpha 
= 0.88, CR = 0.88, AVE = 0.61): “I make an effort in my job because the tasks I work on is 
exciting”, “… because my job is interesting”, “… because I find it personally satisfactory”, 
“… because I feel good when I conduct my work”, and “… because I like to conduct my 
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work.” All the items were measured on a seven-point scale (1 = very limited extent and 7 = 
very high extent).  
Collaborative climate. Research also highlights that contextual and environmental 
factors have an impact on employees’ creativity. Specifically, a work environment where 
collaboration, communication, and mutual respect are promoted may reinforce feelings of 
reciprocity and cohesiveness, which in turn may facilitate the development of informal 
relationships, knowledge transfer and, eventually, creativity (Mumford & Hunter, 2005). 
Collaborative climate consists of three items (scale from Ramaswami, 1996) that perform 
very well in forming a strong construct (Alpha = 0.83, CR = 0.83, AVE = 0.63): “Managers 
invite for collaboration among employees”, “…for a climate where employees respect each 
other”, and “…for work-related discussions.” All the items were measured on a seven-point 
scale (1 = very limited extent and 7 = very high extent).  
Tenure. Finally, experience has been argued to provide people with more complete 
cognitive structures and knowledge bases that enable them to successfully process and 
recombine the available information into creative thoughts (Mumford & Hunter, 2005). We 
thus included tenure of the employee to tease out the variation in creativity that may be 
driven by work experience. This variable is a single item measure where respondents were 
asked: “How many years have you worked in the firm?”  
RESULTS 
The correlation matrix is shown in Table 1, which includes descriptive statistics for all 
variables. None of the independent variables have correlations that indicate problems of 
multicollinearity, as all of the correlations among the independent variables are below the 
commonly accepted threshold of 0.4. The highest correlation among the independent 
variables is found between brokerage and tie strength (r = -0.38, p = 0.01), which is not 
surprising as sparse social structures rich in structural holes tend to be characterized by the 
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presence of weak ties between the nodes (therefore the negative coefficient). It is also 
noteworthy that the correlation of brokerage and outflow of knowledge (r = 0.36, p = 0.01) is 
highly significant, indicating that a brokerage position does not just entail inflow of 
knowledge, but typically also involves outflow of knowledge. This is consistent with the idea 
that knowledge exchanges are typically not one-way streets, but rather interactive and 
bidirectional processes where information is acquired, processed, and also shared by the 
parties involved in the exchange.  
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
Insert Table 1 here 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
We ran hierarchical regression to test the proposed hypotheses. Several checks were 
done to verify that the assumptions of the regression model were met, including examining 
variance inflation factor (VIF) values (where highest value obtained in Model 1 is 1.37), 
residual plots, and normal probability plots of the residuals. Model 1 is our base-line model 
that includes the main effects of our two hypothesized variables—brokerage and attention—
and the six control variables. In Model 2 we add the squared term of brokerage to test the 
curvilinear relationship proposed in Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 is tested in Model 3, where 
the sample is split into those observations with low versus high attention.  
    The results are presented in Table 2. It appears from Model 1 that the included 
variables explain no less than 43% of the variation in creative behavior (F  =  5.46, p = 0.01). 
This is due to the significant effects of autonomous motivation, outflow of knowledge and 
tacitness of knowledge, and to the relatively high ratio of explanatory variables to 
observations in the dataset. It is further noticeable that brokerage does not have a significant 
impact on creativity. This might be due to the fact that more bridging provides access to more 
information which is valuable, and yet at the same time difficult to process. However, when 
the squared term of brokerage is introduced in Model 2 both the first order and second order 
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effect of brokerage becomes significant. Specifically, the first order effect turns positive (β = 
0.24, p = 0.05) and the second order effect turns negative (β = -0.04, p = 0.01), while the 
other variables basically remain the same. This is also reflected in the increase in R-square 
from 0.43 to 0.49, and in the significant F-test for increment in the R-square (F = 6.82, p = 
0.01). All in all, Model 2 provides support for Hypothesis 1 that brokers exhibit greater 
creativity when they are bridging an intermediate (as opposed to low or high) number of 
otherwise disconnected nodes in the network.  
The sample split in Model 3 allows us to test the model for the employees with low 
attention versus those with high attention. The sample is split according to the median where 
all employees with a value below 5 on the attention scale is categorized as low attention and 
those equal to or higher than 5 as high attention. An analysis of variance of the differences in 
the means of creativity for the two groups indicate that there is no significant difference in 
the level of creativity for the two groups (F = 0.02, p = 0.89) as the means are 5.70 and 5.73 
for the low and high attention group respectively. In other words, employees with low 
attention are as creative as employees with high attention (which is also the reason why the 
attention variable is insignificant in Model 1 and 2).  
It appears from Model 3 that both first and second order effects of brokerage are 
insignificant for those employees with low attention. In other words, brokerage has no effect 
on creativity when the broker’s attention is in the low end of the scale. On the other hand, in 
the high attention group, both the first order and second order effects are significant with the 
first order effect being positive (β = 0.46, p = 0.01) and second order effects being negative 
(β = -0.07, p = 0.01). It is striking that we get the same curvilinear relation for the high 
attention group in Model 3 as we did for all employees in Model 2. However, the coefficients 
are much higher for the high attention group in Model 3 than for all employees in Model 2. 
This is illustrated in Figure 1, where the obtained coefficients are applied to portray the 
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relationship between brokerage and creativity for both all employees, and for those 
employees in the high attention group only. The maximum effect of brokerage on creativity 
that is obtained for all employees is 0.39, while it is double as high (0.78) for the group of 
high attention employees. Taken together, these results provide support for Hypothesis 2 on 
the relation between brokerage on creativity being contingent on brokers’ attention.  
Among the control variables, autonomous motivation is consistently significant over 
all the presented models. This confirms that employees’ own internal motivation is indeed of 
high importance for creative behaviors (Amabile, 1983, 1986; Mumford & Hunter, 2005). 
Similarly, tacitness of knowledge is also significant in most of the presented models. This 
again is not surprising, as tacit knowledge has been theorized to be conducive to creativity 
(Lam, 2000). Our results on outflow of knowledge, however, may seem to be less intuitive. 
Outflow of knowledge is positively related to creativity. Although the nature of our data does 
not allow us to substantiate the direction of causality, a possible explanation could be that 
creative people have more valuable ideas, and are therefore recognized as valuable source of 
information in the organization. For this reason, we could expect highly creative people to be 
approached by many colleagues in search of advice or information, and thus to have high 
knowledge outflow levels.  
Finally, a number of robustness checks were conducted in order to validate the results. 
The models were tested while excluding the three observations with a brokerage value above 
5 as these might be considered outliers, but the results qualitatively remained the same. We 
also conducted different splits between the low and high attention group—e.g., with the value 
4 as the dividing point (instead of the median of 5)—but the results remained the same.  
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
What drives individual-level employee creativity? We consider two constructs—
brokerage and attention—that both influence creativity in the workplace. Brokerage captures 
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a node’s access to otherwise disconnected nodes, and, in turn, her access to non-redundant 
information. Attention captures an employee’s capacity for cognitively attending to that 
information. Our research highlights that brokerage opportunities together with the possibility 
to focus and concentrate in the workplace are critical parts of an answer to this question.  
 Access to non-redundant information is a fundamental ingredient of creativity 
(Amabile, 1996; Simonton, 1999). Ceteris paribus, employees that link otherwise 
disconnected others in a network get access to more non-redundant information, and are thus 
expected to be more creative than employees that do not have this structural opportunity 
(Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; Fleming et al., 2007). This research, however, does not show a 
linear relation between brokerage and creativity (cf. Zhou et al., 2009), but rather a 
curvilinear one. This finding is consistent with the idea that, because of bounds in human 
rationality, the benefit of having access to non-redundant information can, after a certain 
point, be outweighed by the cognitive costs of managing that information. Given the 
importance of creativity in organizations (Amabile, 1996; Ford, 1996), this research was 
aimed at better understanding how bounds on human rationality impact on the relation 
between brokerage and individual-level creativity in the workplace.  
 In line with limited information-processing capability arguments (Simon, 1978), we 
proposed that there is a point of diminishing returns where too many ties bridging otherwise 
disconnected nodes in a network become difficult to manage for the focal employee. Further, 
we took an attention-based perspective (March and Simon, 1958; Ocasio 1997, 2011), and 
proposed attention as a fundamental contingency factor that determines whether a broker can 
benefit from her position in the social structure. We find that employees exhibit higher 
creativity when their brokerage levels are intermediate, and that this relation is contingent on 
the possibility for the broker to focus and concentrate in the workplace. This finding is 
interesting, as previous research on the network antecedents of creativity has looked at the 
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effects of structural (Burt, 1992, 2004), and more recently psychological (e.g., Fleming et al., 
2007; Rodan & Galunic, 2004) factors without addressing the extent to which these effects 
are impacted by employees’ cognitive and attentional limitations.  
 The main insight of this research is that network-driven opportunities for being 
creative in the workplace are constrained by bounds in human rationality. Thus, the 
possibility to dedicate attention to the processing of the information that flows through a 
brokered social structure is a crucial factor that decides whether the opportunity to link 
otherwise disconnected others results in creative behaviors. With these findings we contribute 
to two main areas of research. First, by looking at how social structure and attention combine 
in predicting creativity in organizations we confirm Adler and Kwon’s insight that: “The 
mere fact of a tie implies little about the likelihood that social capital effects will materialize” 
(2002: 25), and contribute to research in network theory that emphasizes the importance of 
looking at social relationships together with psychological mechanisms (e.g., Adler and 
Kwon 2002, Anderson 2008, Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994, Mehra et al. 2001). Second, we 
contribute to research looking at network structures as predictors of creativity in 
organizations (e.g., Fleming et al., 2007; Perry-Smith, 2006; Perry-Smith & Shalley, 2003). 
Controlling for factors that have already been shown to be conducive to creativity such as 
autonomous work motivation, a collaborative climate, and work experience, we find that the 
potential of brokerage needs to be considered together with psychological factors.  
 The contributions of this study should be considered in light of its limitations. First, 
we rely on cross-sectional data. Thus, the direction of causality in our model cannot be fully 
ascertained. That is, while we argue in the direction from brokerage and attention to 
creativity, it is also possible to hypothesize alternative causal explanations. For example, it 
could be argued that our creativity measure reflects pre-existing individual characteristics: 
People that are very creative may tend to place themselves in social contexts where they 
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know that they can interact with people pertaining to distant social worlds, and hence obtain 
novel information. However, our arguments run in the opposite direction because abundant 
research highlights that creativity is indeed a malleable characteristic that is influenced by 
personal and contextual factors (Amabile, 1983, 1986; Mumford & Hunter, 2005; Shalley et 
al., 2004). This notwithstanding, additional research based on experimental or longitudinal 
data is needed to confirm the direction of causality that we propose in our model.  
 Second, attention involves the focusing of mindfulness and energy on a limited 
number of elements at a time. Focused attention eases perception and action towards those 
elements being attended to (Kahneman, 1973). Thus, employees that selectively focus their 
attention on opportunities for being creative in the workplace may benefit from a brokerage 
position even with relatively low attention levels. We control for environmental, individual, 
and organizational factors that may influence an employee’s ability to attend to tasks. 
However, we do not look at mechanisms of selective attention allocation. In other words, we 
assume that low overall attention also means low attention that is dedicated to information 
processing.  
Finally, our results also carry important managerial implications. In order to stimulate 
employee creativity in the workplace, managers need not only to ensure that employees 
develop intermediate numbers of ties bridging structural holes, but they also need to protect 
employees’ attention in the workplace. This defines an important role for the numerous 
factors that may influence the attention that employees allocate to their tasks and behaviors—
for example, the way in which the office space is designed (e.g., open-space versus closed 
offices), the way in which communication is carried out, or the scheduling of meetings that 
may have an impact on the normal workflow. Thus, a better understanding of how structural 
and attentional factors combine in fostering individual-level creativity in the workplace not 
only enriches our theoretical understanding of this fundamentally important behavior, but 
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also provides managers with refined guidance for value creation. We trust that the analysis 
presented here will encourage future developments of this important path towards a better 
understanding of how rational limitations and structural factors combine in determining 
individual-level creativity in the workplace.  
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Figure 1.  Relation between brokerage and creativity   
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Table 1: Correlation matrix (n = 68)* 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
1) Creativity 
2) Brokerage 
3) Attention 
4) Tie strength 
5) Tacitness of knowledge 
6) Outflow of knowledge 
7) Autonomous motivation 
8) Collaborative climate 
9) Tenure 
 
1.00 
0.04 
0.02 
-0.04 
0.22 
0.31 
0.47 
0.37 
0.22 
 
 
1.00 
0.01 
-0.38 
-0.14 
0.36 
0.03 
-0.03 
-0.15 
 
 
 
1.00 
0.07 
0.11 
-0.06 
-0.01 
0.07 
-0.01 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
0.23 
-0.17 
-0.20 
-0.01 
0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
-0.02 
-0.05 
-0.03 
-0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
0.22 
0.19 
0.03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
0.37 
0.14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
0.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
 
Mean 
Std. dev. 
 
Min. values 
Max. values 
 
 
5.71 
0.69 
 
4 
7 
 
2.20 
1.83 
 
0 
8.66 
 
5.00 
1.49 
 
1 
7 
 
0 
0.61 
 
-1.40 
1.53 
 
4.80 
0.88 
 
2.4 
7 
 
5.21 
1.27 
 
1 
7 
 
6.2 
0.65 
 
3.8 
7 
 
5.72 
0.99 
 
2 
7 
 
8.33 
6.93 
 
0 
29 
 
*All coefficients above |0.30| are significant at 5% significance level 
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Table 2: Hierarchical regression results (n = 68)* 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 Model 3 
Low attention High attention 
Attention 
 
 
Brokerage 
 
 
Brokerage*Brokerage 
 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.10) 
0.42* 
(0.20) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.24** 
(0.10) 
 
-0.40 
(0.24) 
0.46*** 
(0.15) 
 
 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.10 
(0.07) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
Controls 
 
Tie strength 
 
 
Tacitness of knowledge 
 
 
Outflow of knowledge 
 
 
Autonomous work motivation 
 
 
Collaborative climate 
 
 
Tenure 
    
 
0.08 
(0.13) 
 
0.18** 
(0.08) 
 
0.16*** 
(0.06) 
 
0.37*** 
(0.12) 
 
0.12 
(0.08) 
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
 
0.05 
(0.12) 
 
0.21*** 
(0.08) 
 
0.14** 
(0.06) 
 
0.33*** 
(0.11) 
 
0.16** 
(0.07) 
 
0.01* 
(0.01) 
 
0.11 
(0.15) 
 
0.13 
(0.13) 
 
-0.01 
(0.09) 
 
0.62** 
(0.24) 
 
-0.01 
(0.14) 
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
 
-0.15 
(0.22) 
 
0.17* 
(0.10) 
 
0.21*’ 
(0.08) 
 
0.28** 
(0.13) 
 
0.13 
(0.09) 
 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Intercept  1.03 
(0.83) 
0.76 
(0.80) 
1.23 
(1.30) 
-1.81 
(1.59) 
N 
F-value 
R-square 
 
F-tests of increment in R-square 
 
Maximum point 
68 
5.46*** 
0.43 
 
 
 
68 
6.16*** 
0.49 
 
6.82*** 
 
(3.21, 0.39) 
33 
3.23** 
0.56 
 
 
 
 
35 
6.38*** 
0.70 
 
 
 
(3.38, 0.78) 
 
***, ** and * indicates a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively	  
 
 
